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A Journal of the
John W. McCormack
Institute of Public Affairs

University of Massachusetts Boston

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The John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs is named for the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives from 1962 to 1971. John W. McCormack was born in South Boston, less than a mile from the University of Massachusetts Boston, Harbor Campus. The McCormack Institute represents the university's commitment to applied policy research — particularly on issues of concern to New England — and to public affairs education and public service.

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Editor's Note

Padraig O'Malley

On April 23, 1993, the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs celebrated its tenth anniversary. To mark the occasion, the Institute established the John Joseph Moakley Award for Distinguished Public Service, which will be awarded annually to a man or woman whose contribution to the public good merits our most grateful acknowledgment. The first recipient of the award was Congressman John Joseph Moakley, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, one of the most powerful and influential positions in Congress.

Among those who paid tribute to Congressman Moakley were Michael E. Haynes, Minister, Twelfth Baptist Church, Boston; Raymond G. Torto, Director, John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs; Raymond L. Flynn, Mayor of Boston; Sherry H. Penney, Chancellor, University of Massachusetts Boston; Michael K. Hooker, President, University of Massachusetts; the Honorable David E. Bonior, Majority Whip, U.S. House of Representatives; the Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., former Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives; the Honorable William M. Bulger, President, Massachusetts Senate; the Honorable Charles F. Flaherty, Speaker, Massachusetts House of Representatives; and Duncan Nelson, Poet Laureate and Professor of English, University of Massachusetts Boston.

In place of our usual Editor's Note, we reproduce here Professor Nelson's ode to the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs because we want to share its sentiments with you our readers, who continue to make possible the publication of the *New England Journal of Public Policy*.

**Lo and Behold!
Ten Years Old!**

O Muse Homeric, spread thy wing,
That I may of McCormack sing!
And Polyhymnia, tune thy lyre,
That I may strike ten-candled fire,
As we toast our host and give salute:
"Happy birthday, McCormack Institute!"

Padraig O'Malley is a senior fellow at the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, University of Massachusetts Boston.

How fortuitous, how fitting,
That this room where we're all sitting
Is in what we, with honor, call
John W. McCormack Hall!

You've risen, John, "through all the chairs"
To occupy your place upstairs!
Though Speaker now of that higher House,
In your eye this occasion must arouse
An appreciative gleam. You've had heaped on your
Head the praises of David Bonior;
Heard a "Tip"-top tribute from Thomas O'Neill;
Then a panegyric non-pareil
From the podium's prince, that effulgent indulger
Of wit-mixed-with-blarney, William M. Bulger!
And you've heard the acceptance of John Joseph Moakley —
Who has followed your lead, who gets things done *loc'lly*!
Now it's time for you to take pride in the worth
Of the Institute to which you gave birth,
To be pleased this hotbed of Public Affairs
Your eponymous imprimatur bears!

From the moment the Institute first appeared
From behind the mustache of Edmund Beard,
It has, almost to the point of confusion,
Grown high, wide, and handsome in fecund profusion!
Each independent Hydra's head —
The Resource Center for Higher Ed,
The *Journal of Public Policy*,
The M.S.P.A., the Ph.D.,
The special task force on FFP,
And many another entity —
Sprang Athena-like from Ed's head, as from Zeus! —
Reaping renown, *and* revenues!
Mary Grant's project, just one illustration,
Saved the commonwealth millions in "cost allocation."

So many to thank and to whom to say "Brava" —
Like Murray Frank and Sandy Matava!
We learn from Liz Sherman and Betty Taymor
How women in politics now get to *say* more!
Can't name all the names, though that's a great pity,
For it's time to get down to the nitty-gritty:
Time to clear up all mystery
As to the McCormack's history!

It began because Joe here, and Tip O'Neill,
Brian Donn'lly, Joe Early, the late great Sil,
Knew the ways of Congress and had the will
To push through an enabling bill
That provided a grant of *three mil*!
This got us going in eighty-four;
And in ninety-one we got three million more!
It's as simple as that, and we owe them a debt
That we on this campus shall never forget!

Since eighty-four is the year we begin,
It might be said we came in with Flynn!
Signing on for his fiscal task force,
Our Institute bet on a very good horse!
And seeing him here at this celebration,
On the eve of his imminent elevation,
The Institute wishes him well 'neath the dome,
And promises him — right here in this poem! —
When we've dealt with South Africa, Russia, and "Home
Rule" for Ireland, we'll help him with Rome!

Enough parenthetical exegesis.
Back I return to my central thesis.
Having these millions at his disposal,
Ed could beat Redford's *Indecent Proposal*!
With backing like that he could pick and choose,
And make people offers they "couldn't refuse"!
Since he wanted the best, was determined to have it,
He signed on Patterson, Morrissey, Slavet,
Torto, Lynton, Ellman, O'Malley,
Young, Gamson, Cardarelli, Natale;
And, in subsequent feeding frenzies,
Brought in Bluestone, Hogarty, Ferguson, Menzies!
And we mustn't forget who's responsible wholly
For this event, Kathleen Foley!
Our campus's loss was our country's gain
When Uncle Sam sicced her on Saddam Hussein!

So there you have it, while Brandeis, B.C.,
B.U., and Northeastern think globally,
And taking their cue from Harvard and Sloan,
Take on "The Big Picture," UMass stands alone —
Deals with local exposures, those miniature prints
Which, examined attentively, give huge hints
As to the *human* "wherefores"
Of famines, pollution, prejudice, wars.
The McCormack deals with the *local* matter,

With the *local* solution, which all the data
Stored up in the computer banks
Of all the great think tanks
Cannot get at. What we learn in school
Often misses what's real in its stress on "the rule"!

Illustrating which, here at my close,
I'll tell you a story — the story is Joe's!
And it concerns the way he bore
The cross of truth through El Salvador.
While diplomats drank tea in the villas,
Joe drove out to see the guerrillas.
Just as Virgil was Dante's guide through hell,
Joe's guide was Gomez, Leonel.
And the day they journeyed to Santa Marta
Will go down in that history as Magna Carta.
Villa Lobos, Canas, Hercules —
Without these men's trust there could never be *peace*.
Joe works *one* way — Southie, Salvador,
You shake every hand, go from door to door,
Drink what you're offered, eat native cake,
Sing a chorus of "Steve O'Donnell's Wake";
And mirabile dictu, ere he was done,
The process of peace had fairly begun!
By his actions, this one-man "Truth Commission"
Brought forth in that country the crucial condition —
True at all times and in all lands —
That to touch people's hearts you must touch people's hands!

We lift our glasses with one accord!
Joe, your virtues reach beyond reward.
You took on a country much ignored,
Which, touched by your hand, by the grace of the Lord,
Now hammers ploughshares out of the sword.
There as here, John Joseph, you are adored.

For the University of Massachusetts Boston
Duncan Nelson

The Influence of Europe on the Young JFK

Nigel Hamilton

I think that of all twentieth-century American presidents, John F. Kennedy is considered — by Europeans at least — to be the most Eurocentric in his sympathies and political orientation. In the days ahead we shall be reexamining the history of the Kennedy administration in relation to Europe, but before we do, I think it might help to know the true genesis of JFK's personal attitudes towards Europe, so that we may better understand his eventual role in the history of the early 1960s: culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis and his anti-Communist speech in Berlin in June 1963, as well as the Limited Test Ban treaty of the following month. As Mikhail Gorbachev recently remarked when addressing faculty and students at Harvard University, it was hard even for a Russian Communist in the early 1960s not to warm to the image of John F. Kennedy, to admire his social conscience, his idealism, and his youthful charisma.¹

That in itself is an extraordinary testimonial. Yet I wonder, candidly, whether there has ever been, in European history, a case quite like Kennedy's, where the father — who held the post of United States Ambassador to Britain at the time of Munich — should have become so universally detested as an appeaser, yet the son become so acclaimed as a crusading U.S. president, determined to defend Western European democracy at any price, only two decades later.

JFK, in his brief life, never did outgrow some of the grotesque attitudes of his father (causing European secret services many a headache), but by and large JFK moved so far away from his father's notorious World War II isolationism that I am often amazed at the paucity of historical attention paid to JFK's early years, in particular the failure of biographers and historians to chart the painful journey JFK was required to make in order to free himself from the stigma and the attitudes of a parent whom Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., characterized as "one of the most evil and disgusting men I have ever known."² Yet without understanding the nature and direction of that early voyage, I do not think we can ever do justice to the achievement of

Nigel Hamilton is a senior fellow and the John F. Kennedy Scholar at the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, University of Massachusetts Boston.

JFK, or be certain where he — as opposed to his advisers, speech writers, and aides — truly stood on the world historical issues of his presidency.

Appropriately, in terms of this conference, it was the burning question of Europe — and in particular Britain and Nazi Germany in the late 1930s and early 1940s — that became the pivotal point of JFK's student years. His father, the son of a Boston Irish barroom keeper, had made a fortune swindling on the stock exchange in the 1920s, and had then astutely backed Roosevelt's election as president in 1932.³ After a brief stint as chairman of the nascent SEC ("It takes a thief to catch a thief," President Roosevelt excused the appointment)⁴ and at the U.S. Maritime Commission, Joseph P. Kennedy was paid off by Roosevelt with the U.S. ambassadorship to Britain at the end of 1937 — one of the most deplorable appointments, given the gathering European crisis, of Roosevelt's entire career.

Time does not permit me here to record the monstrous performance of Ambassador Kennedy in the years between 1938 and 1941, but in terms of JFK's conflict of loyalties as a son and as a student, it is important to note that Joseph P. Kennedy — who had deliberately avoided the draft in 1917⁵ — became not only America's number one isolationist, but virtually an honorary member of Neville Chamberlain's appeasement cabinet: indeed, he was informed *before* the British cabinet of Chamberlain's decision to fly to Bad Godesberg to meet Hitler, prior to Munich,⁶ and he personally supplied Chamberlain with Charles Lindbergh's notoriously defeatist estimates of German air power;⁷ indeed, he was thanked by Chamberlain in 1939 as the man on whom he had most leaned for advice and support.⁸

Joseph Kennedy's part in the defeatism and surrender of the European democracies to Hitler's menaces was so ignoble that, once Chamberlain was forced to resign in May 1940, the new prime minister, Winston Churchill, refused even to speak to the U.S. ambassador⁹ and, instead, communicated directly with President Roosevelt by secret cipher.¹⁰

For JFK, who had served as personal secretary to his father in 1939, it was impossible not to be deeply influenced by his father's much trumpeted role as American appeaser. Indeed, JFK's elder brother, Joe Jr., became, at Harvard Law School, the chief spokesman of their father's isolationist views, and would establish there, in time, the Harvard Committee Against Military Intervention, giving a series of speeches and addresses to Massachusetts audiences — including some at Jewish temples — that argued passionately against any aid to Britain which might prejudice America's future relationship with the European dictators.¹¹

For JFK at Harvard, however — despite one shameful editorial in the *Harvard Crimson* calling for a new American-sponsored Munich¹² — it was to be very much more complicated.

Born on May 29, 1917, JFK was two years younger than his bigoted elder brother, Joe Jr. His first trip to Europe was intended to take place in 1933, when JFK was sixteen, along with his brother and his parents, who were going to "meet important people of Europe — Mussolini, etc."¹³ However, he'd been so badly behaved at his boarding school — he was eventually expelled¹⁴ — that the school advised against the idea, and it was not until the autumn of 1935, at the age of eighteen, that JFK finally set foot on European soil — not Plymouth, England, as planned, but terra firma at Calais, France, the great transatlantic liner, the S.S. *Normandie*, having been blown off course by a gale. Taking the ferry to Dover, JFK found "the Channel was the roughest of the year," as he described it to a school friend. "We sat out and soon

everyone began to yawk. I was on deck singing to one of the women in the party. I was singing 'The Man on the flying trapeze' and when I came to the part where you break into the chorus with O O o Ohhhh, etc, a woman behind me retched all over me with 'oh my God that's the finish' — you can imagine me covered from tip to toe with hot vomit."¹⁵

JFK's brother had studied for a year at the London School of Economics under the eminent socialist historian and political scientist Professor Harold Laski, and it was intended that JFK should do the same. However, JFK wasn't well and was contemptuous, as a would-be eighteenth-century London rake, of his fellow students at the "Fresher's social" who, he claimed, were "holding in their arms pimply faced English school-girls." In hospital for tests he met Prince Surloff, "who is supposed to be next Czar or some such shit . . . I have met a number of Earls + Lords here," he recorded, "and am getting rather royal myself."¹⁶

JFK's irreverent humor and anti-authoritarianism would be his saving grace. His brother, Laski later related, was far more serious and in fact openly determined to become "nothing less than the first Catholic president of the United States."¹⁷ Unknown to Laski, however, this brother was also deeply anti-Semitic and had become, on a trip to Nazi Germany in 1934, a great admirer of Hitler.¹⁸ JFK's own exposure to Nazi Germany had to wait, however, for his health in London deteriorated, and in mid-October 1935 he returned to America and recommenced his college career, this time at Princeton.¹⁹

Princeton, JFK found, was even more snooty than London high society. Advised after eight weeks to take a year off and recuperate, he went to work on a ranch in Arizona. By the time he returned East in the summer of 1936, he'd decided to follow his brother to Harvard, not Princeton, a decision that was to have an important bearing on his "Europeanization."

The year off college allowed JFK not only to recover his health but to grow up. Though his new teachers at Harvard were unimpressed by his academic diligence, he set his own agenda, becoming so popular that, the following autumn, he achieved what no Boston Irishman and possibly no Catholic had ever done: acceptance into one of Harvard's exclusive "final" clubs, the Spee.²⁰

Like his brother, JFK had chosen to study government. Unlike his brother, he had an open, curious mind, a sharp wit, and remarkable objectivity for his age. At the end of his freshman year, having taken an extended course in European history, he hoisted his new car aboard the S.S. *Washington* and, together with his school friend, set off on July 1, 1937, for a two-month motoring tour of Europe.²¹

Luckily, JFK kept a diary of his trip — a journey which was to prove the most formative political and cultural experience of his youth. Driving through France, picking up young hitchhikers who spoke English, interviewing Spanish refugees from the civil war, motoring through Italy to Rome, attending an audience with the pope, listening to Mussolini rant, then heading north to Austria and Nazi Germany, Holland, Belgium, and Britain — and all the time testing his experience against John Gunther's *Inside Europe*, which he was reading — he was determined to see for himself, as an American, the countries that had provided his religious and historical heritage, and to form his own opinions about the revolutionary movements currently sweeping the continent of Europe. Where his brother had applauded the rise of Hitler and excused the ill treatment of the Jews, JFK discerned, even at age twenty, the extent to which truth was distorted by government control of the media. "There is no

doubt about it that these dictators are more popular in the country than outside due to their effective propaganda," he noted sanguinely in Munich.²² In Nuremberg, shortly before Hitler came to speak, he and his American friend had "the added attraction of being spitten on."²³

In Britain, staying in the castle of Sir James Calder, owner of the Haig and Haig distillery, JFK went grouse shooting and trout fishing. He found the people snobbish and conceited — ready targets of his derisive wit — but the guardians too of a political tradition that, increasingly, would obsess him in an age of dictatorship: democracy as underdog.

Returning to Europe with two evil-smelling grouse, which his welcoming sister Kathleen immediately pitched into New York harbor,²⁴ he himself pitched into his studies as a sophomore student — the more so once it was announced, in January 1938, that his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was to be the next U.S. ambassador to Britain. The elevation of his father to the number one American diplomatic post in the prewar world was to alter JFK's life in many ways, intellectually as well as socially.

No sooner had the new American ambassador settled into Prince's Gate in March 1938 than Hitler's troops moved to annex Austria. Yet for all his astuteness as a businessman, Joseph P. Kennedy could see no possible concern for Americans. He remained convinced that economic self-interest was the root motive behind Hitler's machinations, and that the German führer could be "bought" off by British and French business and commercial concessions, while America waited patiently by the sidelines to trade with whichever parties proved the more successful. In the meantime, using his privileged position as ambassador, he went on speculating through nominees on the stock exchange, to his own personal profit.²⁵

For his son JFK, studying European history under distinguished American professors such as Carl Friedrich and Thomas Yeomans, the gathering crisis in Europe thus became a very real and tangible focal point of his university education. He spent the late summer of 1938 in London and the south of France, where his father rented a villa, and through his father's personal involvement became privy to much of the British government's appeasement dealings — dealings which Ambassador Kennedy supported and to some degree personally engineered since, as he put it (in a draft speech that was censored by the State Department), he knew of no "dispute or controversy existing in the world which is worth the life of your son, or of anyone else's son. . . . For the life of me I cannot see anything involved which could be remotely considered worth shedding blood for."²⁶

For JFK, who had been shown the draft of the speech by his father, it was an excruciating introduction to the mounting controversy over American isolationism, particularly once JFK returned to Harvard for his junior year and experienced bitter university denunciation of the Munich pact. His father had — against all protocol — begun a burst of cheering from the Visitors' Gallery of the House of Commons for the prime minister, Neville Chamberlain,²⁷ but the recent publication of Joseph Goebbels's diaries makes it clear how little Chamberlain had gained by his abject surrender to Hitler's threats. The only defensible border of Czechoslovakia fell without Hitler having to fight — indeed, incited the Nazis to step up their armament program to even greater levels: "*Nun heisst es rusten, rusten, rusten* [Now we must arm, arm, arm]," Goebbels confided.²⁸

It was at this juncture in his life, in the autumn of 1938, that JFK decided to ask Chester Hanford, dean of Harvard (and one of JFK's junior year professors of government), if he might spend six months working at the London embassy and traveling across Europe on behalf of his father, in lieu of his Harvard second-half-year courses. Hanford agreed provisionally, and by dint of taking six courses instead of four in the fall and winter of 1938–1939 and getting placed on the Dean's List for academic achievement — entitling him to write a fourth-year honors thesis — JFK left Harvard in a minor blaze of glory early in February 1939, bound for the London embassy.²⁹ “Met the King this morning at a Court Levee,” he soon boasted to a friend back in America. “Thursday night am going to Court in my new silk knee breeches, which are cut to my crotch tightly and in which I look mighty attractive.”³⁰

Few twenty-one-year-old American undergraduates can have had such an extraordinary experience as part of their college education. JFK was invited to 10 Downing Street and met all the great appeasers of the day, from Lord Halifax to R. A. Butler. He spent a month working for Ambassador William Bullitt at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, then stayed with Ambassador Anthony Biddle in Poland. He traveled through the Soviet Union, he visited Palestine in a demi-official capacity, paid a trip to German-occupied Prague, went to Munich, Berlin, and Danzig, the tinderbox of Europe in the high summer of 1939. From Berlin, a few days before the outbreak of the Second World War, he wrote to his friend saying he still did not think there would be war,³¹ but that the Germans had gone so far with their propaganda over Danzig that it would be difficult for them to back down; moreover, there was a dangerous misapprehension in Germany — thanks to Munich — about Britain's firmness of purpose in guaranteeing Poland's frontiers.

The discovery and recent publication of Goebbels's diaries bear out JFK's contention. On September 1, as German troops prepared their invasion, Goebbels noted: “*Der Führer glaubt noch nicht daran, dass England eingreifen wird* (The Führer still doesn't believe that England will get involved).”³²

JFK's father, however, had become convinced that the democracies, having appeased the dictators with his full support and even *einmischung* (meddling) as U.S. ambassador, were now doomed to military defeat if they resisted, and he made it his life's purpose to keep America out of the subsequent conflagration. Though he had categorically refused to serve in World War I, he believed every bogus figure and assertion of Charles Lindbergh regarding the German Luftwaffe. He secretly rented a private mansion, with seventy rooms, twenty-five miles outside London to avoid the fate of the capital.³³ There, for the next year, he quaked in fear of German bombs³⁴ and predicted disaster,³⁵ attempted to make secret deals with the Nazis,³⁶ and became America's most cowardly and self-serving ambassador of the twentieth century.³⁷

Joseph P. Kennedy's lack of moral fiber and profound pessimism³⁸ were not only a dark chapter in American international relations, but were bound to rub off on his children — and, to JFK's later shame and embarrassment, they did. In October 1939, after the fall of Poland, JFK wrote an editorial for the Harvard University newspaper, the *Crimson*, abjectly recommending that the United States president, through his ambassador to Britain, organize a new Munich-style peace conference. JFK's editorial was titled, ominously, *Peace in Our Time*.³⁹

A majority of Harvard students, according to a contemporary poll, felt likewise. Harvard's faculty, however, was by and large interventionist, and it was in this bitter campus debate that JFK began work on his honors thesis, “Appeasement at Munich:

The Inevitable Result of the Slowness of Conversion of the British Democracy to Change from a Disarmament Policy to a Rearmament Policy.”⁴⁰

Though an English fable, this topic went to the heart of the historical and moral controversy raging at Harvard. By having to explore the antecedents of the debate — from Versailles in 1919 to the absconding of America from its promised role in the League of Nations in 1920 and the rise of British postwar isolationism — JFK gained an abiding insight into the weaknesses of democracy in the face of totalitarian intransigence. His thesis, painstaking and jejune, was given the lowest honors grade at Harvard, yet it was not only a remarkable document in its balance and detail, but it reflected the political soul of its young author in a way that no later work would ever do.

By setting England’s complacency and indolence against the backcloth of a weary, postwar era, he not only drew a terrible lesson for America, but, in a sense, put his father in his historical place. He was accused of whitewashing Stanley Baldwin and Chamberlain — and by extension, his father — but the significance of the thesis was that it enabled JFK himself to gradually and honorably divest himself — unlike his obedient and blinkered elder brother — of his father’s political baggage and, at age twenty-two, to move towards his own, independent political philosophy.

By June 1940, shortly after the Anglo-French evacuation at Dunkirk, JFK was writing in the *Crimson* to protest against a recent editorial that had argued against an American arms buildup.

If anyone should ask why Britain is so badly prepared for this war or why America’s defenses were found in such shocking condition in the May investigations, this attitude toward armaments is a substantial answer [JFK warned]. The failure to build up her armaments has not saved England from a war, and may cost her one.⁴¹

Moreover, he privately advised his father not to resign, as he was threatening to do, “as it might undo the work of 7 years.” He suggested instead that he and his sister come to war-torn England “as it would show we hadn’t merely left England when it got unpleasant.”⁴²

Courage was the issue here, as it would be later in JFK’s life. Joseph P. Kennedy reluctantly heeded his son’s advice, but hid nightly in his seventy-room mansion twenty-five miles from the capital and by the fall of 1940 became so cowardly that he blackmailed Roosevelt into recalling him to the safety of America, threatening, if Roosevelt did not comply, to publish a denunciation of the president in the run-up to the 1940 presidential election.⁴³ Once back in the United States he bad-mouthed Britain to all who would listen, predicted defeat for the democracies, warned Hollywood producers not to make any more anti-Nazi films⁴⁴ — and gave a press conference in which, while still ambassador to London, he prophesied not only that Britain was doomed but that the Queen of England (Elizabeth, wife of King George VI) — who, he claimed, had more brains than the British Cabinet under Churchill — would make a peace settlement with Hitler.⁴⁵

All this, for the ambassador’s second son as he recuperated from mysterious intestinal illness at Stanford University in California, was deeply embarrassing. Father and son had not seen each other for a year, and the ambassador’s bullying, bigoted Boston-Irish personality had lessened in its influence as JFK distanced himself from

his father's position. He had also, in the meantime, become a best-selling author at age twenty-three, when his thesis was successfully turned into a book, *Why England Slept*.⁴⁶ However, in December 1940, having visited JFK in San Francisco for a few hours on his self-appointed mission to keep America out of the war, Joseph P. Kennedy sent JFK a telegram, demanding his son send him an "Outline on Appeasement," which he could use when announcing to the press his forthcoming formal resignation as ambassador to Great Britain.⁴⁷

For JFK, this was perhaps the cardinal psychological and intellectual crisis of his early life. In an agonizing, recently discovered letter, he responded as best he could, making every excuse for his father's disastrous performance as ambassador. Yet his heart was not in it, and as he boarded a plane to Los Angeles to attend an academic conference on the world crisis and read reports of Roosevelt's proposed Lend-Lease legislation — which his father, as America's Number One Appeaser, was threatening to derail — JFK penned a handwritten note that reflects not only the turning point in his maturation, but provides us with the key to his attitude towards Britain and Europe for the rest of his brief but dramatic life. "Dear Dad," he began gingerly.

It seems to me that our actual aid to Britains pretty small, and that the defense program calling for more and more planes is falling behind. . . . We seem to be in the same psychological pattern that England was during the year from Sept. 1938 to Sept. 1939. As Munich awakened England — so the events of the month of May awakened us. But like England we are rearming in much the same leisurely fashion that England did — note the lack of genuine legislation empowering the defense commission.

Of course the reason we are so confident as a nation is that we know, especially after watching England hold out during the summer, that we cannot be *invaded*. — We are safe. We are failing to see that if England is forced to give in by summer due to our failure to give her adequate supplies, we will have failed to meet our emergency, as did England before us. As England failed from September 1938 to September 1939 to take advantage of her year of respite due to her feeling that there would be no war in 1939, we will have failed just as greatly.

Now as this affects your position. I realize that aid for Britain is part of it but in your message for America to stay out of the war — you should not do so *at the expense of having people minimize aid to Britain*. The danger of our not giving Britain enough aid, of not getting Congress and the country stirred up sufficiently to give England the aid she needs now — is to me just as great as the danger of our getting into war now — as it is much more likely.

If England is defeated America is going to be alone in a strained and hostile world. In a few years, she will have paid out enormous sums for defense yearly — to maintain armaments — she may be at war — she even may be on the verge of defeat or defeated — by a combination of totalitarian powers.

Then there will be a general turning of the people's opinions. They will say "Why were we so stupid not to have given Britain all possible aid. Why did we worry about money etc. *We should have put in more legislation*. We should have given it to them outright — after all — if we voted \$13,000,000,000 for defense in 1940 at home we should have been ready to give England money — they were definitely another arm of our defense forces" . . .

Just as we now turn on those who got us into the last war, Hines Page etc. (which after all may have been the best thing when all the accounts are added

up) — so in the future they may turn on those who failed to point out the great necessity of providing Britain in the crucial months of 1940–1941.⁴⁸

Time, unfortunately, does not permit us to recount the sequel to this letter beyond its obvious importance for JFK. It is interesting to note, however, that Joseph P. Kennedy, some weeks later, stunned the isolationist movement in America by dropping his objections to Lend-Lease at the congressional hearings, and the bill passed safely, enabling Britain to hold out another year.⁴⁹

JFK was beginning to show a remarkable sense of judgment, not least in the loving, gentle way he shepherded his father away from catastrophe. While Joseph P. Kennedy retired into sullen obscurity, his son finally became, in November 1941, a month before Pearl Harbor, an open interventionist.⁵⁰ And when America was tumbled into war by the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of hostilities against the United States, JFK was already in uniform, as an intelligence officer in Washington. By the following summer he was training — despite concealed ill-health — to be a combat PT boat officer, and in 1943 he got his wish as commander of the *PT-109* and later 59. Sunk, abandoned by his colleagues, rescued by Christian natives, and becoming a legendary skipper in his squadron, JFK by the age of twenty-six had proved himself a hardened leader of men with a precocious grasp of global political problems.

That the United States would have to take a major role in the postwar world order was clear to JFK by 1943. Moreover, it was a role in which, increasingly, he felt he had a personal stake. "This war here is a dirty business," he wrote to the love of his early life, Inga Arvad, in September 1943, soon after his sinking and rescue.

It's very easy to talk about the war and beating the Japs if it takes years and a million men, but anyone who talks like that should consider well his words. We get so used to talking about billions of dollars, and millions of soldiers, that thousands of casualties sound like drops in the bucket. But if those thousands want to live as much as the ten that I saw, the people deciding the whys and wherefores had better make mighty sure that all this effort is headed for some definite goal, and that when we reach that goal we may say it was worth it, for if it isn't, the whole thing will turn to ashes, and we will face great trouble in the years to come after the war.⁵¹

In the winter of 1944–1945, after his medical discharge from the Navy, JFK made the fateful pact with his father that would send him to Congress.⁵² As the war moved towards its climax in Europe, he was disposed to see world disarmament and an effective United Nations as the "goal" which the United States should pursue.⁵³ However, once again personal experience qualified and altered his perspective.

Attending the birth of the United Nations in San Francisco in April and May 1945 as a Hearst newspaper correspondent, he met Anthony Eden, Clement Attlee, Jan Masaryk, as well as distinguished American diplomats such as Chip Bohlen and Averell Harriman. "Winston Churchill once said that Russian policy was an enigma wrapped in a mystery. I'd like to report to Mr. Churchill that the Russians haven't changed," JFK began his column on April 30.⁵⁴ "It is unfortunate that more cannot be accomplished here," he lamented the next day. The UN would become, he warned "merely a skeleton. Its powers will be limited. It will reflect the fact that there are deep disagreements among its members. . . . It is unfortunate that unity for war

against a common aggressor is far easier to obtain than unity for peace. We are beginning to realize how difficult and long the road is ahead. San Francisco is only the beginning.”⁵⁵

To the editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*, who had asked to print JFK’s draft article on world disarmament, JFK now sent a regretful no. “I have delayed answering,” he apologized,

as I wanted to see for myself whether there was any possibility that a world security organization strong enough to permit comprehensive world disarmament would come out of San Francisco. Frankly, and though the conference is only in its first week, it appears as though there will not be. The Russians have demonstrated that they believe a country’s voice in the conference should be heard only in direct ratio to its military power — and it hardly seems feasible to advocate disarmament under that condition. Furthermore they have demonstrated a suspicion and lack of faith in Britain and the United States which, while understandable in the light of recent history, nevertheless indicates that in the next few years it will be prudent to be strong. I am naturally disappointed in this, as I haven’t changed my views that disarmament is an essential part of any lasting peace.⁵⁶

The jigsaw of JFK’s political philosophy was filling up. In June 1945 he arrived in England to cover the British general election — in which Churchill was resoundingly defeated — and visited for the first time the country of his ancestors to report on partition in the postwar era. “De Valera is fighting politically the same relentless battle they fought in the field during the uprising of 1916, in the war of independence and later in the civil war. . . . At this weekend, the problem of partition seems very far from being solved,” he cabled confidently to Hearst newspapers.⁵⁷

There was one final — and crucial — journey to make. In mid-July 1945, American Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal made good his promise to take Jack to Germany. Although President Harry Truman failed conspicuously to invite him to Potsdam, Forrestal flew anyway, picking JFK up in Paris and taking him in his personal aircraft to Berlin, Bremen, Frankfurt, Salzburg, and Hitler’s aerie in Berchtesgaden.⁵⁸ Not only did JFK meet General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, but he obtained an eyewitness idea of the iron curtain as it descended. He had traveled through Russia himself in the spring of 1939 and had been singularly unimpressed by Soviet propaganda; now, interviewing local commanders, political advisers, and the president’s entourage at Potsdam and walking through the ruins of Berlin with Russian officers, he saw for himself Europe’s looming struggle after the fall of Hitler.

The anti-Communist whose younger brother would work for Joe McCarthy was born that year; his anti-Communism had nothing to do — as others have sometimes assumed — with his father’s right-wing views but everything to do with JFK’s growing maturity as a would-be politician. By the following year, having won the Democratic nomination for Massachusetts’s Eleventh Congressional District, he unequivocally declared to a meeting of the Young Democrats of New York that he was not a fellow traveler.

“The time has come when we must speak plainly on the great issue facing the world today,” he afterwards declared on Boston radio, revealing how, in answer to a question about Soviet Russia, he had told the group of Young Democrats “that I felt

that Soviet Russia today, is run by a small clique of ruthless, powerful and selfish men, who have established a government which denies the Russian people personal freedom and economic security.”

I told them that Soviet Russia is embarked upon a program of world aggression. I told them that the freedom-loving countries of the world must stop Soviet Russia now, or be destroyed. I told them that the iron curtain policy and complete suppression of news with respect to Russia, has left the world with a totally false impression of what is going on inside Soviet Russia today. I told them that the people in the United States have been far too gullible with respect to the publicity being disseminated throughout the world by the clever and brilliant Moscow propagandists. . . .

This crisis is both moral and political. The years ahead will be difficult and strained, the sacrifices great, but . . . only by supporting with all our hearts the course we believe to be right, can we prove that course is not only right but that it has strength and vigor.⁵⁹

I think I speak on behalf of most Europeans in paying tribute today to the young politician who emerged from the ignoble and defeatist shadow of his father and, by his intellect, courage, and conviction, went on in the years afterwards to bolster the American-European ideal of democracy and personal freedom.

Let me end with some words from an address which JFK gave in Faneuil Hall in Boston, in the presence of his revered grandfather, a Democrat who had been, in his own time, Boston's youngest-ever elected congressman and mayor, and whose witty, endlessly energetic interest and compassion were the model on which JFK would base his political life. It was the annual Fourth of July oration, and in it JFK attempted, on the eve of his own election to the House of Representatives, to put into words his abiding beliefs. He began quietly:

Conceived in Grecian thought, strengthened by Christian morality, and stamped indelibly into American political philosophy, the right of the individual against the state is the keystone of our Constitution. Each man is *free*. He is *free* in *thought*. He is *free* in *worship*. To us, who have been reared in the American tradition, these rights have become a part of our very being. They have become so much a part of our being that most of us are prone to feel that they are rights universally recognized and universally exercised. But the sad fact is that this is not true. They were dearly won for us only a few short centuries ago and they were dearly preserved for us in the days just past. And there are large sections of the world today where these rights are denied as a matter of philosophy and a matter of government.

We cannot assume that the struggle is ended. It is neverending. . . .

May God grant that, at some distant date, on this day, and on this platform, the orator may be able to say that these are still the great qualities of the American character and that they have prevailed.⁶⁰

JFK was barely twenty-nine. Fifteen years later he would be president of his nation and leader of the free world. How far he'd come from his father's cowardice and isolationism remains for me at least one of the great personal odysseys of our century — and one for which we Europeans will always, always be grateful. Though he never lived to see the fall of Soviet communism, his role in upholding the

democratic ideals of the United States and Western Europe was courageous, noble, and in the end, it has proved triumphant. 🍀

Notes

1. *Boston Globe*, March 16, 1992.
2. Ralph G. Martin, *A Hero for Our Time* (New York: Macmillan, 1983), 24. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter used almost identical words in describing Joseph P. Kennedy to Richard Goodwin — Goodwin to author, October 12, 1992.
3. Doris Kearns Goodwin, *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 327–328. Kennedy never pretended, later, that his stock market dealings were ethical; indeed, he often boasted at his cleverness in manipulating the unregulated market prior to the creation of the SEC. Interviews with, inter alia, John Kenneth Galbraith, William Walton, and Charles Spalding.
4. Michael R. Beschloss, *Kennedy and Roosevelt: The Uneasy Alliance* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980), 88.
5. Goodwin, *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys*, 268–283; Nigel Hamilton, *JFK: Reckless Youth* (New York: Random House, 1992), 29–40.
6. James M. Landis, draft manuscript for the unpublished “diplomatic memoirs” of former Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy (hereafter referred to as JML), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts, ch. 14, 21.
7. JML, ch. 15, 3; Hamilton, *JFK*, 237–238.
8. JML, ch. 17, 1; Hamilton, *JFK*, 239.
9. JML, ch. 49, 8–10; Hamilton, *JFK*, 343.
10. JML, ch. 36, 3; David Irving, *Churchill’s War* (New York: Avon Books, 1991), 195; Hamilton, *JFK*, 305.
11. Original press release, December 15, 1940, HUD/36, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Hamilton, *JFK*, 392–393.
12. *Harvard Crimson*, October 9, 1939; Hamilton, *JFK*, 290.
13. George Owen minute, September 26, 1933, JFK Student File, Choate School Archives, Wallingford, Connecticut; Hamilton, *JFK*, 100.
14. Maurice Shea, JFK Library Oral History; Hamilton, *JFK*, 124.
15. JFK to K. Lemoyne Billings (hereafter referred to as KLB), October 9, 1935, KLB Papers, JFK Library; Hamilton, *JFK*, 140.
16. JFK to KLB, n.d. (October 1935), KLB Papers; Hamilton, *JFK*, 42.
17. *As We Remember Joe*, ed. John F. Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass.: University Press, 1945), 44; Hamilton, *JFK*, 109.
18. Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., to Joseph P. Kennedy, April 23, 1934, quoted in Goodwin, *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys*, 471; Hamilton, *JFK*, 108.
19. Dr. William Murphy to Joseph P. Kennedy, October 10, 1935, JFK Personal Papers, Box 4B, JFK Library; Joseph P. Kennedy to R. Bingham, October 21, 1935, and November 12, 1935, quoted in Goodwin, *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys*, 490; Hamilton, *JFK*, 144–145.
20. Interviews with James Rousmaniere, April 6, 1989, Holton Wood, January 9, 1989, Donald Thurber, June 7, 1990, and Ralph Pope, January 24, 1989; Hamilton, *JFK*, 207–210.
21. JFK Diary, European Trip (hereafter referred to as DET), entry of July 1, 1937, JFK Personal Papers, Box 1; Hamilton, *JFK*, 178.

22. DET, entry of August 18, 1937; Hamilton, *JFK*, 193.
23. DET, entry of August 20, 1937; Hamilton, *JFK*, 193.
24. KLB interviews, Joan and Clay Blair Papers, University of Wyoming Archives, Laramie, Wyoming; JFK Library Oral History; Hamilton, *JFK*, 199.
25. Joseph P. Kennedy to Arthur Krock, April 14, 1938, Arthur Krock Papers, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey; Hamilton, *JFK*, 226–227; Perowne minute, September 27, 1939, FO 371/22827, and Scott minute, September 30, 1939, FO 371/22827, Public Record Office, Kew, England; *The Diaries of Sir David Cadogan*, ed. David Dilks (London: Casell, 1971), 215; Hamilton, *JFK*, 292. See also David E. Koskoff, *Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and Times* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), and Richard Whalen, *The Founding Father: The Story of Joseph P. Kennedy* (New York: New American Library, 1964).
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27. JML, ch. 16, 16; Hamilton, *JFK*, 239.
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29. JFK Harvard University Student File, 1938–1939, JFK Personal Papers, Box 2, JFK Library; Hamilton, *JFK*, 242, 253.
30. JFK to KLB, n.d. (March 1939), KLB Papers; Hamilton, *JFK*, 55.
31. JFK to KLB, July 17, 1939, KLB Papers; Hamilton, *JFK*, 261.
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43. Lord Halifax to Lord Lothian, October 10, 1940, FO 371/24251, Public Record Office; Hamilton, *JFK*, 362 (see also 361–369).
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49. JML, ch. 52, 10; Hamilton, *JFK*, 397.
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52. Joe Kane interview, Ralph Martin Papers, Boston University Archives, Boston; Hamilton, *JFK*, 674.
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The Entrepreneurial State Goes to Europe

State Economic Policies and Europe 1992

John J. Carroll
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This article investigates state-level export programs in response to the emerging new economic and political regime of Europe 1992. Little related export promotion activity is found, even in states reputed to have the most active entrepreneurial policies. The authors conclude that states have few resources to invest in export promotion and are inappropriate jurisdictions around which to organize such policy, despite the much touted "entrepreneurial state."

There has been considerable excitement in scholarly circles over the economic development role that some states are exploring. This active new role, which Peter Eisinger¹ has labeled the "entrepreneurial state," is being widely discussed, and considerable attention has been given to the various strategies states might use to make American industry more competitive at home and, especially, abroad. The scholarly literature on these innovative approaches has penetrated political circles to the extent that both "entrepreneurial government" and David Osborne's work² were cited by Massachusetts Governor William Weld in his 1991 inaugural address as providing models for his administration. Among those innovations, special emphasis has been placed on export promotion as a means of moving beyond the domestic market for goods and services.

The purpose of this article is to sound a note of caution about the entrepreneurial state and the state export policies that are thought to characterize it. The extensiveness and effectiveness of state export efforts have thus far been minimal, and the fiscal constraints under which states operate make it unlikely that these programs will be substantially expanded. Furthermore, we do not believe that a workable export policy can be organized and implemented by even the largest of the states operating alone or by regional groups of states operating through loosely structured interstate compacts such as the various governors' conferences.

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Entrepreneurial trade policies, if they are to be effective, require coordination, funding, and policy leadership by the national government, where the legal and constitutional responsibilities to design and implement trade policy are located. In the absence of federal leadership over the past few years, it is clear that some states have introduced economic development strategies aimed at foreign as well as domestic markets, but it is equally clear that these programs are unsubstantial as judged by staffing levels and potential impact.

While some American states were reorienting their economic development strategies to promote increased foreign trade, members of the European Economic Community (EEC) were adopting profound reforms in their relationships, which will affect American access to their markets. Established in the 1950s by six European states to promote European political and economic integration in Europe, the EEC in the early 1980s fell far short of the expectations of its original founders. Although as early as the mid-1960s the community had created a customs union among members, the purpose of which was to eliminate formal tariff barriers to trade, it was far from achieving the free movement of goods, services, and people among its present twelve members, which was the original goal of the Treaty of Rome, the EEC founding document.³

Differences in regulations and product standards, national subsidies, limits on capital movements, and extensive border controls were substantial barriers to a unified market. The political goals of the Rome treaty were even further from realization than the economic ones. National states in the EEC did not coordinate their foreign policies and, except in agriculture, had made little progress in coordinating their domestic economic policies. In 1985 EEC leaders made two fundamental commitments to alter this situation. First, they approved an amendment to the Treaty of Rome — the Single European Act — to change decision-making processes in order to facilitate greater political integration. Second, they set a deadline, December 31, 1992, for completing a true unified market in Europe and approved a specific list of barriers to trade to be eliminated by the deadline.

The Single European Act and the 1992 unified market program themselves represent a profound acceleration of European integration, but in December 1991, EEC heads of government negotiated a plan to tie the community together even more closely than envisioned in these initiatives. At their biannual meeting of the European Council, they signed the Maastricht agreement — named for the city where it was done. The agreement provided for closer political cooperation leading to a single European currency, including a European central bank, Eurofed, and a single currency, the ECU. If all member states ratify it, the Maastricht treaty will make the community a fully integrated economic power early in the next century.⁴ To the chagrin of advocates of greater European integration, several events have put ultimate ratification of the Maastricht treaty in jeopardy.

The Danes rejected the treaty in a June 1992 referendum, raising questions about the degree of European public support for greater integration. Although the Irish later approved their referendum on the Maastricht, and the French, on September 20, narrowly passed theirs, the Danish defeat and new uncertainties about public support will require a renegotiation of the agreement before it can be implemented.⁵ English withdrawal on September 16 from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism — precursor to eventual monetary union — compounds concerns about the feasibility of rapid adoption of a common currency.⁶ Although at this writing the ultimate fate of

the Maastricht agreement is uncertain, it is likely the road to monetary union and greater political cooperation will not be as short or as smooth as envisioned in Maastricht.

While Europeans have been preoccupied with the grander and even tighter union envisioned in the Maastricht treaty, the already substantial program to create a unified market went into effect on schedule on December 31, 1992. The goals of such a market, agreed to in 1985, will be achieved even if there are substantial delays and modifications to Maastricht. With or without monetary and political union, the 1992 European internal market program presents enormous opportunities, as well as hazards, to American states and their entrepreneurial visions.

Even if Maastricht is not ratified, the 1992 initiative itself will restructure the ground rules for trade within the European community and between Europe and the rest of the world. These changes will eliminate the remaining nontariff trade barriers that restrict the free movement of goods, services, and people among the twelve member nations. The 1992 program, no matter what happens to the plans for monetary union, lays the groundwork for the emergence of a new European economic superpower of 350 million consumers, perhaps the most prosperous free market in the world. American businesses, like all world business, will need access to this market if they are fully to develop their export potential.

If reports of a shift by states to entrepreneurial export policies are correct, one would expect them to respond to the emergence of this potential European superpower.⁷ Four of America's top nine export markets are within the European Economic Community: the United Kingdom (\$18.4 billion), West Germany (\$14.3 billion), France (\$10.1 billion), and the Netherlands (\$10.1 billion); the value of 1988 U.S. exports to the EEC nations was \$75.6 billion.⁸ Judging from their speeches, many of the nation's governors have been highly aware of the importance of foreign trade and the European markets for their states' economic health. The comments of Governor Weld of Massachusetts are typical. He told the 1990 New England Governors Conference that "international trade is not, by any means, an immediate solution to our economic situation, but it is a solution — and it is a good long-term solution. . . . Today, almost 70 percent of [Massachusetts] companies do not export a single product. I'd like to see that figure change." And Governor William O'Neill of Connecticut stated that "maintaining [our] competitive edge . . . forces us to keep a constant vigil on world economic developments. Without question, the biggest economic events of the next decade will take place in Eastern and Western Europe."

By themselves, the states have been able to launch a number of small and often well-designed programs, but the impact of these programs on state economies has been and will continue to be minimal. We argue that given the states' limited autonomy and resources, they can only hope to support small-scale export development programs. Substantial expansion of exports from the states will depend more on federal policy and leadership.

Our review of state policies developed in response to 1992, based on our survey of the states, will find a broad awareness of the importance of the emerging Europe, but little concrete action. In this report, we explore the states' responses to developments in Europe, for an entrepreneurial state would surely need to take the prospect of this economic colossus into account in its export policy. In conclusion, we speculate on the implications of our findings for the possibility of the entrepreneurial state and the efficacy of export policy at the state level.

The Entrepreneurial State

The idea of the entrepreneurial state is both descriptive of the new orientation toward economic development and evocative of a new dynamism at the state level. As a descriptive term, it tracks the movement from the business-climate-centered policies of the 1970s to emphasis on the creation of new capital in the 1980s. In the seventies, most states attempted to create attractive business climates through reductions in corporate taxes, reforms of workers' compensation policies, and enactment of specific investment incentives.

Economic development professionals were expected to be "smokestack chasers" — identifying potential businesses to attract, devising appealing investment packages, and advertising in business publications. The policies of the entrepreneurial state imply an entirely new style of government intervention, which seeks to develop new markets, products, production methods, and technologies. The entrepreneurial emphasis is on expanding markets through the export of goods and services and the creation of new industries and products through business-university partnerships, the infusion of capital, and state sponsorship of research "greenhouses."⁹

As an evocative term, the entrepreneurial state suggests active management and direction of the economy in the mode of the "strong states" of Europe and Japan, rather than the traditionally "weak" model associated with the United States. Eisinger believes that the entrepreneurial state, like private entrepreneurs, is a dynamic economic player that expands market share by finding new markets for old products and by creating new markets through the production of new products. The state

seeks to identify market opportunities not for its own exclusive gain but on behalf of private actors whose pursuit of those opportunities may serve public ends. . . . [Its] role is to identify, evaluate, anticipate, and even help to develop and create those markets for private producers to exploit, aided if necessary by government as subsidizer or coinvestor.¹⁰

Used this way, the term "entrepreneurial state" carries the implication that such activities are, or are likely to be, a major policy commitment for the states and that state policies can produce the industrial adjustments to make the United States competitive internationally. This view implies that the states will take responsibility for economic development policy, relieving the national government of some of its obligations. As an optimistic President George Bush told the National Governors Association, governors "are becoming our economic envoys . . . restoring American international competitiveness and expanding world markets for American goods and services."¹¹ In our view, these arguments grossly overestimate the capacity of the states to undertake export policies.

Export promotion programs are thought to be archetypical of the new entrepreneurial approach. These policies are characterized by efforts to stimulate new demand for existing or new products in foreign markets. Proponents of state export promotion believe this is an area in which state intervention might make a difference. According to most observers, despite increasing U.S. export activity in the 1980s, there remains much untapped potential.¹² While we share the view that the export potential is great, we argue that the states alone will not be able to tap that potential; substantial federal initiative is needed.

Entrepreneurial States and Europe 1992

The European 1992 initiative is stimulating a complete restructuring of the business environment on the Continent. One characteristic of Europe 1992, not often emphasized in American reports, is its probusiness, neoliberal, as opposed to social democratic, character.¹³ The internal market program focuses completely on changes in the European marketplace to facilitate economic, that is, business, growth. The elimination of internal trade barriers is supposed to stimulate the ability of business to compete both within Europe and with the rest of the world.

Social democratic leaders, like French President François Mitterrand, embrace this program because they saw the economic stagnation of the 1970s threatening European welfare states, which can exist only on a foundation of economic prosperity. Measures to make business more competitive internationally are viewed as a prerequisite for continuation of improvements in the European standard of living and an equal distribution of prosperity. The probusiness character of 1992 is consistent as well with the evolution of economic policies in individual European countries in the 1980s, even those of socialist governments.¹⁴

The decade has seen a shift toward privatization and market-oriented policies in all countries. Cognizant of this trend and the promise of 1992, European business has been strongly supportive. Business people believe a unified market will bring opportunities for growth and profits. In contrast to the slow and hesitant reaction of European labor, European business has worked actively — and largely successfully — to prevent the enactment of regulations they view as harmful.¹⁵

Post-1992 Europe is expected to be an economic colossus and a good place to do business. The new European order is expected to affect international trade, American businesses, and state government policies in a number of concrete ways:¹⁶

- After 1992, a firm will need a presence in only one European country and meet only one set of product standards in order to sell in all twelve EEC countries. One would expect an entrepreneurial state to develop a variety of programs to take advantage of the 1992 opportunities to promote state exports.
- Many observers believe that the new Europe will expect reciprocity in laws and regulations if it is to freely allow American investment and exports. This poses a challenge to purchasing laws in some states, which require state and local governments to buy only American or locally produced products. If American business wishes to bid on European government purchases, states may have to repeal such laws.¹⁷
- A similar problem exists in the area of financial services. Under EEC regulations, banks in Europe will be able to engage in such practices as establishing branches in other countries and selling securities, which are restricted under U.S. federal and state banking laws. Relief for European financial institutions from these restrictions may be required if the EEC is to permit U.S. banks in Europe.¹⁸
- Europe 1992 will complicate state efforts to attract and retain business investment. Europe's appeal as an export market will be matched by its attractiveness as an investment location. Rather than export locally produced products, businesses may opt to set up joint ventures or their own production facilities in

Europe. Foreign capital will be more difficult to attract to the United States as investors like the Japanese shift their investments to Europe.¹⁹

- The heterogeneity of American state regulations and tax laws will reduce the overall U.S. competitive position as Europe provides a more homogeneous business environment. Some experts warn that American states must limit interstate tax variation, develop common definitions of taxable bases, and pass uniform regulations, for example, for the trucking industry, if they want to compete for international capital.²⁰
- Many trade issues exist between the United States and Europe, which could pose problems for the entrepreneurial state. These are especially severe in agriculture, where both the United States and Europe have provided a complex array of subsidies. In manufacturing, European proposals for "local content" or "rule of origin" requirements, which mandate that a certain percentage of parts in products assembled in Europe be produced in Europe, will interfere with exports from many states.²¹

Given the opportunities and challenges of the Europe 1992 deadline, how are the states preparing to respond? To answer this question, we concentrated on sixteen states with the most active and innovative economic development programs. These are the fourteen states that Gray and Lowry²² identify as industrial policy activists, plus two additional states from their "moderate" category,²³ which are frequently cited as industrial policy innovators in the anecdotal literature. Gray and Lowry rank the states on a five-point index of industrial policy activism depending on how many of four targeted incentive programs they have adopted.²⁴

We do not make a careful distinction between the terms "entrepreneurial state" and "industrial policy," because they refer to essentially the same set of phenomena. Although the term lacks precise definition, "industrial policy" refers to a comprehensive set of economic development policies designed by government to restructure the industrial base. The term "entrepreneurial state" is used to emphasize the high level of governmental activism that "demand-side" industrial policies require. For this reason, the entrepreneurial states cited by Eisinger and Osborne comprise virtually the same cluster of states that Gray and Lowry identify as active industrial policy states.

We used a mail survey, with follow-up telephone interviews in some states, to ask international trade directors how their states were responding. We also conducted personal interviews with several international trade specialists in New England. Table 1 summarizes the 1992 related activities reported in the sixteen entrepreneurial states. The most interesting finding is that six states reported no special activities related to Europe 1992. In one case, Montana, the state was simply disinterested: Montana promotes exports only to the Far East. However, the other five states all maintain at least one office in Europe and report continued interest in exporting to the Continent. Some of the disinterested states expressed awareness that the 1992 deadline was approaching, but saw no need for special activity. For a third of our entrepreneurial states, the prospect of a major change in the international economic environment stimulated no special activity at all.

Table 1

Industrial Policy States and Europe 1992

State	No 1992 Activity	Specific 1992 Program	Specific 1992 Publications	1992 Seminars or Conferences
California	—	—	X	—
Connecticut	—	—	X	X
Illinois	—	—	X	X
Indiana	X	—	—	—
Maryland	—	X	X	—
Massachusetts	—	—	—	—
Michigan	—	—	—	—
Mississippi	X	—	—	—
Missouri	—	—	—	—
Montana	X	—	—	—
New Jersey	—	—	X	—
New York	—	X	—	—
Ohio	X	—	—	—
Pennsylvania	X	—	—	—
Rhode Island	—	X	X	—
Wisconsin	X	—	—	—

State	Added Trade Activity	Special 1992 Counselors	Upgrade EEC Offices	No. European Offices
California	X	—	X	2
Connecticut	—	—	—	1
Illinois	—	—	X	1
Indiana	—	—	—	2
Maryland	X	X	X	1
Massachusetts	X	—	—	0
Michigan	—	—	—	1
Mississippi	—	—	—	1
Missouri	—	—	X	1
Montana	—	—	—	0
New Jersey	—	—	—	0
New York	—	—	X	2
Ohio	—	—	—	1
Pennsylvania	—	—	—	2
Rhode Island	—	—	—	1
Wisconsin	—	—	—	1

Source: Mail/phone survey of international trade directors.

Ten of the entrepreneurial states report some effort to take the new Europe into account, but even here the level of activity is low. Most concentrate on disseminating information about the event, leaving their business communities to react as they see fit. Five of the states have issued publications describing 1992, and three have sponsored conferences or seminars. Two of the publications (prepared by outside consultants) are quite elaborate and provide sophisticated analyses of 1992 and its implications for American business.²⁵ However, neither state reports following up these publications with targeted activities or programs. Three of the states added European trade shows to their calendars partly because of interest in 1992, and five have upgraded their European offices. California added a second office in Frankfurt to take advantage of an expected increase in European export opportunities.

Only three of the states, Rhode Island, New York, and Maryland, reported initiating a special program focused on Europe 1992 as a vehicle for promoting exports. The Rhode Island 1992 Commission kicked off its effort with a major conference on European integration in May 1990. Attended by representatives from about three hundred Rhode Island businesses, the conference introduced the 1992 Commission, a creation of the lieutenant governor and the head of the U.S. branch of a British multinational, and offered a number of seminars on the implications of 1992 for Rhode Island firms. In the following year, the commission met only once, and the centerpiece of its program, a mentoring program matching large companies with expertise in European exporting with small and medium-size firms, was not implemented. So far, Rhode Island's Europe 1992 program has had a false start. The New York program consists of dissemination of information about the European Economic Community and what it means for New York businesses.

Only one of the entrepreneurial states has actually launched a major program to take advantage of Europe 1992. Maryland's Opportunity '92 integrates informational seminars, European trade shows, and business counseling into a single program, which includes financial assistance to businesses to attend trade fairs. According to the brochure describing it, the program is intended "to make the Port of Baltimore a major gateway to the EC." With the possible exception of Maryland, the expectation that a major event in the international political economy, like Europe 1992, would produce a significant response in the entrepreneurial states has been disappointed.

The Entrepreneurial State?

None of the fifty states — and the entrepreneurial states are no exception — have found more than token resources to commit to their export policies. In the 1980s most states developed a range of programs to support the governor's foreign marketing efforts. All fifty states employ "international trade directors" in their economic development offices, although many combine their international trade activities with other duties. All but seven of the fifty maintain at least one overseas office, and most have several. However, all these programs, including those in the sixteen entrepreneurial states, are grossly understaffed. Of the tens of thousands of state workers in each state, few are employed in export programs; exports remain a low investment priority despite the relatively high visibility given them by their governors.

In the entrepreneurial states, the average professional staff charged with implementing state export policies consists of only nine persons, slightly better than the average of six professionals in the other states. The foreign office staffs, developers of trade shows and export leads, average only three persons in the entrepreneurial states and two in the others (see Table 2). The Rhode Island effort is typical: its European office employs one professional staffer and part-time clerical help.

The most popular activities in the states are also those which require a modest investment: seminars and conferences, dissemination of World Trade Center and Commerce Department sales leads, trade shows, and missions (see Table 1). One-on-one counseling involves more extensive resource investments, but these activities are usually rationed because of limited funding.²⁶ The international trade specialists we talked to in New England emphasized that counseling was among the most important services they could provide, but also the most costly. They were acutely aware that

their resources permitted helping only a small number of businesses that could benefit from their services.²⁷ Only seven of the fifty states have established export finance programs, a more extensive commitment of resources.²⁸ Like entrepreneurial policies in general, a great deal of export-related activity seems to be taking place in the states, but the reality is considerably less than the appearance.

Table 2

Export Efforts of Industrial Policy and All Other States

States ^a	High Industrial Policy States ^a	All Other States ^b
Mean number of professionals on staff	9.03	5.81
Mean number of seminars per year	22.57	15.36
Mean number of staff in foreign offices	2.93	1.87

Source: Data are from 1988 State Export Program Database of the National Association of State Development Agencies.

^aExcept for Wisconsin, which was missing from the NASDA data, these are the states listed in Table 1.

^bWashington, West Virginia, and Wyoming are missing from the NASDA data.

It is not surprising that the states are responding to Europe 1992 mainly by publishing brochures. The reacting states have made little response to the European initiative partly because they lack the resources to enter in a meaningful way. Certainly the effects of the 1990–1991 recession demonstrate the vulnerability of the states to national economic forces and to fiscal crises. More than half the fifty states ran deficits toward the end of the 1991 fiscal year,²⁹ as they continued to be squeezed by federal preemption of state revenue sources, the cost of federally mandated programs to the states, reductions in federal grants-in-aid, and soaring costs, particularly for medical benefits for state employees and persons on relief.

Given the hard fiscal realities faced by the states, twenty-nine of which laid off or furloughed workers and froze hiring in mid-1991,³⁰ their resources continue to be directed to their traditional responsibilities in education, public safety, maintenance of infrastructure, health, and the like. The devastating impact of the recession on the fiscal stability of California, New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, all entrepreneurial states, underlines a fundamental limitation to state policy: it cannot offset regional economic forces and the national economy, although this is a frequent justification for state industrial policies. Nor can state-level policies counteract national decisions on monetary, revenue, fiscal, banking, and interest policies, which affect the industrial structure. The interaction of state economies with national economic forces and policies provides a practical limit to what entrepreneurial states can do to promote their own economies.

Even if the states had discretionary resources to invest, we believe that they would be inappropriate jurisdictions around which to initiate export policy. Reflection on the major challenges Europe poses for American exports underscores this reality: they fall mainly under the responsibility of the national government. The states, for example, have no power to negotiate “rule of origin” requirements with the European Community. The reform of banking laws to assure reciprocity in financial services requires the revision of federal statutes like the McFadden and Glass-Steagall acts.

Even changes in state regulations and tax laws to establish greater homogeneity in the American market would require collective action on the part of the states. It is unlikely such action could be achieved among the fifty states without concerted national leadership from the president and Congress. What needs to be done to respond to Europe 1992 simply cannot be accomplished by the states alone.

Citizens have held state officials responsible for doing something, even though limitations of constitutional structure and finances prevent meaningful action. The response has been entrepreneurial activity that is largely symbolic and at most marginal in its impact on industrial adjustment.³¹ This becomes clearer if we look at the export promotion activities of California, which has one of the more sophisticated and extensive export promotion programs in the nation. With a professional staff of about sixteen people and an annual budget of more than \$10 million, the office is among the five largest trade agencies in the country. In 1989 total California exports equaled \$43.4 billion, a figure the California State World Trade Commission seeks to enhance. The agency's own estimate of its impact, \$500 million in "preserved or created" export sales over a six-year period, constitutes only one percent of total export sales in one year. Its largest-in-the-nation export finance program supported about \$100 million in sales in 1990, approximately 0.2 percent of 1989 exports. Although the entrepreneurial state seems active in California, its impact has not been great.

As the response to 1992 shows, the entrepreneurial state feels compelled in some way to react to highly publicized world events. Meanwhile, the key determination of the extent and terms of American access to the new Europe of the 1990s is up to the national government to negotiate. The outcome of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay round³² or the value of the dollar against European currencies will have much more to do with the volume of exports of businesses in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Michigan than any 1992 state economic development program. The rise of the entrepreneurial state does represent an interesting phenomenon in state government in the last decade, but it is more a symbolic response by state officials to the need for industrial adjustment to international competitiveness than an adequate solution to the problem.

There is a need for the infusion of reality into the discussion of the entrepreneurial state and its activities. There is a role for states in economic development and in export policy as well, but that role is not the design, support, and implementation of programs on a scale that can produce a measurable impact on state economies. The states are well situated to reach the small and middle-size private firms that lack the expertise or initiative to enter the export market yet could fill an important role in the implementation of federally initiated and supported programs. A few of the states have already built potentially workable small-scale models, such as the Export Assistance Center in Rhode Island, which might provide ideas around which to structure workable national programs. Governors might do well to press the federal government to supply what they cannot: a coordinated export policy built on international leverage and national leadership. ♣

Notes

1. Peter Eisinger, *The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State: State and Local Economic Development Policy in the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).
2. David Osborne, *Laboratories of Democracy* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1988).
3. For an account of the evolution of the EEC, see Stephen George, *Politics and Policy in the European Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). For more details on the 1980s movement to greater integration, see Alberta M. Sbragia, *Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992).
4. "West Europeans Gather to Seek a Tighter Union," *New York Times*, December 9, 1991, A-1.
5. "Europe's Future Hangs on the French Voter's Whim," *New York Times*, September 13, 1992, E-5.
6. "Europe's Currency System Shaken as Britain Cuts Free," *New York Times*, September 17, 1992, A-2. Facing strong criticism from "Eurosceptics" in his own conservative party, British Prime Minister John Major, acting in his capacity as rotating president of the EEC, called the other European government heads to an emergency meeting in Birmingham, England, on October 16, 1992, to discuss the new hesitations regarding Maastricht. At the meeting, the European leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the treaty but emphasized the importance of "respecting the interests and diversity of member states." "European Leaders Renew Unity Vow in Face of Strains," *New York Times*, October 17, 1992, 1. For Tory split, see "Echoes of Splits Past," *The Economist*, October 10, 1992, 74. While Major met with European leaders in Birmingham, his government lowered interest rates in an attempt to stimulate the stagnant British economy, a measure that encouraged the continuing decline of the pound against other European currencies. This development underscored the continuing economic differences within Europe, which must be overcome if the goals of Maastricht are to be achieved. "British Interest Rate Cut Exposes European Rift," *New York Times*, October 17, 1992, 4.

In spite of the hesitations about the Maastricht treaty, the European Council, at its December 1992 meeting in Edinburgh, approved amendments to allow Denmark a new vote on the treaty, scheduled for later this year. Meanwhile, the ratification process is on track in the other eleven member states. As to the single-market program, it is being implemented. See Axel Krause, "The Single Market Takes Off," *Europe*, February 1993, 19–22, and "A Rough Year," *The Economist*, December 19, 1992, 19–21.

7. Our data on state reaction to the 1992 program, which was collected prior to the signing of the Maastricht agreement, focused solely on state reaction to the 1992 program. Therefore, our analysis is completely unaffected by uncertainties about Maastricht.
8. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990*, 110th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 806–809.
9. Eisinger's account of the rise of the entrepreneurial state is consistent with a number of other studies documenting the state innovations of the 1980s. See Mel Dubnick, "American States and the Industrial Policy Debate," *Policy Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (August 1984): 22–27; Susan B. Hansen, "State Industrial Policy: The Case of Pennsylvania," paper presented at the Southwest Political Science Association meetings, Houston, March 1985; and William E. Hudson, Mark S. Hyde, and John J. Carroll, "Corporatist Policy Making and State Economic Development," *Polity* 19, no. 3 (1987): 402–418. This literature provides ample evidence that state policymakers, unlike their counterparts at the national level, endorsed adoption of entrepreneurial policies in their states. Most of this literature is anecdotal, describing policies in a handful of states. Osborne, in *Laboratories of Democracy*, for example, provides a detailed description of gubernatorial initiatives in six states: Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Arizona, Michigan, Massachusetts, and New York. Similar program descriptions are contained in a 1988 Committee on Economic Development-funded study of seven

- states. R. Scott Fosler, ed., *The New Economic Role of American States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Three of Fosler's states are also discussed by Osborne.
10. Eisinger, *The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State*, 7–10.
11. Blaine Liner, "States and Localities in the Global Marketplace," *Intergovernmental Perspective* 16, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 14.
12. Eisinger, *The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State*, 297; John Kincaid, "The American Governors in International Affairs," *Publius* 14, no. 4 (Fall 1984): 95–114; and Liner, "States and Localities in the Global Marketplace," 11–14.
13. William E. Hudson, "The French Socialists and the New Europe of 1993," paper presented at the American Political Science Association meetings, San Francisco, August 1990.
14. A collection of statements on the EEC by leading European socialists has been published as *Europe Without Frontiers: Socialists on the Future of the European Economic Community*, edited by Piet Dankert and Ad Kooyman (London: Mansell Publishing, 1989).
15. Steven Sylvia, "The Prospect of a Unified European Union Movement as a Result of 1992," paper presented at the Seventh Conference of Europeanists, Washington, D.C., March 1990.
16. These effects derive solely from the completion of the unified market program, which occurred on December 31, 1992.
17. Penelope Lemov, "Europe and the States: Free Trade but No Free Lunch," *Governing* 4 (January 1990): 49–52. See also discussions in Gary Hufbauer, ed., *Europe 1992: An American Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990), 41–44.
18. Lemov, "Europe and the States," and Hufbauer, *Europe 1992*, 88–105. This has been a working principle in establishing Europe's internal financial markets, which are to be encumbered by "a minimum of locally imposed conditions." Commission of the European Communities, *Europe Without Frontiers: Completing the Internal Market* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1989), 45.
19. Brandon Roberts, "EC '92: Opportunity Knocks?" *State Legislatures*, May–June 1990, 13–18.
20. Robert P. Strauss, "The EC Challenge to State and Local Governments," *Intergovernmental Perspective* 16, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 13–14.
21. Ibid.
22. Virginia Gray and David Lowry, "The Corporatist Foundations of State Industrial Policy," *Social Science Quarterly* 71, no. 1 (March 1990): 3–23.
23. These are Indiana, Michigan, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, plus California and Massachusetts.
24. The programs are customized industrial training (adopted by forty states), direct or indirect state loans (twenty-seven states), state grants (fourteen states) and state-funded or state-chartered equity/venture capital programs (eight states). Gray and Lowry, "The Corporatist Foundations," 15.
25. The states are California and Connecticut.
26. Liner, "States and Localities in the Global Marketplace."
27. In Rhode Island, for example, export counseling is provided through the Export Assistance Center at Bryant College. The state provides only a portion of the funds to support the center, although the State Department of Economic Development has no capacity of its own to offer such counseling. The center's director has such low expectations of receiving substantial future support from the state that his long-term plan is to move entirely to corporate grants, even though he himself is a state legislator!
28. Robin L. Franz, *Export Finance Programs: Executive Summary* (Smithfield: Rhode Island Export Assistance Center, 1989).

29. See, for example, "American Survey," *The Economist*, February 9, 1991, 27.
30. *New York Times*, April 18, 1991, B-10.
31. Margery M. Ambrosius, "Are Political Benefits the Only Benefits of State Economic Development Policies?" paper presented at the American Political Science Association meetings, San Francisco, August 1990; Susan B. Hansen, "Targeting in Economic Development: Comparative State Perspectives," *Publius* 19 (Spring 1989): 47-62.
32. Negotiations on the GATT, in which the European Economic Community and the United States have been the dominant participants.

State Strategy for Developing Base Industries

A Massachusetts Case Study

Chris Tilly

In developing strategies for economic development, state governments must target base industries that bring income into the state and drive the rest of the economy. This article presents a case study of industry analysis and development strategy for Massachusetts, focusing on the state's base industries. Particular attention is paid to the role of industry clusters — groups of industries linked through customer, supplier, or other relationships, and typically concentrated geographically as well. After assessing strengths and weaknesses of the state's economy, the author concludes that despite the current severe recession, the state possesses the basis for renewed growth. Policy implications for the state government are summarized.

To develop a strategy for economic development, a state government must identify — and find ways to facilitate the growth and prosperity of — key industries. In particular, states must target base industries that bring income into the state and drive the rest of the economy. This article presents a case study of industry analysis and development strategy for Massachusetts, focusing on the state's base industries. The discussion draws on the insights of over thirty economic development experts from business, government, and the academy who participated in a 1992 Massachusetts conference.¹

In the first section I lay out a conceptual framework for understanding the role of base industries in the Massachusetts economy. The next section briefly addresses the Massachusetts boom and bust of the 1980s, with particular attention to base industries. The third section assesses current strengths and problems of the Massachusetts economy, focusing on its ability to create good jobs. In the following section I examine the actual and potential base industries for the decade to come. The final section presents goals for an economic development strategy, guidelines for the role of state government in that strategy, and a set of policy proposals generated at the conference.

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What Are Base Industries and Why Do They Matter?

Massachusetts, a small economic unit, is highly connected with the rest of the world economy. As a result, the state imports many products from other parts of the country and from the whole world, be they fruit from Florida, movies from California, or automobiles from Michigan and Japan. The state's ability to import, and thus its overall standard of living, depends crucially on the industries that attract flows of income to Massachusetts, commonly known as base, export, or traded industries. These are businesses — from furniture manufacturers to software designers to insurance companies to universities to tourist attractions — that sell a substantial portion of their goods and services outside the state. The base industries drive the rest of the economy. The number of jobs in local or nonbase entities, such as retail outlets, construction, and even government, ultimately depends on the amount of income brought into the state by the base industries. Economists say that any increase in base industry sales outside the state has a multiplier effect. A Massachusetts knitwear manufacturer that exports the major portion of its goods to other states boosts its payroll. The new employees spend their paychecks at local stores, laundries, and so on. The manufacturer also purchases some raw materials, machinery, and energy from in-state businesses. All these, in turn, may add employees or extend employee hours, use more delivery services, and so on — and the multiplier continues down the line. The total effect is that one new job created in a base industry results, on the average, in 0.5 to 1.5 additional jobs being created elsewhere in the state economy.²

Over the long run, the base industries provide a regional economy's engine of growth. For example, the fortunes of western Pennsylvania rose and fell with the steel industry. In the history of Massachusetts, sea trade, textiles, shoes, machinery, and computers have played similarly decisive roles. But as this list illustrates, base industries can change over time, and different industries may affect different regions within a state.


While theoretically defining base industries is simple, actually identifying and measuring them is not. Most industries sell to a mix of in-state and out-of-state customers. Furthermore, government-gathered statistics do not break down figures for in-state and out-of-state sales. While some analysts have expediently defined the base as manufacturing, it is clear that such service industries as hotels and business consulting firms may have substantial out-of-state sales, whereas manufacturing industries, like cement, may not.³ Economic development analysts have developed a variety of techniques to deal with these problems. One approach is to determine which industries are disproportionately concentrated in a state: for instance, since Connecticut insurance carriers employ three times as many people per capita as carriers in the country as a whole, we conclude that Connecticut is exporting insurance to the rest of the country.

Identifying base industries pinpoints a state's current competitive advantage, but it does not tell us the sources of that advantage or the potential for future competitive advantage. To address these issues, Michael Porter has extended the concept of base industries to what he calls industry clusters — groups of industries linked through customer, supplier, or other relationships and, typically, concentrated geographically as well.⁴ For example, Porter identifies one such Massachusetts entity as the information technology cluster, encompassing computer and peripheral manufacturing, software development, information technology professional services, information

retrieval services, telecommunications, precision instrument manufacturing, and electronic components manufacturing.

Porter argues that the cluster as a whole, rather than any one industry within it, generates innovation and competitiveness. Successful clusters — and economically successful regions and nations as well — are characterized by the “competitive diamond” (see Figure 1). Competing companies, sophisticated groups of customers, specialized suppliers, and specialized factors of production (skilled workers, research and development, and infrastructure) form a mutually reinforcing complex.

Figure 1



Source: Michael Porter and the Monitor Company, Inc., *The Competitive Advantage of Massachusetts* (Cambridge, Mass.: Monitor Company, 1991), 10.

Some of the scholars who criticize Porter's framework argue that Porter overemphasizes rivalry among firms in a cluster, overlooking the cooperation and community that characterize successful industry groupings.⁵ Furthermore, while clusters play a decisive role in a region's economy, noncluster industries are also essential. Nonetheless, the concept of clusters, as well as the concept of base industries, is useful in thinking about the economic strengths of Massachusetts and other states.

In summary, base industries, particularly those which are part of industry clusters, fundamentally determine the state's economic health. An effective economic development strategy must find ways to aid and stimulate growth and innovation in these key industries. Before moving to the possible effects of policies in the future, we must examine past Massachusetts base industries.

Massachusetts Base Industries in the 1980s


Economist Lynn Browne comments that, as of 1988, "it would have been a brave forecaster indeed who suggested the region was about to suffer a serious downturn."⁶ Nonetheless, the Massachusetts — and New England — slump began in 1989. Looking at the industry patterns that drove the 1980s boom and precipitated the bust helps us think about the potential for future growth.

Figure 2 (reproduced from Browne's article) depicts the change in employment in New England industries at each year of the 1980s, and how the growth (or decline) differed from the U.S. average. Although these figures represent New England trends, they mirror the changes in Massachusetts. The broad pictures are straightforward. In 1979–1982, while the country struggled through the last recession, Massachusetts and New England enjoyed proportionally greater job growth (or smaller losses) in every major industry group except government. By 1987–1989, New England's employment growth lagged behind the nation's in every major industry.

More revealing than the overall trends, however, are the patterns for particular industries. Massachusetts and New England manufacturing employment outpaced the nation's from 1979 to 1984. As it turned out, however, 1984 was the peak. Since that year, the Bay State's manufacturing employment has fallen in absolute numbers and relative to the nation's. From 1984 to 1992, Massachusetts manufacturing jobs tumbled by 30 percent, with almost half the decline taking place before the regional recession began in 1989.⁷ The decline affected durable and nondurable production alike. Particularly visible was the drop in high-tech manufacturing employment. Companies such as Digital, Prime, Wang, and Data General, which had helped propel the boom in the early 1980s, shed jobs after 1984.

Since manufacturing — particularly high-tech manufacturing — is generally viewed as the key base industry in Massachusetts, this represents a puzzle. How did the Massachusetts economy keep expanding between 1984 and 1989 if the driving industry of the region was shrinking? Part of the answer lies in nonmanufacturing base industries. As Browne points out, Massachusetts firms selling to national markets include those in business consulting (such as the Boston Consulting Group), software (such as Lotus), mutual funds (such as Fidelity), and insurance (such as John Hancock) — representative companies in the service or finance/insurance/real estate (FIRE) industries. Services and FIRE continued strong growth in Massachusetts and New England until about 1988 before slowing down, which resulted from a series of factors, including the stock market crash of 1987, the implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated some real estate-related tax shelters, and instability among thrifts and commercial banks.

Continuing strength in business services and finance partially accounts for the continuation of the Massachusetts boom despite drooping manufacturing employment. But in addition, Massachusetts "broke the rules" with a real estate boom that was —



at least temporarily — self-sustaining. Buoyed by predictions of manufacturing recovery as well as by bustling service and finance industries, developers undertook a residential and commercial building boom in the late 1980s. Massachusetts and New England employment in construction zoomed past the nation's until 1988. The construction boom itself drove down unemployment and fed prosperity. In addition, the hot real estate market boosted homeowners' wealth, spurring consumption, which also contributed to economic growth. But without strength at the base, this cycle could not continue. The real estate market became saturated — indeed, overbuilt — and real estate values plummeted.

Thus, the Massachusetts boom of the 1980s was somewhat peculiar, having been propelled by manufacturing growth only during the first few years of the decade. After 1984, the boom was fueled by a combination of export services and a temporary surge in local construction and real estate activity. When the crash came in 1989, it hit triply hard: demand for Massachusetts manufactured goods declined, sales of the state's traded business and financial services dropped, and construction and real estate slumped. We cannot expect a replay of this boom in the 1990s, but by assessing the long-term strengths and weaknesses of the Massachusetts economy, we can begin to form a realistic picture of what is possible.

The State of the Massachusetts Economy

Massachusetts brings both problems and strengths into the 1990s. Rather than considering every possible economic strength or weakness, I focus here on those affecting base industries. Much of this section draws on analyses by Sara Johnson and Michael Porter.⁸

Perhaps it is inevitable in a time of recession that Massachusetts's list of problems is longer than its list of strengths. However, the considerable strengths of the state's economy have brought renewed growth repeatedly from the 1950s to the present.

Seven main problems affect Massachusetts base industries: (1) the erosion of base manufacturing; (2) the state's historic dependence on defense; (3) tight credit; (4) poor business climate; (5) high cost of doing business; (6) shortage of industrial space; and (7) dependence of particular regions on a single industry. Let's consider these one by one.

Problem 1: The Erosion of Base Manufacturing

The 30 percent loss of Massachusetts manufacturing jobs is a serious setback. Much of it is temporary, and much of it reflects the national downturn, but part of it reflects competitive weaknesses of specific Massachusetts industries. The best-known example is the minicomputer industry, whose market narrowed through the 1980s as desktop PCs and later network workstations took the place of minicomputers in many workplaces. Over the long run, however, job losses have been concentrated in traditional manufacturing sectors such as fabricated metals and textiles, apparel, and leather.

Problem 2: Dependence on Defense

The end of the Cold War is bringing cuts in every sector of federal defense spending, with real spending cuts over the next five years ranging from 20 percent for research

and development to 40 percent for missiles and ships.⁹ These reductions will hurt those Massachusetts businesses which earlier benefited from the defense buildup. With only 3 percent of total U.S. employment, Massachusetts receives 9 percent of Department of Defense prime contracts.

In manufacturing, sectors affected by spending reductions will include makers of aircraft engines, missiles, guidance systems, communication equipment, instruments, and electronic equipment — and the subcontractors that supply them. The cuts will also strike beyond manufacturing, hitting universities and laboratories conducting defense-funded research as well as military bases and facilities such as Fort Devens. Overall, Massachusetts is losing about 1,000 defense-related jobs per month, and the state stands to lose a total of 50,000 in the next two to three years.¹⁰

Problem 3: Tight Credit

Businesses in Massachusetts complain bitterly of an ongoing credit crunch. As of late 1990, Massachusetts banks ranked last in the country in domestic deposit growth and forty-seventh in domestic loan growth.¹¹ While part of the drying up of credit is a temporary reaction to hard times (and harsh regulatory scrutiny), participants pointed out that the consolidation of the banking industry has virtually eliminated the community banker, shifting decisions over commercial lending to central locations where officials have little understanding or sympathy for local business needs. Most difficult of all is accessing venture capital, especially for small companies.

Problem 4: Poor Business Climate

Many business spokespersons fault the Massachusetts business climate. Compared to that of other states, the permitting process for siting is slow. Businesses must navigate a plethora of state and local regulatory agencies, and communication from these agencies is often unclear or inconsistent. Business owners feel that agency representatives are often indifferent or hostile to business needs and requests.

Problem 5: High Cost of Doing Business

Many Massachusetts business costs remain higher than elsewhere in the country. Average manufacturing wages in the state, which stood 5 percent below the national average in 1980, climbed rapidly during the tight labor market of the 1980s and currently exceed the national average by 17 percent. Part of this wage gap results from the mix of manufacturing jobs in Massachusetts, which is different from that of the nation as a whole, but even after adjusting for the mix, Massachusetts wages are 14 percent higher. Service wages exceed the national average by 11 percent.¹² Slow expected population growth in Massachusetts may create new labor shortages once the economy recovers.

Industrial electricity prices in the Bay State are 13 percent above the national average as well, reflecting high-cost nuclear, oil, and gas generation (though this gap will narrow as Clean Air Act regulations raise the price of coal generation).¹³ Compounding these problems, employer taxes to fund the state's unemployment insurance pool rose substantially in 1992.

Problem 6: Shortage of Industrial Space

Despite the softening of the real estate market, industrial space remains relatively costly and difficult to find in many parts of Massachusetts.

Problem 7: Dependence on a Single Industry

While the state as a whole is relatively diversified, certain regions depend decisively on one industry — or a small number of related industries — rendering them vulnerable to a slump in those industries. For example, Cape Cod and the neighboring islands depend greatly on tourism; southeastern Massachusetts leans heavily on the declining garment and textile industries.

These problems may seem daunting, but the state also possesses three key strengths that offer hope for the future of Massachusetts base industries: (1) an educated work force; (2) research and technology resources; and (3) clusters of competitive industry.

Strength 1: An Educated Work Force

The combination of a concentration of colleges and universities and the growth of industries requiring an educated work force has allowed Massachusetts to generate and retain a highly educated labor pool. The Bay State, which is tied with Connecticut for the highest percentage of college graduates in the adult population, has the highest percentage among twenty-four- to thirty-four-year-olds.¹⁴ The Massachusetts advantage persists as one looks higher up the education ladder as well. Of software CEOs surveyed by the Massachusetts Software Council, 55 percent received their higher education in Massachusetts.¹⁵ Skills and education pay off: between 1979 and 1986, Massachusetts worker productivity rose three times as fast as the national average.¹⁶

Strength 2: Research and Technology Resources

Massachusetts ranks among the top five states in per capita number of scientists and engineers with Ph.D.'s, patents issued, R & D expenditures, venture capital, and science and engineering graduate students.¹⁷ The state's agglomeration of universities, existing high-technology businesses, laboratories, research hospitals, and venture capital firms has proved to be a potent generator of new industries and new products.

Strength 3: Clusters of Competitive Industry


Although Massachusetts is currently in a downturn, and much attention has focused on the rocky fortunes of a few minicomputer manufacturers, many sectors remain vital and nationally and internationally competitive. These sectors have either continued to grow through the slump (for example, in software, in which employment grew 3 percent between 1988 and 1991)¹⁸ or are poised to grow once the national economy recovers. According to Porter, "The core industry clusters in our economy would be the envy of most nations. All are expected to be among the fastest growing sectors of the national and world economy."¹⁹

This inventory of problems and strengths sets the stage for a strategy for development of base industries in Massachusetts. The next step is to identify the base industries that can foster prosperity.

The Future: Massachusetts Base Industries in the Nineties

Which industries will power the Massachusetts economy of the 1990s? Predictably, each expert's list is slightly different. Yet most analysts agree on certain common threads.

Porter identifies four core clusters in the state: health care, knowledge creation, information technology, and financial services.²⁰ They fit his criteria for size and growth over the last two decades, as well as his assessment of their sophistication, productivity, and market position. These clusters embrace the main export industries of Massachusetts, as shown in Figure 3. Heinz Muehlmann, chief economist of the Department of Employment and Training (DET), has tabulated employment for these clusters, along with other industries, for the fourth quarter of 1991 (see Table 1).



The health care cluster includes hospitals, home health care agencies, nursing and personal care facilities, biomedical technology, medical research institutes, medical instrument manufacturing, and medical laboratories. As Table 1 shows, this cluster, which employs more than 300,000 people, represents 13 percent of Massachusetts private employment. By far the largest sector within this cluster is hospitals, with 132,000 employees; biotechnology and medical instrumentation, by contrast, account for a far smaller 30,000.

Table 1

**Massachusetts Private Sector Employment by Clusters,
Fourth Quarter 1991**

Major Clusters	Employment	As percentage of total
Health care	311,224	13.0%
Knowledge creation	179,163	7.5%
Information technology	154,615	6.5%
Financial services	141,198	5.9%
Travel and tourism ^a	87,500	3.6%
Total	873,700	36.5%
Minor Clusters (Traditional Manufacturing)		
Metals	48,086	2.0%
Machinery	52,626	2.2%
Plastics	21,953	0.9%
Apparel and textiles	32,239	1.3%
Paper	21,072	0.9%
Printing & publishing	48,640	2.0%
Food products	19,579	0.8%
Aerospace/missiles	25,057	1.0%
Chemicals	13,712	0.6%
Instruments	50,529	2.1%
Other manufacturing	36,476	1.5%
Total	369,960	15.5%
Total, All Clusters	1,243,660	52.0%
Local (Noncluster) Industries	1,148,295	48.0%
Total Employment	2,391,955	100.0%
Special Clusters ^b		
Defense-related	158,313	
Environmental	55,000	
Marine-related	81,826	

Source: Heinz Muehlmann, "Employment Profile of the Massachusetts Economy, 1988-1991," Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training, July 1992, 2.

^aEmployment estimated by industry representatives.

^bEmployment estimated by industry representatives; overlaps with categories above.

The knowledge creation cluster includes research and development laboratories, educational institutions, basic research institutions, think tanks, engineering firms, consulting firms, legal firms, printing and publishing companies, and advertising market research firms. Almost 180,000 people, close to 8 percent of the commonwealth's private work force, are employed in this sector. Colleges and universities make up the largest subgroup, with 72,000 employees.

The information technology cluster includes computer and peripheral manufacturing, software development, information technology professional services, information retrieval services, telecommunications, precision instrument manufacturing, and electronic component manufacturing. Unlike the other clusters, no one sector dominates this cluster's work force of 155,000 — almost 7 percent of total private employment: computer and office equipment manufacturers account for 39,000,

electronic components for 30,000, and computer services, chiefly software, for 40,000.

The financial service cluster includes banking, venture capital, asset management, life and property/casualty insurance, and real estate. Financial service weighs in with 141,000 employees, 6 percent of the state's private work force. The major employers within this cluster are depository institutions (76,000) and insurance carriers (53,000).

Muehlmann also identifies a travel and tourism cluster, with 87,500 employees. It is not clear that this is a cluster in Porter's sense of a dynamic, innovative group of industries, but it clearly is an important employer in Massachusetts.

Moving beyond the core clusters, Porter suggests three minor clusters. One, the new, growing environment equipment and service industry, includes engineering firms, manufacturers of equipment used in environmental monitoring and recycling processes, hazardous waste management firms, and consulting firms working with issues like asbestos removal, among others. The Environmental Business Council claims 55,000 employees in this industry. (Government statistics are not conducive to measuring this number, so Table 1 shows it separately, along with defense and marine industry clusters.) Many of these businesses apply high technology to environmental problems, making up what is called the envirotech industry.


Porter's other two minor clusters, although they are more mature, traditional manufacturing industries, still possess the capacity to innovate and penetrate niche markets. Metalworking, centered in central and western Massachusetts, accounts for 101,000 workers when primary metals, fabricated metals, and machinery (except electrical) are included. Plastics, concentrated in the Leominster-Fitchburg area, employs 22,000.

The DET breakdown identifies eight additional Massachusetts manufacturing industries as minor clusters. Although these may be small in terms of statewide employment, they play a crucial role in providing jobs in particular substate regions. Looking through this local area lens, we can certainly suggest a number of other miniclusters, for example, fishing and marine industries, furniture, paper, and food processing, but it will require further research to come up with a full set of new cluster definitions.

Overall, then, major clusters account for 36.5 percent of the state's private work force, minor clusters for 15.5 percent, and local industries for 48 percent (see Figure 4).

How well positioned are the Massachusetts industry clusters? Overall, Massachusetts private employment dipped 11.8 percent between fourth quarter 1988 and 1991. The major clusters lost only 3.9 percent of their jobs, and major plus minor clusters lost only 7.9 percent. However, these averages conceal substantial variation. For example, among the major clusters, information technology lost jobs faster than overall private employment (-16%); financial services and travel/tourism lost jobs at almost the statewide rate (-9.6% and -8.5%, respectively); knowledge creation remained essentially unchanged (-0.1%); and health care actually gained jobs at a 9 percent clip.²¹

Despite the recent losses in many of these industries, analysts, including Porter and Johnson, view the major clusters — and selected minor ones — as healthy and competitive. Porter cautions that in some cases industry growth will be limited by



constraints on demand, such as cost-containment pressure in health care and the shrinking college population — and rising cost of higher education — in knowledge creation. Table 2 shows the list of potential growth industries offered by Johnson and three other experts — John Hodgman, president of the Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation, and Chris Sands and David Basile, senior vice president and vice president, respectively, of Tucker Anthony.

Table 2

Potential Growth Sectors Identified by Experts

Sara Johnson, DRI/McGraw-Hill

- Information systems
 - Networking equipment
 - Parallel-processing supercomputers
- Fault-tolerant computers
- Video communications
- Health care
 - Biotechnology, biopharmaceuticals

John Hodgman, Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation

- Computer networking and communications
- Fiber optics
- Software
- Supercomputing
- Biotechnology
- Manufacturing equipment
 - (e.g., for the semiconductor industry)
- Contract manufacturing
- Educational materials and services

Chris Sands and David Basile, Tucker Anthony

- Health care
- Envirotech
- Telecommunications
- Biotechnology

Source: Presentations at conference cosponsored by the Massachusetts Executive Office of Economic Affairs and the University of Massachusetts, "Expanding the Base of Our Economy to Provide Good Jobs," University of Massachusetts at Lowell, July 16, 1992.

Certain commonalities appear in these lists, as well as in Porter's views. All agree that several overlapping factors will characterize the industries and companies which will come out on top in Massachusetts

- New or specialized products
- High-value-added products
- Focus on quality and meeting customer needs
- Products building on high technology
- Goods and services requiring high skill levels

These industries will benefit most from the state's skilled work force and its strengths in technology and research. They are industries for which — unlike the traditional manufacturing industries — high labor costs are an expected part of doing business and a spur to increases in innovation and productivity.

Of course, none of this implies that traditional manufacturing jobs will disappear or become unimportant in the Massachusetts economy. The hundreds of thousands of jobs provided by traditional manufacturing will continue to be a mainstay for the Bay State. But within these industries as well, new growth will be spawned largely by

companies that are innovating or aiming at niche markets. Examples of such companies abound. Within the declining Adams-Gardner area furniture sector, companies such as a ceramic tabletop manufacturer are developing high-value-added products and conquering international markets. Despite the overall stagnation of the needle trades, a Polo apparel factory in Lawrence is using advanced process technology, with high-value-added results. These exceptions help to prove the general rule.

Goals, Guidelines, and Policy Proposals

The following initial recommendations for state policies to facilitate the growth of base industries and the creation of good jobs are based on this analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Massachusetts economy. They fall into three categories: goals for economic development policy, general guidelines for policy, and policy proposals.

Goals for Economic Development Policy

It is useful to specify general economic development goals and the criteria for identifying the industries we wish to foster.

General economic development goals should include

- Creating a high standard of living in the state
- Inclusiveness — avoid leaving any particular regions of populations behind
- Sustainability

Desirable industry characteristics dovetail with the attributes of growth sectors.

- Ability to apply new technology
- High-value-added products
- High-wage jobs
- Ability to generate multiple products from a single technology
- Utilization of local resources
- Minimum seed money, maximum leverage
- Growth potential
- Exporting to other regions

General Guidelines for Policy

Several major guidelines characterize a wise state economic development policy for Massachusetts.

- Economic development policy must be flexible and multifaceted. In addition to its emphasis on base industries, the state must pay attention to other industries. Base and nonbase industries are interdependent, as the clusters demonstrate. In addition to targeting growing industries, Massachusetts must retain existing industries.
- Economic development policy must serve everyone in the state. This involves separate strategies for each region of the state and an end to a state government perspective on economic development that barely looks beyond the Boston area. Successful economic development is local economic development, and a

key state goal should be bolstering local capacity. It also means including all populations in the state, with a focus on providing skills and creating jobs for groups that have lagged behind.

- Economic development policy must develop base resources as well as base industries. Massachusetts's resources — particularly skills and technology — help the state grow and attract businesses. In the foreseeable future, Massachusetts will not compete on the basis of low costs of labor, land, or capital. Therefore the main focus should be on increasing resource quality, not reducing costs. State spending that builds up the resource base should be viewed as investment rather than expenditure.
- Economic development policy must help the market work better. The goal is to improve the functioning of markets for labor, land, capital, and goods, not to replace these markets.
- Economic development policy must be strategic, proactive, and long term. The state should try to stay ahead of the curve rather than simply reacting to crises as they occur. Among other things, this requires depoliticizing economic development and buffering it from the annual struggle over the next year's budget.

Policy Proposals

Specific policy changes are needed in six major areas: finance, work force, information and capacity building, transportation, and the state's economic development capacity. These are framed as broadly sketched proposals.

Finance. As noted in the guidelines, the objective is to make the market work better. This requires a careful analysis of where the capital market is failing, owing to problems such as lack of information or transaction costs. Based on this analysis, state government can play several roles.

- Catalyst. For example, help to set up or give special benefits to private — but possibly nonprofit — venture capital funds, revolving loan funds, and so on.
- Broker or facilitator. Bring people together; help match supply with demand.
- Investor. As in the case of the Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation and other quasi-public financial institutions, the state may play the role of providing “the first olive out of the bottle,” especially for smaller companies, or gap financing.
- Regulation. This might include judicious use of the Community Reinvestment Act to redirect the flow of capital. Another aspect in the current credit crunch might be pressing regulators to be less conservative.

Work force. State government should direct efforts in the following areas:

- Improving education and skills. K–12 education, specific vocational education, and public higher education have all been cut back over the last few years; they, along with retraining programs, must be rebuilt and strengthened. The effort must begin with K–12; after all, only about one quarter of Massachusetts residents complete a four-year college degree, and almost one-fifth don't finish high school at all. While the state's major clusters need highly educated workers, they also need competent workers at the high school graduate level,

especially in finance and health. There may be a need to revamp the traditional curriculum. Specific vocational education and programs for the school-to-work transition help create a work-ready group of high school graduates. The point is not just to train in one specific set of skills, but to provide an understanding of the world of work that will serve wherever a student ends up. Public higher education helps train engineers, accountants, and nurses, as well as young adults with general problem-solving and communication skills — all groups that have been in short supply — and are likely to be again when the economy rebounds. Retraining is important to help workers move from one area of work to another, so that the work force can adjust flexibly to meet the needs of a fast-changing economy.

- Building “social infrastructure.” The work force needs day care and affordable housing. Especially at a time when the work force is expected to grow very slowly, infrastructure that helps to expand the potential work force plays a critical role.
- Enhancing quality of life. This is a “hidden” work-force issue. Studies show that quality-of-life factors greatly influence industrial location, because businesses are concerned about attracting and retaining mobile high-level employees. This is particularly true for industries with large numbers of professional and technical workers, like many of the main industries in the commonwealth. Massachusetts has a lot going for it in terms of natural beauty and cultural amenities, but funding cutbacks have eroded certain basic quality-of-life items like schools and public services in many areas.

Information and capacity building. This touches on several areas.

- Local capacity building. As noted in the guidelines, successful economic development is local economic development. The state should facilitate the capacity of local institutions — chambers of commerce, local planning departments, regional planning bodies, community-based organizations — to engage in economic development. The ultimate goal would be for the state to limit its direct involvement to areas in which there are economies of scale (such as data gathering) or where issues cut across different regions of the state.
- Help businesses network. Some industries are well organized, but others have not gotten together to identify and act on their needs. The state can help businesses form networks and associations for purposes like joint marketing, training, and lobbying.
- Technology transfer. Businesses, particularly smaller ones and those in mature industries, have a hard time staying on the technological cutting edge. Yet investing in process and product innovations could help them expand their markets and stay competitive. The state can play a critical role in diffusing information about state-of-the-art technology tailored to the needs of business. One possible model is the “industrial extension program,” akin to the tremendously successful agricultural extension system. It would be natural to plug this kind of technology transfer function into such existing state institutions as public schools of higher education.
- Export marketing. The state has already recognized this as an important area. Markets are becoming increasingly global, and there is the potential for

rapidly expanding markets in areas such as Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. The state has economies of scale in training and assisting businesses in global marketing.

- Geographic information system. A tremendous resource for companies making location decisions would be a computerized geographic information system (GIS) that shows the location of infrastructure, transportation nodes, institutions of higher education, and so on. A GIS should probably be based at the University of Massachusetts.

Business climate. These straightforward proposals would have a payoff in good will as well as business attraction and retention.

- One-stop shopping. It would be a great boon to provide a central clearinghouse for information on all types of regulation and assistance affecting business.
- Streamline regulatory processes. To the extent possible, speed up regulatory decision making and permitting. Recognize the cost of delays to businesses.
- Customer-oriented agencies. State agencies should learn to view businesses as customers, not as adversaries. This does not mean abandoning regulations (as Porter points out, strong regulation in areas such as the environment is one element that helps breed strong global competitors). But it does mean a change of attitude.
- Market the state. This begins with steps as simple as a brochure touting Massachusetts to business.

Transportation. The rebuilding of Boston's Central Artery and digging a third tunnel beneath Boston Harbor will help relieve congestion; other region-specific projects to eliminate bottlenecks would also be important. However, in the long run the state should develop alternatives to automobile and truck transportation, particularly by upgrading the rail system. A second international airport may also be needed.

Economic development capacity. The state government must not only invest in building local economic development capacity, but must also invest in itself. Paring back in some areas may have handicapped the state's ability to plan and execute economic development. Fleshing out and acting on the previous five proposals will require research, planning, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation, in addition to the resources needed for direct implementation. State government should invest in itself in a logical way to establish these capabilities. Another important step, as noted in the guidelines, is to insulate long-term economic development strategy from year-to-year budget struggles, perhaps by setting up independent quasi-public institutions like Pennsylvania's widely hailed Ben Franklin Partnership.

These proposals build on the state's strengths. Acting on the proposals will assist Massachusetts in nourishing and strengthening its base industries. The current downturn is temporary, and the investments and improvements suggested here will help the Massachusetts economy to charge back in the years to come. Other states, as well, should undertake similar analyses of their key base industries, of their main strengths and weaknesses with respect to these industries, and the policy implications that flow from these analyses. ■

Notes

1. The conference, "Expanding the Base of Our Economy to Provide Good Jobs," cosponsored by the Massachusetts Executive Office of Economic Affairs and the University of Massachusetts, took place July 16, 1992, at the University of Massachusetts at Lowell. It was one of a series of economic strategy conferences convened by these sponsors during the summer and fall of 1992.
2. Heinz Muehlmann, "Trends in Massachusetts Base Industries," presentation at conference, "Expanding the Base of Our Economy."
3. For a discussion of these issues, see Edward Moscovitch, "The Downturn in the New England Economy: What Lies Behind It?" Federal Reserve Bank of Boston *New England Economic Review*, July/August 1990, 53–65.
4. Michael Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1990); Michael Porter, and the Monitor Company, Inc., *The Competitive Advantage of Massachusetts* (Cambridge, Mass.: Monitor Company, 1991).
5. William Lazonick, "Industry Clusters versus Global Webs: Organizational Capabilities in the U.S. Economy," *Industrial and Corporate Change*, forthcoming.
6. Lynn E. Browne, "The Role of Services in New England's Rise and Fall: Engine of Growth or Along for the Ride?" Federal Reserve Bank of Boston *New England Economic Review*, July/August 1991, 27.
7. Sara Johnson, "One State's Story: Massachusetts Emerges from Recession," *DRI/McGraw Hill U.S. Review*, July 1992, 34–38.
8. Ibid.; Porter and Monitor Company, *The Competitive Advantage of Massachusetts*.
9. Johnson, "One State's Story," 35.
10. Muehlmann, "Trends in Massachusetts Base Industries."
11. Porter and Monitor Company, *The Competitive Advantage of Massachusetts*, 87.
12. Johnson, "One State's Story," 35.
13. Ibid., 36.
14. Ibid.; Porter and Monitor Company, *The Competitive Advantage of Massachusetts*, 73.
15. Porter and Monitor Company, *The Competitive Advantage of Massachusetts*, 106.
16. Ibid., 48.
17. Johnson, "One State's Story," 36.
18. Heinz Muehlmann, "Employment Profile of the Massachusetts Economy, 1988–1991," Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training, July 1992.
19. Porter and Monitor Company, *The Competitive Advantage of Massachusetts*, 20.
20. Ibid., 14.
21. Muehlmann, "Employment Profile of the Massachusetts Economy."

Education and Community Development Among Nineteenth-Century Irish and Contemporary Cambodians in Lowell, Massachusetts

Dr. Peter N. Kiang

As cities undergo dramatic demographic changes, schools become important sites of conflict between the interests of established and emerging communities. This article presents a case study of Lowell, Massachusetts, where the second largest Irish community in the country resided during the 1850s, and which is now home to the second largest Cambodian community in the United States. Analysis of nineteenth-century Irish community dynamics, particularly in relation to issues of public education in Lowell, reveals the significance of religious institutions and middle-class entrepreneurs in the process of immigrant community development and highlights important relationships to ethnicity, electoral politics, and economic development. In light of the Irish example, a conceptual framework is presented to understand current dynamics of leadership, institution building, and community empowerment among Cambodians and their contemporary struggles for educational equity.

Lowell, Massachusetts, the birthplace of America's industrial revolution and the crucible for many important developments in U.S. immigrant and labor history, has undergone a new period of dramatic demographic change caused by the rapid growth of Latino and Southeast Asian populations.¹ During the 1980s, for example, the number of Cambodians in Lowell grew from fewer than 100 to between 15,000 and 25,000 — totaling one fifth of the city's population and making Lowell the site of the second largest concentration of Cambodians in the country after Long Beach, California. Rapid demographic change has triggered conflict in the city, particularly in relation to issues of schooling and the new immigrant communities.

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This article explores the recent dynamics of Cambodian community development in light of Lowell's remarkable history during the mid-1800s, when rapid demographic change led to the development of the nation's second largest concentration of Irish in the country. Analyzing the development of the Irish community and its relationship to issues of public education in Lowell during this earlier historical period reveals particular themes that situate schools in their social context and that link current struggles for educational equity in Lowell with dynamics of leadership, institution building, and community empowerment.

There are obvious limitations in the applicability of specific lessons from mid-nineteenth-century Lowell to the present day. The city's economic structure and political institutions have changed dramatically during the past 150 years. Furthermore, the social, cultural, racial, class, and religious characteristics of the two immigrant groups are substantially different.²

Nevertheless, given the lack of focused research on Cambodian community development as well as continuing debates over larger issues of race, class, and immigrant assimilation in the United States, the historical case provides a useful lens through which to assess contemporary social conflicts and community strategies for empowerment. As historian Mark Scott Miller asserts in his study analyzing the impact of World War II on Lowell:

At each step of the city's history, Lowell's citizens experienced the extremes of the advance of American society and its social and economic structures. Because Lowell's life as a city is so dramatic, changes in this archetypical community clarify trends that more moderated experiences in other communities might obscure.³

A Brief History of Lowell

The town of Lowell⁴ was established in 1826 in the context of America's industrial revolution. Seeking to expand their economic base, Boston gentry purchased land alongside the Merrimack River and built a chain of textile mills with an elaborate interlocking system of canals that powered looms with energy generated by the river's current. As Lowell emerged as the country's textile center, teenage girls were recruited from the area's surrounding farms to work in the mills. Paid at half the male wage, yet earning more than they would from farm work, the mill girls lived in dormitory-style housing constructed next to the factories. Harsh working and living conditions, however, led to some of the country's first examples of labor organizing — including mill girl strikes in 1834 and 1836, formation of the Lowell Female Labor Reform Association in 1844, and a petition to the Massachusetts legislature for a ten-hour workday in 1845.⁵

With successive waves of European immigrants arriving on the East Coast throughout the 1800s and early 1900s, cheap immigrant labor entered the booming textile industry and replaced the mill girls in Lowell. The girls' dormitories evolved into overcrowded tenement housing for successive waves of Irish, French Canadian, Greek, Polish, and Portuguese immigrants.

As the textile industry reached its height in the 1890s, Lowell became widely recognized as a city built by immigrants. Labor organizing also continued in the city

as the Yiddish-speaking Lowell Workingmen's Circle formed in 1900 and Greek immigrants led a citywide strike in 1903 that set the stage for the well-known Bread and Roses strike of 1912 in the neighboring mill town of Lawrence.

But by the 1920s, the textile industry in Lowell entered a long period of depression and economic decline. By 1945, eight of the city's eleven big mills had closed and unemployment soared. Foreshadowing the decline of many midwestern industrial cities during the 1970s, Lowell and other textile mill towns in the area all but died during this period.

In the 1970s, a combination of factors, including the emergence of new industries fueled by high-technology research at Massachusetts universities and the political muscle of the Massachusetts congressional delegation — which included Speaker of the House Thomas ("Tip") O'Neill, Jr., Senator Edward Kennedy, and Senator Paul Tsongas (who was born and raised in Lowell) — led to a turnaround in the state's economic condition. A combination of federal dollars and corporate investment revitalized Lowell's economy, enabling the city to move from 13.8 percent unemployment in 1978 to 7 percent in 1982 to less than 3 percent in 1987. After rehabilitation of the rundown mill factories, the city's vacant industrial land area dropped from 100 acres in 1978 to zero by 1987.⁶

Serving as the backdrop for the launching of Michael Dukakis's presidential campaign in 1988, Lowell was cited as the model city of the Massachusetts economic miracle, having overcome industrial decline to reemerge as a leading center of the country's high-technology revolution. Lowell's remarkable rebirth generated an optimism within the city that paralleled accounts from the early days of industrialization during the 1830s, when Lowell was described as "the focus of all eyes . . . a light upon a hill."⁷

Demographic Change and Community Development: The Irish Experience

Lowell owes much to Irish immigrants, who were among the initial laborers to construct a set of canals and factories in 1822 even before the city was formally incorporated. By 1830, more than 500 Irish had settled permanently in "paddy camps," later known as "the Acre," on the outskirts of the mill village at the center of town.⁸

During the 1830s, two contrasting trends emerged. The Irish population established a stable community characterized by their entry into the mills in Lowell and the surrounding area, their development of ethnic businesses and a small entrepreneurial class, and most important, their construction of an Irish Catholic church in the neighborhood. Erected in 1831, Saint Patrick's served as "a symbol of the Irish presence in Lowell and represented the Irish commitment to order and stability. . . . The church was, in effect, the center of the first stirrings of community among the Irish in Lowell."⁹

However, as the Irish population grew, so did local resentment and anti-Irish Catholic reaction. In May 1831, a general riot left one person dead and many others injured. Street fights and harassment escalated. Lowell city officials reported in 1832 that "a disturbance of the peace is of almost nightly occurrence."¹⁰

These two trends, which continued to take root in counterpoint during the next two decades, intensified with the massive influx of Irish immigrants escaping Ireland's potato famines in the 1840s. By 1840, the Irish population of Lowell had

reached 21,000. By 1850, the arrival of famine Irish raised the number to more than 33,000 — roughly 30 percent of the city — making Lowell the second largest concentration of Irish in the country, after Boston.

Irish population growth created new markets and opportunities for the small Irish entrepreneurial class who owned ethnic neighborhood businesses, rented out tenement apartments, and contracted Irish labor power for the mills. With increased support from the Boston Irish Catholic church leadership, Lowell's Irish community, which had long since outgrown their 1831 church facility, succeeded in constructing a magnificent new Saint Patrick's Church in 1854.

At the same time, rapid demographic change led to growing concerns about public image and order in the city, particularly after the influx of poor, uneducated famine Irish. Anti-Irish sentiment, which had been brewing since 1831, climaxed in 1854, less than a month after the opening dedication ceremony of the new Saint Patrick's Church, when the Know-Nothing party swept into elected office in Lowell and throughout the state on an explicitly anti-Irish campaign platform. Lowell's local Know-Nothing party was founded in 1851 with a call to action against "the swarms of Irish poor who wreaked such havoc upon the moral, economic, and social character of Lowell."¹¹

Given the intensity of demographic change, educational institutions were called on to resolve some of the growing social conflicts. Like the evolution of common schooling throughout New England, the view of Lowell's graded schools embodied deeply felt goals of assimilating and Americanizing immigrants. Lowell's attention to public schooling reflected strong desires for social order and stability amid the growing crime, poverty, and health problems that had seemingly accompanied the famine Irish to the city. Schooling was seen as the vehicle to preserve and promote Yankee standards and power relations.

Schooling through the 1840s and 1850s also became the process through which Lowell's Irish became employable. Public school certificates of attendance became standard letters of introduction for Irish children seeking work in the mills.¹²

Of any city institution, the public schools dealt most directly, and perhaps most equitably with the Irish community. Interestingly, as Mitchell notes, "of all Irish political activity, participation on the school committee was most significant."¹³ A compromise agreement over schooling between the city and the Irish community in 1835 exemplified this relationship. Unlike New York and other cities where the issue of public schooling for Irish Catholic children fueled bitter debate and hostility between school officials and the church, a compromise negotiated between local priests, Boston's Bishop Benedict Joseph Fenwick, and Lowell city officials allocated public education funds to support parish schools attended by Irish Catholic schoolchildren.

The compromise, hailed by all parties, maintained nominal school committee authority while providing for significant Irish community control. School committee decisions on hiring, curriculum, and textbook selection, for example, were to be based on choices acceptable to the church and its Catholic instructors. The agreement recognized the significance of the Irish Catholic community as a constituent group in the city,¹⁴ and resulted in the incorporation of the majority of Lowell's Irish Catholic schoolchildren into the public school system.¹⁵

The 1835 compromise remained in effect until 1851, when the nascent Know-Nothing party forced the parish schools to close for lack of public funds.¹⁶ By then,

the Irish constituted a majority of the labor force working in the mills. As anti-Irish sentiment grew through the 1840s with the coming of the famine Irish, a new generation of Irish community leadership emerged which responded to the worsening social climate by calling for unity under the banner of the church. Central to their strategy was the establishment of new Catholic parish schools with their own funding and facilities.

Unlike their predecessors, who tried to accommodate community needs with Yankee concerns for order and stability, the emerging generation of Irish leadership in the 1850s advocated fulfilling the community's needs by strengthening the roles of the family and the church. Over time, this approach succeeded in forging a new, working-class, Irish Catholic identity that evolved into a cohesive voting bloc and significant political force in the city — eventually producing Lowell's first Irish mayor in 1882 and dominating city politics from that time to the present.¹⁷

Demographic Change and Community Development: The Recent Experience

More than a century after the Irish had settled the Acre, a small number of Puerto Ricans settled in Lowell in the late 1950s as part of large-scale Puerto Rican migrations throughout the Northeast industrial states. In the late 1960s, a large group of Puerto Rican workers based at garment factories in New Jersey were transferred to Lowell. Through the 1970s, Puerto Ricans and growing numbers of Dominicans established a more permanent Latino community. By 1987, the Latino community had grown to represent more than 10 percent of the city.¹⁸ In neighboring Lawrence, Massachusetts, the Latino community swelled to 30 percent of the city's population — reflecting significant demographic changes throughout the Merrimack Valley area.

However, the most dramatic growth in Lowell during the 1980s resulted from Southeast Asian refugee resettlement and secondary migration. The 1990 U.S. census counted 11,493 Asians in Lowell compared with only 604 in 1980. Highly critical of the census undercounting, the Lowell city and community estimates show an even more striking profile with fewer than 100 Cambodians in Lowell in 1980, compared with between 15,000 and 20,000 ten years later. In addition, city and community leaders estimate an additional 1,000 Lao and 1,000 Vietnamese. During the 1980s, Lowell became home to the largest Cambodian community on the East Coast and the second largest per capita concentration of Southeast Asians in the United States after Long Beach, California.

The majority of Southeast Asians in Lowell are secondary migrants, having moved there from other states rather than being resettled directly from refugee camps in Southeast Asia. Many settled in Lowell because of the city's well-publicized economic health and availability of jobs. Some were drawn by the establishment of one of the few Cambodian Buddhist temples in the country in the mid-1980s. Others came because family members or friends were already established there. Still others came simply because they heard that Lowell was a place where Cambodians live.

As the numbers of Latinos and Southeast Asians expanded rapidly during the 1980s, the city found itself unprepared to address the multiple issues of housing, bilingual services, and civil rights that confront new immigrants. Furthermore, Lowell's economic rejuvenation had failed to refurbish the city's nineteenth-century housing stock and public school facilities, particularly in neighborhoods such as the

Acre, where large numbers of Latinos and Southeast Asians had settled. Educational issues and the schools quickly emerged as a primary concern for Lowell's new immigrant communities.

Lowell has the sixth largest Hispanic student population and second largest number of Asian students in Massachusetts. In 1975, only 4 percent of Lowell's students were children of color. By 1987, however, students of color made up 40 percent of the school-age population. Half of them were limited English proficient. As their families continued to migrate to Lowell throughout 1987, as many as thirty-five to fifty new Southeast Asian students arrived and enrolled in school each week. Strains on the public school system quickly reached crisis proportions.

In trying to accommodate state bilingual education mandates, the Lowell School Committee responded to the population influx by establishing makeshift bilingual classrooms. Overcrowded classrooms combined students from grades one to six. Partitions in cafeterias separated bilingual classes in Spanish, Lao, and Khmer. Special compensatory education classes were held in hallways, which were quieter. The basement boiler room and an auditorium storage area of the Robinson School were converted into classrooms. A Lao bilingual class in the Daley School was conducted in a converted bathroom that still housed a toilet stall.

Other students were placed in nonschool facilities such as the Lowell Boys Club and Lowell YMCA. This process de facto segregated 170 Latino and Southeast Asian elementary-age schoolchildren in buildings that lacked library and cafeteria facilities as well as principals and supervisory staff on site.

At a school committee meeting to discuss the crisis, on May 6, 1987, one hundred Latino and Southeast Asian parents came to voice their concerns about their children's education. After requesting to speak with the assistance of interpreters who accompanied them, the parents were quickly rebuffed by George Kouloheras, senior member of the committee, who declared that they were in an English-only meeting in an English-only town in an English-only America. Kouloheras then walked out, reducing the quorum necessary for the meeting to continue; later he characterized the Latino parents as "those bastards who speak Spanish."¹⁹

From May 1987 through November 1988, Latino and Southeast Asian parents responded by developing a thirty-three-point program of demands for educational reform and by filing a Title VI lawsuit in federal court against the city for unconstitutional segregation and denial of equal educational opportunities to students of limited English proficiency.²⁰ In the process, they confronted disenfranchisement within the city's political institutions as well as anti-immigrant resentment and racial intolerance.

In June 1987, under pressure from the parents and the state board of education, the Lowell School Committee adopted a desegregation plan that Kouloheras and many white residents vehemently opposed because it required a mandatory busing plan to integrate several predominantly white schools. The desegregation plan became the focal point for candidates' campaigns during the fall 1987 school committee and city council elections. Fueled by English-only rhetoric, anti-immigrant sentiment escalated throughout the summer and climaxed in September with the drowning of Vandy Phornng, a thirteen-year-old Cambodian boy who was thrown into one of the canals by an eleven-year-old white boy who called him racist names. The white child's father was an outspoken advocate for English only in Lowell.

In the school committee election, Kouloheras and his ally, Kathryn Stoklosa, received the highest tallies of votes. Sean Sullivan, a first-time candidate whose

campaign focused exclusively on opposition to “forced busing” was also elected, while George O’Hare, a longtime incumbent who supported the desegregation plan was defeated.

For the Southeast Asian and Latino parents, the election reinforced what they had begun to recognize — in spite of their significant and growing numbers, they had no political representation or even influence within the city’s institutions. The only Hispanic in City Hall, for example, as many community leaders were quick to point out, was a gardener.²¹

In the months following the city elections, the parents continued to press their case with assistance from the advocacy organization META, Inc., and a statewide Latino parents network, PUEDO. In November 1988, the coalition of Latino and Southeast Asian parents, known affectionately as MAMA, or the Minority Association for Mutual Assistance, won a historic victory as the Lowell School Committee accepted most of the demands for reform and settled the lawsuit out of court.

In spite of these gains, however, anti-immigrant sentiment continued; it culminated in November 1989, when Lowell’s electorate voted on a nonbinding referendum introduced by George Kouloheras to declare English the official language of the city. The English-only referendum passed by a wide 72 percent to 28 percent margin, with 14,575 votes for and 5,679 votes against.²² Not unlike the Know-Nothing electoral sweep of 1854, the three-to-one English-only referendum vote galvanized native opposition to the rapid demographic changes taking place in Lowell. Yet, as Pérez-Bustillo notes, it was ironic that so many European Americans, whose families were themselves victims of exclusion and harassment as immigrants in Lowell, were so threatened by the population growth of Latinos and Southeast Asians.²³

Current prospects for Cambodian community development and empowerment in Lowell are far from clear. However, themes from the historic example of Lowell’s Irish community suggest some ways to analyze and participate in the process of contemporary Cambodian community development in Lowell, and perhaps in other cities as well.

Community Development and the Role of Religious Institutions

As the most important institution within Lowell’s Irish community, the Catholic church provided moral, social, and political guidance for all of its members. The construction of Saint Patrick’s Church, first in 1831 and again in 1854, signified major landmarks in the community’s development. Church facilities served a variety of roles, including classroom space when public school facilities were deemed inappropriate or inadequate. Local priests, with the sanction of Boston’s bishop, handled not only their religious duties, but also functioned as political leaders with the responsibility of representing their community’s interests in negotiations with city officials. This crucial political role of religious leaders was highlighted in their successful brokering of the education compromise of 1835, which integrated parish schools into the Lowell public school system while preserving essential community control over hiring and curriculum decisions.

In the recent case, a majority of the Latino parents are Catholics with strong ties to their own local churches. Furthermore, most of Lowell’s Cambodians are Buddhists. Reminiscent of Saint Patrick’s Church, a significant symbol and landmark of

the Cambodian community's place in Lowell was first achieved when community members established a Buddhist temple in 1984.

Unlike the Irish priests, however, the temple's Cambodian monks have neither sought nor attained recognition by city officials as having a role to play in political affairs, despite the fact that they are the single most important influence on the direction of the Cambodian parents. Community advocates have observed, for example, that only a small number of Cambodian parents go to City Hall or a public school to meet about educational issues, while large numbers of them go to the temple to discuss the same issues.

Examples ranging from Lowell's Irish Catholic church in the mid-nineteenth century to the roles of black churches and Jewish temples in other settings suggest that religious institutions are significant in the process of community development. The survival and development of Cambodian Buddhist temples are essential to the maintenance and rebuilding of Cambodian culture and identity in the United States. Can Cambodian monks go beyond that internal community role to participate actively in Lowell city politics and lead the external process of Cambodian community empowerment in ways comparable to Irish Catholic priests? Or will such a role fundamentally compromise their spiritual and moral legitimacy, which rests upon their renunciation of worldly affairs?

There are examples in Asia of Buddhist monks asserting moral leadership within political contexts — including those who self-immolated in Vietnam to protest government policies during the war and current examples of monks demanding fundamental change in Burma. The appropriateness of such comparisons to Cambodian monks in the United States, however, is unclear. It is worth noting, however, that the lay chair of Lowell's Buddhist temple was one of the main community leaders in the 1987 parents' struggle. Though not a monk himself, he has often voiced the need for Cambodians to run for school committee and city council offices, and will likely do so in the future.

Community Development and the Role of Middle-Class Entrepreneurs

During the 1830s, the small number of Irish store owners and entrepreneurs wielded considerable social, economic, and political influence within the community and were also key players in negotiating the 1835 schools compromise with the city. Mitchell identifies them as a class force because of their relative economic security and their perspective, which he describes as less transient, less clannish, more broad minded, more independent, and the "most 'American' of the Irish in Lowell."²⁴

The strategy for community development articulated by these entrepreneurs, and exemplified in their own lives, was one of accommodation to Yankee interests for the sake of peace and stability. In the 1840s, as the numbers of famine Irish multiplied, the middle-class entrepreneurs initially benefited because of expanded market opportunities. However, their accommodationist strategy proved inadequate or inappropriate for the masses of poor Irish immigrants. By the mid-1840s, their leadership had been eclipsed by a new generation of service-oriented priests who called on community members to unite behind an Irish Catholic working-class identity in order to strengthen the community's own institutions.

In the more recent case, a class sector similar to their Irish middle-class entrepreneurs comprises the main public leadership within the Cambodian community. Their approach to city/community relations is also comparable in its accommodationist tendency. While some observers of community dynamics have suggested that the desire for harmony and stability expressed by the Cambodian community leadership is a cultural value, the Irish experience suggests that it may also be a class characteristic. There is not yet an articulated working-class identity or an organizational form outside of the Buddhist temple, which reaches the masses of Cambodians in Lowell. In light of the Irish example, this may constitute an important stage of development and maturation for the Cambodian community in the coming years.

Interestingly, the Latino community leadership in Lowell has been more effective in reaching and mobilizing the masses behind a clear agenda. This may reflect their longer term of residence in Lowell relative to the Cambodian community and, for Puerto Ricans, the advantage of already enjoying U.S. citizenship and some voting rights.

In any case, the Irish example suggests the importance of analyzing the character and quality of leadership within the community, particularly in terms of its class orientation and strategy for community development.²⁵ This should be examined more closely in the Cambodian community.

The Economic Context and the Role of Industry

While the first two themes from the Irish community's history refer to internal dimensions, it is also important to place the processes of demographic change and community development in the larger context of the local economy. One way of understanding the history of Lowell is to view it through the lens of industry.

The story of Lowell's Irish is simultaneously the story of Lowell's industrialization and urbanization brought about by nineteenth-century capitalist expansion and economic growth. The mills served as the context of life in Lowell for more than a century. With the mills came the rationales for initial settlement, continuing cycles of demographic growth and change, class and ethnic conflict, and expanded public education. Without considering the context of the mills, Irish community development in Lowell loses much of its meaning.

Similarly, it is impossible to understand why Cambodians came to Lowell in such large numbers in the 1980s without analyzing the city's economic revitalization. Central to the city's rebirth was the decision of An Wang, a Chinese immigrant and chairman of Wang Laboratories, Inc., to relocate his company to Lowell in 1976. Wang purchased cheap industrial land and, with the added incentive of \$5 million in federal grants, built new electronics assembly plants and corporate office towers. The timing of the move coincided with Wang's takeoff as a company. Corporate sales rose from \$97 million in 1977 to \$2.88 billion in 1986, making Wang the largest employer in Lowell. Its 1986 payroll of \$114 million infused the city with a significant new economic base.²⁶

Cambodians flocked to Lowell because of the promise of jobs. However, concentrated, like the Irish, in entry-level assembly work, they remained vulnerable to shifts in the local and regional economies. Beginning in 1988, Wang Laboratories has faced steady and severe economic difficulties, leading to layoffs of thousands of

employees, drops in quarterly earnings and stock prices, and resignations of many managers, including An Wang's son, Frederick. Following An Wang's death in April 1990, the company's fortunes continued to deteriorate. Between 1988 and 1992, Wang's work force declined from 31,500 to 8,000. Facing estimated losses of nearly \$140 million in fiscal year 1992, Wang Laboratories filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in August 1992.²⁷

With Wang's decline and the Massachusetts recession entering its fifth year, economic scapegoating of the Cambodians, like that of the Irish during the depression years of the late 1830s, has continued. Drastic cuts in school budgets and social services have coincided with increased unemployment, homelessness, small-business closings, and youth gang and drug activity among Cambodians in Lowell. Cambodian community leaders have also observed patterns of migration out of Lowell with as much as 15 percent of the population seeking a better living elsewhere. For those who have stayed, however, community development remains an urgent challenge.

Ethnicity, Race, and the Role of Electoral Politics

Lowell is a city of 100,000 residents, but only 40,000 voters. The overwhelming majority of Southeast Asians and Latinos are not registered, and many are not citizens. Numerically, however, they account for roughly 45 percent of the city's population, and their numbers are continuing to grow. Successful candidates in Lowell elections typically receive fewer than 10,000 votes. George Kouloheras, the top vote getter in the 1987 school committee race, for example, received only 8,400 votes. Although not a factor in the most recent election, the political potential of both the Latino and Cambodian vote seems exceptional in this context.

It is useful to remember that in 1854, when the city's population was nearly one-third foreign-born, the mayor was elected on the basis of a "Know-Nothing" anti-Irish, anti-immigrant platform. Later waves of European newcomers continued to face resentment, exclusion, and exploitation characteristic of the immigrant experience in New England.

Yet, eventually, each group achieved some measure of representation and political power. As early as 1874, with immigrants nearly 40 percent of the population, Samuel P. Marin became the first French-Canadian to win elected office in Lowell. Under his leadership, the ethnic "Little Canada" community grew and thrived. By the 1950s, most of Lowell's ethnic groups, including the English, Irish, Greeks, and Poles, had succeeded in electing their "favorite sons" to the mayor's office and had won basic political representation within the city.

Will the newest immigrant groups of Latinos and Southeast Asians follow this same historical pattern of European ethnics' structural assimilation into the social, economic, and political mainstream of Lowell? Or alternatively, does the current state of disenfranchisement confronting Latinos and Asians reflect their nonwhite status in the tradition of the African-American experience as much as it does their being recent immigrants?

Lowell's African-American population, according to the 1990 U.S. census, comprised less than 3 percent of the city's population. Prior to the dramatic influx of Latinos and Southeast Asians to Lowell, the city was ethnically diverse but racially

homogeneous. Noting the implications of this reality during the 1987 parents' struggle with the school committee, a Latina member of the city's Human Rights Commission Planning Committee observed: "People in Lowell talk about it being an ethnic city, but they only embrace that and endorse that as long as they are white."²⁸ A Lao community leader involved with the parents' struggle echoed: "When they say 'Americans,' they don't mean us. Look at our eyes and our skin. We are minorities, but we have rights, too. We need to support each other."²⁹

Further analysis and development of strategies for Cambodian community development will need not only to consider scenarios based on lessons from the Irish case, but also how the dimensions of race and racism shape Cambodian experiences and status within the structure of the city's social, economic, and political institutions.

As a case study illustrating the contemporary challenge of changing demographics and community development, the story of Lowell is unresolved. By drawing from an earlier case of changing demographics involving the historic development of Lowell's Irish Catholic community, some important conceptual perspectives can be identified, which help to frame analyses of current and future developments in the city. Specifically, the historical example of mid-nineteenth-century Irish community formation suggests the significance of religious institutions and the role of middle-class entrepreneurs in the process of community development.

Schools have historically served as sites of struggle by immigrants and communities of color for access, equity, and democratic reforms. Schooling and school committee policy represented critical issues for Lowell's Irish throughout the 1800s. Similarly, for contemporary generations of immigrant and refugee parents who have sacrificed their own lives and dreams in order to give their children opportunities for security and social mobility, the schools typically represent their single most important investment in this country.

Historically and currently, as cities have undergone dramatic shifts in their demographic makeup, the schools have quickly emerged as one major arena, and often as the initial battleground, where contradictory agendas unfold based on conflicting relations and responses to the population changes. Anti-immigrant sentiment, racial harassment, and English-only advocacy characterize one set of responses to the challenge of changing demographics currently facing Lowell as well as many other American cities. These reactions, framed by struggles over turf and the interests of a shifting electorate, often lead to divisiveness and segregation as in the case of the Lowell public schools, and even violence and tragedy as in the killing of thirteen-year-old Vandy Phornng.

Like the rise and fall of the Know-Nothing party in relation to the growing political presence of Irish in Lowell during the 1850s, efforts by Lowell's Latino and Southeast Asian communities to gain access and equity for their children in the schools have met with resistance, if not overt hostility, and have led directly to their demands for political representation and political power.

Lowell's political dynamics, however, are fluid and volatile. With the Massachusetts economy in the midst of deep recession and companies like Wang Laboratories, the foundation of Lowell's economic infrastructure, having declared bankruptcy, social conditions are becoming more polarized. As was the case with

Lowell's Irish, it is crucial to ground the dynamics of social and demographic change within the larger economic context of the city.

The structural changes caused by industrialization and urbanization in Lowell during the 1800s, according to historian Thomas Bender, were reflected in changing cultural paradigms and ideals about society and social relations. Bender suggests that as the famine Irish poured into Lowell's factories, the ideas and ideals of Lowell's residents lost their agrarian roots and were transformed into an increasingly urban vision.³⁰

Ironically, with the influx of Cambodians during the 1980s, the city of Lowell may have, for the first time since the mills opened, a growing number of its residents who can claim peasant roots and agrarian visions. In time, Cambodians, who represent the largest minority group in the city with a population approaching 20 percent of the total, will have an especially critical role to play in determining the future of Lowell. Their efforts at community development, including contention over school policy and issues of educational reform, will continue to prove critical to that historic process. ■

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Notes

1. Puerto Ricans, along with some Dominicans, comprise the majority of the Latino population; Cambodians comprise the majority of the Southeast Asian population, although there are some Lao and Vietnamese.
2. I thank Joel Perlmann for his comment on an earlier draft of this article.
3. Marc Scott Miller, *The Irony of Victory: World War II and Lowell, Massachusetts* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), viii.
4. This section is adapted from Peter Nien-chu Kiang, "Southeast Asian Parent Empowerment: The Challenge of Changing Demographics in Lowell, Massachusetts," Monograph No. 1, Massachusetts Association for Bilingual Education, 1990.
5. Kevin Cullen, "Lowell: The Dark Side of the Boom," *Boston Globe*, October 25, 1987. For autobiographical recollections of life among the early mill girls, including a section on education, see Harriet H. Robinson, *Loom and Spindle* (Kailua, Hawaii: Press Pacifica, 1976). See also Thomas Dublin, *Women at Work: The Transformation of Work and Community in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1826-1860* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
6. Cullen, "Lowell."
7. Thomas Bender, *Toward an Urban Vision: Ideas and Institutions in Nineteenth-Century America* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1975), 42.
8. For further descriptions, see *ibid.* or Brian C. Mitchell, *The Paddy Camps: The Irish of Lowell, 1821-1861* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988).
9. Mitchell, *The Paddy Camps*, 56.
10. Bender, *Toward an Urban Vision*, 107.
11. Mitchell, *The Paddy Camps*, 134-135.
12. *Ibid.*, 114-116.
13. *Ibid.*, 49.

14. Ibid., 49–53.
15. However, the agreement never enabled large numbers of Irish to attend Lowell High School. See Bender, *Toward an Urban Vision*, 123–126, for more discussion of Irish enrollments and high school attendance.
16. Ibid., 123.
17. Mitchell, *The Paddy Camps*, 142.
18. The 1990 U.S. census, criticized for undercounting immigrants and people of color in urban areas, counted 10,499 Hispanics in Lowell out of a total population of 103,438.
19. Diego Ribadeneira, "School Panelist in Lowell Accused of Racism," *Boston Globe*, May 8, 1987, and Nancy Costello, "Kouloheras Sparks Racial Clash at Meeting," *Lowell Sun*, May 7, 1987.
20. The legal precedents came from the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974.
21. Doris Sue Wong, "Lowell Is Seen Not Fulfilling Its Promise for Many Asians, Hispanics," *Boston Globe*, November 3, 1987.
22. Jules Crittendon, "English Referendum Passes Nearly 3 to 1," *Lowell Sun*, November 8, 1989.
23. Camilo Pérez-Bustillo, "What Happens When English-Only Comes to Town? A Case Study of Lowell, Massachusetts," in James Crawford, ed., *Language Loyalties: A Sourcebook on the Official English Controversy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 194–201.
24. Mitchell, *The Paddy Camps*, 40–41.
25. For a provocative discussion of immigrant leadership, see Victor R. Greene, *American Immigrant Leaders, 1800–1910* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
26. John Wilke, "Wang Had Key Role in Lowell's Economic Revival," *Boston Globe*, November 9, 1987.
27. Jonathan Yenkin, "Wang Says '92 Loss May Get Worse," *Boston Globe*, September 25, 1992.
28. Wong, "Lowell Is Not Fulfilling Promise."
29. Interview with Sommanee Bounphasaysonh, June 11, 1987.
30. Bender, *Toward an Urban Vision*, 71–92.

The Press and Politics

A Comprehensive Examination

Heather Long

This article is based on interviews and research on the press and politicians, whose relationship is shown to be extremely controversial. Views held by members of the press, who see themselves as dutiful to their readers, are radically different from those held by politicians, who see reporters as money-hungry thieves who do not stop short of invasion of privacy for a story. The views of scholars — who attempt to make sense of the relationship — are different from both. The author attempts to amalgamate these views, assess the picture of the institutional relationship as it truly exists, and discover means to resolve the apparent differences.

The auspice for this article arose during the five months I spent as an intern on Jon Keller's *Let's Talk Politics* weekly television program on WLVI-56, Boston, which is similar in style to *This Week with David Brinkley*. Keller interviews a locally or nationally known guest during the first half of the show, discussing issues germane to that person. In the second half, three representatives drawn from the local media, political consultants, scholars, or state representatives comment on the interview and discuss the events of the previous week.

During my tenure on *Let's Talk Politics*, I had opportunities to chat with many of these well-known figures, who harbor specific views on the role of the media in American politics. This article is a reflection of their views and, combined with research into the literature in the field, provides an insight to the relationship between the media and the politicians on whom they report. The questions posed to the guests were: With what ideas do you think the media approach politicians? Do you automatically assume that members of the media harbor an attitude of opposition to those in power, or do you consider them as agents of a fourth branch of government who operate as insiders?

In an era in which 73 percent of American adults claim to be newspaper readers and almost every American household has a television set in use an average of nearly

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seven hours per day, the power of the press cannot be denied.¹ We as citizens owe it to ourselves to understand the way they report to us.

For the purposes of this article, the media comprise any person who reports on events that shape our lives. The type of reportage — print, television, and so forth — is largely irrelevant, except when specifically identified. Additionally, the terms “media” and “press” are used interchangeably.

The one constraint on the answers that follow is that many of the people interviewed were indigenous to the Massachusetts area. With the exception of Tom Harkin and several interviews in the literature, the respondents are based in Boston. Whether this affects their views is open to question. The Boston media are unique among peers. As one politician put it, “It is a common view that there are two newspapers in Boston. One tells you what to think and one shows you pictures.”²

Finally, while I have made a genuine attempt to keep election-time rhetoric out of this discussion, the unusually volatile nature of 1992 politics lends itself to the occasional slipping in of a review of events.

I begin with the history of the media and politicians, primarily during this century.

History

In *The Federalist Papers*, Alexander Hamilton states that “the public papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the most remote inhabitants of the Union.”³ While Hamilton could not have foreseen the addition of television and radio to the media, we witness the importance placed on the institution from the onset. Indeed, it is an important starting point to recognize that the press is the only private institution enshrined in the Constitution. The First Amendment, which guarantees the freedom of the press, is the source of the U.S. media’s auspicious beginning.

One of the best works about the press and politics during this century is Douglas Cater’s *The Fourth Branch of Government*. The author points to the beginning of the press conference during Woodrow Wilson’s presidency and the specific earmarking of a room in the White House for the press as Theodore Roosevelt’s idea.⁴ During the next few years, the press room was an old boy’s network, largely informal and full of cigar smoke. By the New Deal era, reporters began to specialize according to agency or branch of government, but the process was still not entirely formalized.

A good many newspapermen look back with nostalgia to the [Franklin D. Roosevelt] press conferences . . . there was a spirit of informality and directness about the whole affair. The reporter shot his question at the President and received a quick retort, then hurried to get it down on the back of an envelope before the next round. There was no officially released transcript to challenge the reporter’s own notations. He and he alone conveyed information about top governmental policy from the White House to the public.⁵

Press coverage of the government became largely formalized under President Harry Truman. By January 1955, recording devices were allowed in press conferences for the first time. Today the placement of television cameras, microphones, and still cameras dictates the execution of a news conference. Press releases and leaks are strategically planned as a matter of daily measure. Scandals concerning our elected public officials — Watergate, Jimmy Carter in *Playboy*, Donna Rice, and on and

on — have all been discovered and disclosed by members of the mass media. Clearly, the face of the media and their importance in American society have grown considerably.

The Literature and Scholars' Views

During Grover Cleveland's first campaign for president, a Buffalo newspaperman discovered that the candidate had fathered an illegitimate child. Cleveland apologized, won, and was reelected four years later.⁶ Hugo Black, a Supreme Court justice nominated in the 1930s, was found by the media to have engaged in Ku Klux Klan activities. He apologized, said he no longer espoused such views, and took his seat on the bench without protest.⁷ Presidents John F. Kennedy and Franklin D. Roosevelt, and even Martin Luther King, Jr., are rumored to have had extramarital affairs during the course of their seat in public prominence. And yet, "Martin Luther King, Jr.'s indiscretions were shopped around by the FBI in the 1960's, but not even J. Edgar Hoover could find a reputable taker; among other dampers on the story, his liaisons simply had no visible effect on his civil rights crusading."⁸

In 1993, these reactions appear preposterous. The press harps on such issues unmercifully. A case in point is the early-on exposure of Bill Clinton's extramarital affairs or Dan Quayle's joining the National Guard in lieu of serving in Vietnam. What accounts for this change in the attitude of the press? Why can they not stop reporting on Gary Hart's dalliance with Donna Rice or Barney Frank's relationship with a live-in male prostitute?

Most scholars point to Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein's uncovering of what came to be known as the Watergate affair as the beginning of the modern media. Doris Graber points to the irony in it.

It is ironic that the power of the press, which had done so much to propel Richard Nixon into the highest office of the land, ultimately launched his downfall as well. Without the persistent probing by *Washington Post* reporters into the misdeeds of the Nixon administration, the Watergate scandal would very likely have remained a minor story.⁹

Graber explains that the modern media want to entertain and excite, not necessarily educate us. Conflict and controversy are far more interesting than the so-called puff stories about good deeds and things going right. In addition, the press elects to give the public breadth instead of depth in its reports.¹⁰

Newspeople want stories that are newsworthy, judged by the usual criteria. They believe that their public is more interested in exciting events and human interest tales than in academic discussions of public politics, their historical antecedents, and their projected impact, expressed in statistics. Newspeople also feel a special mission, like Shakespeare's Mark Antony, "to bury Caesar, not to praise him." And, like Brutus, they claim that their criticism is not disloyalty. They do not love the government less, they only love the nation more.¹¹

However, not all scholars buy into the thinking that sees the intent of the media as altogether altruistic. Kiku Adatto, a student at the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center for

Press, Politics, and Public Policy of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, researched the difference between the 1968 and 1988 elections and found that in 1988

the focus of television news on media events, political commercials, media advisors and failed imagery, reflects the turn of political coverage to theater criticism. But this image-conscious coverage did not succeed in avoiding the manipulation of the campaigns. Instead, it shifted attention from the substance to the stagecraft of politics, and eroded the objectivity of political reporting.

Rather than report the facts, or the actual records of the candidates, there was a tendency simply to balance perceptions, or to air an opposing image. Fairness came to mean equal time for media events, equal time for political commercials. But this left the media hostage to the play of perceptions the campaigns dispensed.¹²

In other words, the media have shifted from substance to "puff" and allowed themselves to be guided by political consultants.

But if we accept this way of thinking, how would scandals such as Iran-contra and Watergate ever have been brought to the attention of the American public? Certainly these were not puff stories.

Denis McQuail attempts to answer this question by dividing the media's reporting methods in this country into three phases. The first, from the turn of the century to the 1930s, is characterized by empirical observation, not scientific investigation. In reports to their papers and radio stations, members of the press interjected their opinions as often as they interjected facts.

The next phase, from 1940 to the 1960s, saw the growth and application of the empirical method of research. Specificity was the key.

In the third phase, from the 1960s to the present, the media have taken over the agenda-setting power in this country. By choosing what to report on daily, they assume the power to control the minds of citizens and politicians alike.¹³ Gladys and Kurt Lang elaborate on this point by discussing the two functions of the media — one to disseminate information from which the public may formulate opinions, the other to disseminate public opinion to American legislators for their interpretative use in shaping voting and policy positions. The Langs state that the media thrive on scandal, which influences what they choose to report.¹⁴ This turns the picture from reporting puff pieces to digging up scandal.

However, if it is true that the media thrive on scandal and try to ferret it out wherever they can to sell papers or get ratings, perhaps this may not be all bad. In 1975, *Los Angeles Times* reporters teamed up with Congressman Peter Stark to investigate the treatment of American prisoners in Mexican jails. The result of their combined efforts was a congressional investigation into the matter and an eventual prisoner exchange with Mexico.¹⁵ This reflects not the press in opposition to the parties in power but a joint effort of both, with which Douglas Cater would have agreed. His view, from a 1959 historical perspective, was that the press operates independently of the government, hence his title, *The Fourth Branch of Government*. Sometimes working in conjunction with the other branches, sometimes following their own agendas, the media answer to no one.¹⁶

Dom Bonafede takes these ideas one step further, stating that "in assessing candidates, helping to set the political agenda and weighing questions of morality, the press operates without formal guidelines, relying on ad hoc, self-defined, self-imposed and self-regulated standards."¹⁷

Yet many emphasize that the press must remain accountable to the public, if for no other reason than to sell its papers or improve its ratings. In this light, "self-defined, self-imposed and self-regulated standards" can go only so far before the public stops believing in the media. Stephen Hess, a media/politics specialist at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., says, "Given the constraints [the media] operates under, it has been unusually accurate. It deserves high marks for seeing through the tissue of lies and the smokescreen of irrelevancies put out [to it]."¹⁸

William Schneider and I. A. Lewis, in a report of a survey of journalists, editors, and their readers, agree. They found that journalists are more liberal in their personal views than the public in general; however, the public neither perceives nor is bothered by this in assessing their newspapers. And while "there are all sorts of subtle, unconscious ways that journalists' values affect their professional performance — their choice of subjects, for instance, or the kinds of sources they find credible," journalists feel that their liberal values are balanced by their editors' more conservative tendencies.¹⁹

In lieu of journalists using their political bias in reporting, Schneider claims,

the press follows the polls. If a president is doing poorly in the polls, the press will dwell on his failures. If a candidate holds a steady lead, the press will portray him as a political genius. That is why the press treated Bush more harshly than it did either Clinton or Perot, as recent studies have shown. The bias is populism, not liberalism.²⁰

Gail Leftwich of the Kennedy School of Government describes the role of the changed media.

There is a tinge of sadness in the change [in the media] at the price that's being paid. The problem is that we're now seeing how the sausage gets made. In the past . . . the press was there watching, yet now there's perhaps too much focus on irrelevancies, but there was also a time when behavior that we now think is inappropriate or when people who should have been a part of what's going on were excluded because it was really a much more closed, controlled process. . . . It's fine when you can trust that the people you are electing are in fact going to serve the public interest. But [that's not always the case]. That's where the press does have to play a role for the little guy. Somebody does in fact have to look out for the person who doesn't always have access.²¹

Walter Guzzardi concludes:

In the end, the media have to make their way in the world of commerce. That may lead to many kinds of reporting that we don't like, but it remains the best system. The media so often support the machinery of power because we, their audience, would not have them do otherwise.²²

It appears that scholars perceive no problem with the manner in which the media approach their reporting of politics. Let's see what the politicians think.

The Politicians

The 1992 presidential candidates seem to have a general politician's view on media coverage. Senator Tom Harkin said,

The one thing I have to say about the national media is that it tends to find one subject, one small story, and stick to it. [Politicians] then find it hard to break out of that mold. Otherwise I think the media's job is to probe and question everything without malice or malicious intent.²³

Paul Tsongas, after pulling out of the race, said,

I'm convinced that politics could not successfully exist without the media. . . . People need it because it makes them feel safe and it acts as a safeguard. . . . My only advice to the press would be not to use their power to write candidates off before they get a chance to get their message across. It's not allowing all to compete on an even keel.²⁴

Senator Thomas Eagleton said in a telephone interview that he thinks the press sometimes goes too far.

The rules are much different from a half-century ago, during the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Then, the press operated under a gentleman's agreement; no pictures were published of FDR in a wheelchair or struggling on crutches. I suspect that more than half of the country didn't know he was a victim of polio.

Today, it is very doubtful that Roosevelt could be elected President of the United States. There would be pictures on the front page and on TV showing him being carried or trying to get into a car with his legs in braces. People would feel that we need a more vigorous President.²⁵

Eagleton sees the increased probing by the media as discriminating against would-be politicians who are somehow set apart from the norm.

Vice President Dan Quayle's political consultant and former Reagan White House aide, Joseph Canzeri, concurs with Eagleton. "[A] *National Enquirer* mentality exists among some members of the press corps. I'm sensitive to the media. They have to do their job, but sometimes they go beyond reasonable bounds."²⁶

Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Paul Cellucci highlights the instigator attitude of the media in the context of the Republican candidates for the presidential nomination in 1992. "I think the press is trying to create a row within the Republican Party. Here's [Patrick] Buchanan, spending millions on a campaign and he can't even get 40 percent of the vote in *any* primary, yet the press keeps harping on the damage Buchanan is doing. It's ridiculous."

Regarding the media in general, Cellucci commented: "The press is always in search of a story. The more controversy they create, the more newspapers they sell. They're in opposition [to the people in power in government] to the extent that it sells newspapers."²⁷

Again we see represented the idea that the media will do anything to be popular and make money, a point of view magnified by Senator Charles Shannon.

While I think the media acts in a good way as a system of checks and balances on government affairs, I also think there is a great deal of yellow journalism today, slanted the wrong way and missing the true issues. In Ben Franklin's time people got *events* reported to them, but today the emphasis is more on people's personal lives than their leadership abilities. Most of the journalism today is trash, I wouldn't give a dime for half of it. I'm here to be whacked at, but don't undermine [my colleagues and myself] because of nonprofessional attributes, only on the basis of our jobs and what's going on there. Time is sliding by and [the public] is missing out. [Reporters should] tell me what the hell someone's going to do for the country, not this other foolishness!²⁸

Even angrier at the media is Democrat Frank Bellotti, former lieutenant governor, state treasurer, and longtime Massachusetts politician, who thinks that the media spend too much time trying to investigate politicians' lives and bring the wrong people down.

A lot of the newspapers seem to get a lot of enjoyment from bringing politicians down. Public service isn't what it used to be. . . . The media love to write what's bad about politicians. . . . A lot of this started after Watergate. It became like open season. You don't need a hunting license to write about politicians.

He gives an example of what he means and how it can have a detrimental effect.

The House bank scandal is dominating the news and it's going to bring a lot of congressmen down, but no one says a great deal about savings and loans, which is like \$500 billion dollars, and the checks on the bank [aren't] even the taxpayers' money, like the S and L is. But it's too big, so you bring congressmen down for foolishness like that. In this way you're not attracting the best people to run. . . .

You look at the people writing and editorializing about Warren Rudman. [They are saying], "Why is he retiring when he should have the courage to stand up and accomplish what he should be able to accomplish?" Then you kill these people and wonder why they're not there.²⁹

But not all people in politics are bitter about the press, even when they have been on the losing end of the scale. "Dukakis '88" press secretary Dayton Duncan does not blame the press for digging up scandals about politicians.

Part of a candidate's character and history also includes whether he spent weekends on yachts with young models, inflated his academic record, once used an illegal drug, led a wild life before a religious conversion, went into the National Guard instead of to a war he publicly supported, has exhibited streaks of "meanness" or sought professional help during times of personal tragedy. Such things are not just "fair game" for the press, they are bits of information the public deserves to know before choosing its president.³⁰

Keeping this information in mind, we turn to the pundits' opinions of their trade.

The Pundits Speak Out

It is interesting to note how much more altruism and trust in the public's ability to sift through the news is emphasized by the opinion on the other side of the camera. While no one denies that there are a few bad apples in every crowd, the media seem to think their attitude is necessary.

It seems only right to start with Jon Keller, with whom I had the most contact. In addition to hosting *Let's Talk Politics*, Keller is a political reporter for the *Boston Phoenix* and commentator for WBZ radio. He says of the press position toward politicians:

The press is adversarial in attitude not in any partisan way. I don't have a laser gun pointed at everyone, but I have the responsibility to the *public* to not do puff pieces on good little programs. Instead, I'm an ombudsman who owes the public the true story for them to sift through.

Regarding the allegation that the media just want to sell newspapers, Keller says, "I don't see a conflict between reporting to the people and selling papers. But some do. *Some* are self-serving and would film a man lighting himself on fire but not help him put himself out." In response to the Los Angeles riots of April 29, 1992, he said:

The press may be partly to blame for the continued rioting there after the first day, but what is the press to do, not report on it? That would be a travesty. However I saw a black kid on television state the point. When the reporter asked the kid why he was destroying his own neighborhood, the kid replied that he felt it was the only way to get the press there to listen and report their anger.³¹

Meg Vaillancourt, former Monitor channel correspondent, agrees with Keller and justifies the opposition of the press to those in power.

I see myself as a conduit of information. Information is power, and I see it as my job to dig deep for anything to give to the public that might help them make their decision in voting or opinion formulation.

As for the recent flood of "trash TV," there has always been trash media. Our roots are in institutions such as the British media where if there isn't a half-naked woman on page three no one will buy it. There's never been a lack of trash. Anyone who is nostalgic for that Eden of journalistic golden days is remembering what never was. We've come a long way from the good-ol'-boy days of [Dwight] Eisenhower and beyond where media elites made or destroyed a politician before the public had a chance. So, yes, I'm in opposition to the one who holds power; I'm on the side of the public.³²

David Brudnoy, political commentator for WBZ radio, agrees but cautions us: "I think what we have to watch out for is 'advocacy journalism,' in which . . . particular media persons' [own] views color the approach, quality, and content of their reporting."

Calling to mind the research done by Schneider and Lewis, Brudnoy adds:

While I know that the vast majority of the media is relatively liberal in their personal political views, I think there is very little advocacy journalism in our mass

media. In general I feel the media does its best to dig on both sides of the issue, not as a bedmate to the party in power or the party running against it.³³

Another word of warning comes from Fredric Smoller, who details the time he was interviewing Sam Donaldson in a San Francisco hotel room. From their window they could see a fire and Donaldson decided to cover it, so off they went.

As we made our way over barricades and water hoses, someone shouted, "Hey, it's Sam Donaldson." "Go get 'em Sam," the crowd cheered. Even some of the firemen who were involved in battling the blaze turned their heads, and an article in the next day's local paper made mention of the correspondent's presence at the fire.³⁴

In this light, we see media people with a high recognition factor, so high it nearly overshadowed a fire. This may affect the manner in which they approach their jobs by being egged on by onlookers.

In addition, the press can get angry at those they cover when they are kept in the dark. The press was kept in ignorance for sixty hours when the United States invaded Grenada in October 1983. They were enraged. "John Chancellor and David Brinkley later explained to a House judiciary subcommittee that there is a long history of conventions between government and the press that have allowed invasions to be covered, including Normandy in 1944, without compromising the military operations." After the press was finally allowed to cover that conflict, they filled their audiences with suspicion by overstating the fact that all films shown were cleared by the government. CBS carried a strip across the bottom of the screen stating that it had been "cleared by the Defense Department censors." In addition, Dan Rather kept restating the message. This left doubt in the viewers' minds as to whether the events took place as they were seeing them.³⁵ This was an extreme way for the press to let people in power know that they were not pleased at having been left in the dark on major events.

Albert Hunt, capital bureau chief of the *Wall Street Journal*, thinks that the increased presence of women in the press room has changed "the old boy view of sexual dalliances and other traditionally male misbehavior, such as drunkenness. 'When I began to cover politics, it was always, "Yeah, he's really something, that son of a gun." And now it's a good deal more pejorative,' he says. 'And I don't think that's bad.'"³⁶

The late Howard Simons, onetime *Washington Post* managing editor, agreed with Hunt.

There was a time when there was a big wink-a-wink at what a politician did, because it was the private life of a politician. Between that decade and this one, there's been an awful lot of change . . . and some of that has been for the better. There's been Vietnam, and Watergate, and this generation is more cynical. It's the same generation that goes not to the National Press Club bar after every assignment and knocks down a few, but goes home.³⁷

By and large, the media view themselves as doing a good job relaying information. They see it as their responsibility to tell the public everything they can find and

then let the public draw its own conclusions. Simons again responded: "All [information] is fair game. The public is not dumb, it can sort out what is trivial. It does a pretty good job given the choice it gets."³⁸

Putting It All Together

This examination has revealed three distinct views on the attitudes of the press toward the politicians on whom it reports. The scholars seem to feel that be it to sell papers or to disseminate information to the public, the press is interested in scandal and will indeed dig it up where they can. The politicians, somewhat angrier than the scholars, while agreeing that the media are necessary, think they go too far in looking for issues to report. In the process they bring down politicians unnecessarily. Media people, on the other hand, seem to feel that what they do is warranted. While there may be a few who abuse the institution, for the most part the media today do a better job than previously of reporting to the American people the events that affect their lives, owing in large measure to the growth of cynicism and the increased role of women in the profession. What conclusions can we draw from these viewpoints?

Where is the fine line between the public's right to know and the politicians' right to privacy? Or do politicians indeed have a right to privacy? Do they effectively surrender that right when they decide to spend their lives in the public sector? The line lies somewhere between Frank Bellotti's view that the wrong people are being brought down for the wrong reasons and Howard Simons's view that the press should dig for everything and let the people ponder what is and is not valid information before making a decision. How do we distinguish that line and force the media to obey it?

While the fine line will be debated eternally, the reformation of the press is something that appears to be universally agreed upon. Senator Shannon says:

The bull needs to be taken by the horns. However, journalists should do this themselves. They should band together and not allow themselves to fall under peer pressure or pressure from their editors [to cross the line of decency]. There needs to be a rebirth of independence from the powers of the editors in chief.³⁹

Complementing Shannon's ideas, Schneider and Lewis point to the public's view of how the press should be handled.

A substantial minority of the public, however — 40% — feel that the news media abuse their power. How should these abuses be handled? Surprisingly, the public agrees with professional journalists: The media should regulate themselves, rather than be subject to more government regulation or stronger court sanctions.⁴⁰

While all seem to agree that there is at least some irresponsible reporting in the media, no one thinks that increased legislation or government intervention is warranted in this situation. Instead, the First Amendment should be respected and we should trust that the media can correct themselves. Perhaps it is as Meg Vaillancourt says, that we are not really any worse than other countries from which we got our media roots. Gail Leftwich adds that we are now seeing the messes our political leaders get themselves into. For years we were not aware of their indiscretions. Now

that it appears we have become increasingly cynical, we are seeing our leaders for what they are — human.

Once we learn to get past the fact that no political leader is a Mother Theresa, we can either accept all of them for their faults or reject them on the basis of their judgment. I for one would rather be privy to the information and make the decision for myself than not be told and perhaps elect an official who might not possess the judgment I thought he or she had. Indeed, this may be the current trend in political reporting. Commenting on the differences between the 1988 and the 1992 presidential races, William Schneider writes:

The 1988 election proved that negative campaigns work. A negative campaign got George Bush all the way to the White House. Negative press coverage drove two candidates out of the race. As a result, negativism began to seep through the press and the political system like poison.⁴¹

In contrast, 1992 saw a rejection of negatives by the electorate, reflected in the press's treatment of campaign reporting.

When the press attacked [Bill Clinton] on his draft record and his relationship with Gennifer Flowers, Clinton took his campaign directly to the people. He insisted on face-to-face meetings with the voters. . . . Clinton used the voters to defy the press and force it into submission. The press essentially dropped the womanizing and draft issues.⁴²

Here we see the beginnings of a new idea, bypassing the media to get ideas across to the public.

Schneider concludes:

What was new about 1992 is that the candidates figured out ways to use public opinion to set the agenda they wanted — and to outsmart the press.

If the ultimate symbols of the 1988 campaign were Donna Rice and Willie Horton, then the ultimate symbols of the 1992 campaign will be Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown Jr.'s 800 number, Perot's live appearances on "Larry King Live" and Clinton's playing the saxophone on "The Arsenio Hall Show."⁴³

In other words, perhaps during the course of the 1992 election we witnessed the beginning of a new era, one in which the politicians will not stand for the agenda setting and offensive techniques of the press, as they see them. Instead, it is the politicians who have gone on the offensive in protest of the media's treatment of them. Future campaigns and continuous coverage of the issues and events that affect this country will give way to conclusions regarding this seemingly new trend facing us.

As for the disagreement between the press and the politicians, Stephen Hess gives us an ironic anecdote: "Without prompting from me, White House Press Secretary Larry Speaks and White House correspondent Andrea Mitchell on the same day complained in the same words, '[Reporters and officials] push the stories they want.'"⁴⁴

Therefore, if you're waiting for the end of the conflict between the press and the politicians, get set for a long siege. ■

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The Homeless of Massachusetts

An Analysis of the 1990 U.S. Census S-Night Data

Christopher G. Hudson, Ph.D.

This article, which examines epidemiological and policy correlates of homeless populations in 351 Massachusetts towns and cities, is based on an analysis of data from the 1990 U.S. census. It reviews the reliability of the most recent census data, reports findings on the distribution and characteristics of homeless persons in Massachusetts, and presents preliminary correlational findings on the impact of key demographic conditions and policies.

The report includes a meta-analysis of several studies that monitored the Census Bureau's street counts. It is estimated that 42.6 percent of the homeless on the streets in selected urban areas were counted by the census. This finding, as well as the results of a regression model that accounted for 68 percent of the variation in street rates in twenty Massachusetts cities with populations of more than 50,000, was used to compute adjusted rates for the remaining towns and cities. Overall adjusted rates for Massachusetts, Boston, and selected areas compared well with independent estimates and counts. The study suggests that at least 10,155 Massachusetts residents were homeless in 1990.

The persistence and growth of homelessness since the early 1980s is not only symptomatic of the fragmentation of American society, but also of an inability to understand and respond to the many kinds of anguish that homeless persons experience. Central to this inability to understand is an ambivalence about who should be considered homeless: those living on the streets? in institutions? in shelters? doubled up with friends? Social liberals, who, as well as many others, usually prefer to define the homeless broadly to include those precariously housed, focus on structural and policy issues in their conceptualization of causes and preferred policies. In contrast, conservatives, who have sought to delimit the definition to those literally living on the streets and in homeless shelters, focus on individual deficits and an emergency short-term response. Whom we consider to be homeless depends on how we define the home, whether as a secure haven in a supportive community or merely a physical domicile.

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The U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1990 pursued the second option in its plan to enumerate individuals living on the streets and in shelters for the homeless — essentially only the most visible of the homeless.¹ The data generated from this massive operation — the largest attempt to date in the United States to measure the dimensions of homelessness — which can represent only the tip of the iceberg, has been beset with major questions about its reliability.²

This article, therefore, reviews currently available research and data pertinent to the reliability of the 1990 census and tests possible corrections of these data based on known sources of systematic error. The research represents a preliminary analysis of the Massachusetts data to test procedures that may be replicated with the national data. Furthermore, the project examines the degree to which the sizes of homeless populations vary according to a range of conditions hypothesized in the literature to be associated with homelessness, such as urbanization, unfavorable economic conditions, housing unaffordability, social fragmentation, deinstitutionalization, and inadequate social services. The adjustments to the Massachusetts census data generated in this research are supported by independent estimates and studies. Both indicate that the 1990 U.S. census managed to enumerate only two thirds (67.7%) of slightly more than 10,000 of the most visible homeless in Massachusetts who meet the restrictive definition of being perceived in street locations or resident in homeless shelters.

Background

During the 1980s, homelessness grew dramatically despite a sustained period of economic growth. Throughout this period, there have been numerous attempts to “count” the homeless, resulting in wildly divergent estimates. In the early 1980s the Community for Creative Non-Violence pegged the level at one percent of the population,³ whereas in 1984 the Department of Housing and Urban Development estimated it at about 0.1 percent, or the 250,000 to 350,000 level.⁴ Both estimates were widely discounted because of their methodological flaws, most commonly involving an attempt to aggregate local guesstimates.

In one of the very few national studies, the Urban Institute in 1987 utilized random sampling methods in twenty cities throughout the United States and extrapolated from these data that more than 0.2 percent of the population, or between 500,000 and 600,000 persons, was homeless.⁵ These data indicated that a disproportionate number of the homeless were single males (73%) and that findings that families make up a third to a half of the homeless are exaggerated, as such data usually originate in shelters, where families are more likely to be found as compared with the streets. It has been suggested that this estimate may be comparable with the earlier HUD figures; if so, it would represent a 22 percent annual increase in homelessness during the mid-1980s.⁶

One of the most extensive national studies of the dimensions of homelessness was completed by Martha Burt of the Urban Institute. In a multivariate analysis of shelter bed rates in 1981, 1983, 1986, and 1989 in 147 cities of more than 100,000 population, Burt was able to identify several different constellations of forces that contribute to people's losing their homes in high-growth versus low-growth cities. In high-growth cities, the traditional income maintenance programs, though providing higher benefits, could not overcome the impact of the high cost of living, housing

unaffordability, and encroaching gentrification. The study offers much evidence to indicate that deindustrialization, the shift of jobs from the manufacturing to the service sectors, has contributed to homelessness, especially in low-growth cities.⁷ Caution should be exercised, however, in overgeneralizing the findings of this study. Burt's suggestion that the shelter bed rates can be used as a proxy measure of homelessness is unconvincing, especially in light of the data analysis to be presented here.

Advocates for the homeless have often argued that any attempt to count the homeless is futile and represents an obfuscation of the problem. Yet one of the first steps in understanding any social problem is determining who are experiencing it and their personal characteristics and social environments. Enumeration is an inescapable part of understanding, though it should be only a preliminary step. Without baseline data on numbers and characteristics of homeless in various localities, it is not possible to develop and test models about the interaction of multiple causal factors and determine the most efficacious ways of altering them.

The U.S. Census S-Night Operations

During the evening of March 20 and early morning hours of March 21, 1990, the U.S. Bureau of the Census attempted to include homeless persons as part of the 1990 census. This effort included counts of persons in emergency shelters, on the streets, in hotels and motels used for the homeless, and at the exits of abandoned buildings. Other components of the homeless populations, such as doubled-up families, were enumerated as part of the regular census.⁸ In all, close to 20,000 locations throughout the country were reported to have been canvassed. In preparation for this count, the bureau surveyed local government officials in the 39,000 jurisdictions in the United States, requesting information about shelter, street, and other locations where the homeless are likely to be found. Because of a very low response of only 14,200 (36.4%), the bureau was reported to have made systematic attempts to enumerate the homeless on the streets only in areas with a population of more than 50,000, and only occasional attempts in smaller areas.⁹ The effort to enumerate the homeless in shelters, however, was not limited to the larger cities.

The census resulted in a count of 228,372 homeless persons, of whom 178,638 (78%) were located in emergency shelters¹⁰ and 49,734 (22%) at preidentified street locations. This suggests that close to 9 out every 10,000 Americans were homeless in 1990. Nearly half were in California and New York (44%); the overall rate in Massachusetts was only slightly above the national average.¹¹

Most observers believe that the census failed to include the majority of the homeless. There has been extensive criticism of both the conceptualization and implementation of S-night. Preliminary field tests suggested that a daytime count would have been more effective. In addition, excessive caution was exercised in the failure to include a range of groups of homeless, such as those hidden, and in seeking any information other than the most rudimentary demographics. The most critical problems, however, lay in the implementation of the excessively modest goals of the project. Despite a budget of \$2.7 million and the employment of 22,644 enumerators for the count, widespread reports indicate there was poor field training and support. A debriefing survey of the enumerators conducted by the Census Bureau indicated that the respondents were satisfied with the training; however, 64.2 percent of their

suggestions for improvement and 70 percent of the problems encountered were considered too general to be coded.¹² There were also widespread violations of bureau procedures by the enumerators, many of which appear to have arisen out of fear of the homeless. Enumerators sometimes teamed up in groups of four instead of two — thus reducing coverage of the assigned locations — failed to leave their vehicles, or failed to show up at assigned locations. There was an attempt to employ homeless persons as enumerators, but administrative regulations, such as the requirement of several forms of identification, are reported to have diminished this effort.¹³

Reliability of Shelter Counts

Because of the widespread concerns about the possibility of an undercount, several monitoring studies were organized by the bureau and by independent advocates prior to the census. While most of these involved the street count, two involved the implementation of the shelter count. A census-commissioned study by the Center for Survey Methods Research, for instance, found that despite the restrictive definition of shelters used by the bureau, it generated lists with more than twice as many shelters as advocates and local experts could.¹⁴ This finding, although increasing confidence in the shelter counts, does not speak to the issue of how well individuals in those shelters were counted. The other Census Bureau study, unfortunately, did not address this issue either, as it involved a survey of the bureau district office personnel about the degree of cooperation received from shelter providers and other groups.¹⁵

There were, however, two independently conducted surveys of the number of persons in homeless shelters in selected cities at around the time of the census. In 1989, Burt, of the Urban Institute, conducted a systematic telephone survey of shelters in 147 cities.¹⁶ In addition, the U.S. Conference of Mayors in 1990 surveyed each of thirty cities regarding their shelter bed rates.¹⁷ Table 1 summarizes the counts for the twenty-one cities for which all three counts were available and provides a basis for comparison of the bureau's findings with those of the other two studies.¹⁸

The table is based on counts in the form of rates per 10,000 to control for differences in population size and permit intercity comparisons. An examination of the figures for individual cities indicates much variability; however, the means of all three counts fall within the 25 to 28 per 10,000 range. The bureau's rates are not significantly different from either of the two other figures at the .05 level using paired *t*-tests. The Urban Institute's and Census Bureau's counts compare relatively well, with means of 28.4 and 27.3, which are not significantly different and are highly correlated ($r = .81$; $p = .00$). However, the correlation with the mayors' estimate is not important, though in aggregate the levels are not significantly different. The mayors' estimate represented a less systematic effort than Burt's, as it involved city-level estimates on the part of diverse municipal officials.

It is clear that much random error is involved in one or more of these measurements owing to the considerable differences within individual sets of figures. But both these figures and the Nashville study do not provide evidence of systematic error or bias in undercounting homeless persons in shelters that adhere to the bureau's implicit definition.

Table 1

**Comparison of 1990 Census and Independent Counts of Shelter Beds in
Selected U.S. Cities with More Than 100,000 Population, 1990
(per 10,000)**

City ^a	U.S. Census	U.S. Conference of Mayors ^b	Urban Institute ^c
Mean ^d	27.3	25.4	28.4
Standard Deviation ^d	17.1	13.8	19.7
Median	28.0	17.6	23.2

Sources: U.S. census figures computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census, Summary Tape File 1-A; U.S. Conference of Mayors, *A Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness in America's Cities, 1990: A 30-City Report* (Washington, D.C., December 1990), 35; Martha Burt, *Over the Edge: The Growth of Homelessness in the 1980s* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1992).

^aThe cities include Alexandria, Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, Kansas City, Louisville, Minneapolis, Nashville, New Orleans, New York, Norfolk, Phoenix, Portland, Providence, St. Paul, Salt Lake City, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. The first two columns below indicate the level of covariation between these ratings, not agreement, and these indicate a correlation between the Census and Urban Institute findings, not with the Mayors' estimates. The last two columns report on paired *t*-tests and reflect the level of agreement, indicating that none of the three pairs represents significantly different levels.

	Pearson <i>r</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>p</i>
Census and Mayors	.35	.12	.25	.81
Census and Urban Institute	.81	.00	-.60	.56
Mayors and Urban Institute	.67	.00	-.94	.36

^bFigures represent total shelter beds and family shelter beds converted to population rates per 10,000.

^cFigures from Burt, *Over the Edge*, Appendix A, "1989 Homeless Rate."

^dPhiladelphia and San Antonio, as well as other unlisted cities, are not included in the computation of the various statistics (except median), since data from the Conference of Mayors' estimates are unavailable.

Reliability of the Street Counts

The question of the reliability of the street counts is considerably more problematic than that of the shelter counts. Fortunately, both advocates and the bureau paid greater attention to assessing any systematic bias or possible undercount in designated locations. The bureau contracted with five private research groups to monitor the street count using one or both of two types of methodology. Four of these groups used recapture methods, which involved placing between 57 and 127 volunteers as "plants" at the predefined locations where the Census Bureau would be counting homeless.¹⁹ Each volunteer recorded whether he or she was counted by an enumerator, thus permitting an assessment of the percentage of eligible persons enumerated. The other methodology involved in-person interviews with homeless persons in the few days following the census, also to determine the percentage who said they were interviewed by a census enumerator.²⁰ In addition to the contracted studies, private groups in Tucson and San Francisco independently conducted two of the most significant monitoring efforts, which involved interviews with 300 and 1,008 homeless persons, respectively.²¹

Table 2

**Meta-analysis of Results, Monitoring Studies of 1990
U.S. Census Street Counts in Selected Cities**

City & Investigator	Studies Using Recapture Methods							Follow-up Studies of Homeless							Total
	<i>n</i>	Yes	Prob.	Maybe	Prob. Not	No	% Ctd ^a	<i>n</i>	Yes	Prob.	Maybe	Prob. Not	No	% Ctd ^a	
Chicago (Edin)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	5	—	—	—	13	28	28%
Los Angeles ^b (Cousineau)	63	21	—	11	—	31	40	50	17	11	—	16	6	74	51%
New Orleans (Wright & Devine)	58	38	—	3	—	17	69	10	5	—	1	—	4	56	67%
New York ^c (Hopper)	127	46	15	—	10	56	45	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	45%
Phoenix (Stark)	57	17	—	4	—	36	32	10	2	—	—	—	8	20	30%
San Francisco ^d (HTF & COH)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1008	353	—	122	—	533	40	40%
Tucson ^d Primavera	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	300	138	—	—	—	162	46	46%
Aggregate	305	122	15	18	10	140	47	1396	520	11	123	16	726	42	42.6%

Sources: Kathryn Edin, "Assessment of S-Night 1990 in Chicago, IL," North Park College, Chicago, May 1990; M. R. Cousineau and T. W. Ward, "An Evaluation of the 1990 Census of the Homeless in Los Angeles," Los Angeles Homeless Health Care Project, June 8, 1990; J. D. Wright and J. A. Devine, "Assessment of the Street Enumeration Procedures during the Census 'Shelter and Street Night' in New Orleans," Tulane University, n.d.; Kim Hopper, "Final Report: Monitoring and Evaluating the 1990 S-Night Count in New York City," Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, January 1991; Louisa Stark, "An Evaluation of the 1990 Census of Homeless People in Phoenix," Community Housing Partnership, Phoenix, July 30, 1990; Coalition on Homelessness, *The Newsletter of the Coalition on Homelessness*, "Alternate Homeless Survey Finds Severe Under Count by Census Bureau," San Francisco, April 1990; Primavera Foundation, press release, "Monitoring the U.S. Census Bureau Shelter/Street Count of Tucson: A Survey by the Primavera Foundation," March 28, 1990.

^aThe percentage of homeless persons counted on the streets is calculated in each case by dividing the yeses (counted) by the *n* for the particular study, excluding any maybes or probabyls. This percentage does not consider the "hidden homeless" or other classes of homeless persons, but only those fitting the U.S. Census criteria for the street count.

^bOnly the figures for street locations selected for the census counted are used here.

^cHopper computed a more specific figure of 53 percent, but to enhance comparability with other studies, the percentage based on the raw data is retained here. This researcher also reports having conversations with twenty-two homeless persons in the weeks after the census, of whom four reported being interviewed. These data, however, are not included owing to their informality.

^dIn contrast to the first two studies, these two studies were conducted by independent advocacy associations, which were under contract with the U.S. Bureau of the Census. While the mean positive count rate for the census studies was 47 percent, in contrast to 41 percent for others, this, as noted below, was not a significant effect.

F tests for main and interaction effects:

	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
Method (recapture vs. homeless survey)	1.399	.237
Funding (census contracted vs. advocacy study)	3.130	.077
City	4.609	.000
Method X city	3.583	.028

The results of the ten studies conducted, summarized in Table 2, indicate that only 42.6 percent of the combined total of the plants and homeless persons were enumerated, showing a severe undercount in the seven urban areas studied. This percentage is calculated by using the 1,508 of the total 1,701 subjects who were able to

say that they definitely were or were not counted and excluding all who equivocated with a “maybe,” “probably yes,” or “probably not.” An analysis of variance indicated that the results did not significantly differ depending on either the method used (recapture or homeless survey) or auspices (contracted or independent study), but they did vary considerably depending on the city.

An examination of the findings in individual cities indicates that the studies with large samples all had findings in the 40 to 46 percent range, whereas the studies with small samples in Chicago, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Phoenix almost all varied dramatically from a low of 20 percent to a high of 74 percent. For this reason, the 99 percent confidence interval for the aggregate percentage counted — 39.2 percent to 46 percent — probably represents a fair estimate of the percentage of homeless living in nonhidden street locations who were counted in major urban areas,²² but not in rural areas, where it is undoubtedly considerably greater.

Since contracting for these studies, officials of the Census Bureau have argued that the results cannot be used as a measure of the degree of undercount.²³ The bureau’s own analysis of these studies, however, indicated that the enumerators “may have missed half the street sites in Chicago and Los Angeles, and a third in Phoenix,” and that “substantial departures from standard procedure appear to have occurred to varying degrees in all five cities.” Statistical and probability theory precludes untested generalizations from the monitoring studies. Nonetheless, the cumulative results of the ten studies do present persuasive evidence that, regardless of auspices and method of study, a consistent pattern of undercounting of persons in the identified locations occurred.

Application to Massachusetts

A review of the reliability of the national data may or may not be applicable to Massachusetts. For this reason, it is important that data relevant to the reliability of the Massachusetts data also be considered. The only overall estimate of both street and shelter numbers is that published by the Executive Office of Human Services, whose estimate, based on various administrative records, was 10,000 for 1990, about 45 percent greater than the 6,887 generated by the Census Bureau.²⁴ However, the Boston Shelter Commission’s count of 2,784 homeless on the streets and in shelters in late 1990 is only 13 percent more than the bureau’s count of 2,463 for March of that year.²⁵ The bureau’s street count for Boston was 218, or 29 percent more than the Shelter Commission’s count of 168. Of the four Massachusetts cities with more than 100,000 population, three are included in Burt’s 1989 study of shelter bed rates. The mean rate from the Burt study for Boston, Springfield, and Worcester was 28.7, compared with 30.1 from the Census Bureau, thus supporting the finding of the absence of a systematic undercount in the census’s shelter figures for Massachusetts. The Executive Office of Human Services’ figures, however, provide evidence — not supported by the Boston Shelter Commission results — of an overall undercount, most likely in respect to the nonsheltered homeless, especially in rural areas.

In summary, this review of research and data collection efforts supports the use of the Census Bureau shelter counts in Massachusetts. In addition, a meta-analysis of data from this research provides us with a possible adjustment factor for estimating the actual prevalence of nonhidden homeless in street locations in urban areas of more than 50,000. This study will, therefore, test the possibility of adjusting the

Massachusetts street counts using this factor. In addition, it aims to analyze factors associated with variability of the rates in large areas to test the feasibility of extrapolating the urban figures to rural towns, then assessing the overall accuracy of the estimates for non- or underenumerated rural areas. Finally, an important purpose is to identify some of the ways these rates vary according to demographic, housing, economic, and service conditions throughout the towns and cities of Massachusetts.

Methodology

This study represents a secondary analysis of data from several government statistical sources. Counts of persons in shelters and on the streets, as well as basic demographic and housing data, were obtained from the 1990 U.S. Census. These items were extracted from Summary Tape File 1-A, using CD-ROM technology (see Bureau of the Census, Technical Documentation, Summary Tape File 1). Data on social, health, and educational services were similarly extracted from the 1988 survey of county business patterns. Information on mental health services was obtained from published documents of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, and income data from 1987 U.S. census reports.²⁶

The units of analysis were the 351 Massachusetts cities and towns, which represent county subdivisions and are contiguous in their coverage of virtually all the land area of the state. Income data were also on a town level; however, the services and mental health data were available only on the county or mental health area level. These data, therefore, were first converted to rates or percentages, then allocated or assigned to each of the towns that comprised the larger unit; none of these towns were split between counties or areas. This procedure assumes equal service coverage within each county. In some respects, the procedure is advantageous, as many of the institutions, such as mental hospitals, serve these larger areas and not just the towns in which they are located.

Extensive data transformations were involved in collapsing the multiple categories in which many of the census counts are recorded. For instance, the counts for the various age groups were used to compute, through a grouped data formula, the median age for each city or town. The index of dispersion²⁷ was the basis for computation of an index of racial diversity within each town, which had the advantage of capitalizing not only on the overall numbers of minority persons, but also the variation in numbers between racial groups. Any aggregation of the rates, using breakdowns or multiple regressions, utilized a weighting factor based on relative population size to avoid the problem of a city like Boston being given no more consideration than a small affluent suburb. Thus, aggregate means for counties or groups of towns represent means of the combined populations, not a "mean of means."

Finally, multiple regression equations were computed to control simultaneously for various independent variables and construct a predictive model to be used in further data adjustments. Because prediction and not causal explanation was the foremost purpose of this analysis, stringent criteria were used in that all predictor variables with *t* scores over .05 were eliminated, keeping the independent variables to a parsimonious minimum. In addition, the adjusted R^2 was used to compensate for small sample sizes.

Results

The Census Counts

Slightly more than one in each 1,000 Massachusetts residents were identified by the 1990 census as homeless (10.3 per 10,000). Of these 6,881 people, 6,207, or almost 9 out of 10 (89%), were located in homeless shelters on the night of March 20, 1990. Rates varied dramatically, from zero in both Duke (Martha's Vineyard) and Nantucket counties to 38.2 per 10,000 in Suffolk County, where Boston is located. Barnstable County (Cape Cod) had the second highest rate of 18.1. An examination of selected towns and cities provides a parallel view as do the counties, and these indicate that significant rates are also found in most urban areas, such as Cambridge, Worcester, Springfield, Lowell, and especially Lynn, an impoverished Boston North Shore inner suburb whose rate surpasses that of Boston with one in each 222 residents found to be homeless (45.0). Table 3 summarizes the overall levels for Massachusetts and the city of Boston.

Table 3

Results from the 1990 U.S. Census Enumeration of Homeless on Streets and in Shelters in Massachusetts

	Shelter	Counts		Rates per 10,000			Percentage of Total in Shelters
		Street	Total	Shelter	Street	Total	
Massachusetts	6,207	674	6,881	10.3	1.1	11.4	89
Boston	2,245	218	2,463	39.1	3.8	42.9	91

Source: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census, Summary Tape File 1-A.

A cursory examination of the census counts, such as those summarized in Table 4, may lead one to conclude that homelessness is almost entirely an urban phenomenon in Massachusetts. However, such an interpretation would ignore the fact that few efforts were made to enumerate street persons in cities of fewer than 50,000 population. Thus, the variation of rates reflected in Table 4, from 1.3 in towns with fewer than 5,000, to 36.0 in cities with more than 100,000, reflects in part the well-known urban bias of the census. Although the shelter rates are also quite disparate, ranging from 1.3 to 32.5, they vary less dramatically than the street rates, which range from zero to 3.6. The street rates reflect a dramatic drop-off just below the 50,000 mark, which is consistent with what we know about the enumeration procedures. In fact, the almost 70 percent of the 351 towns and cities that had counts of zero were almost entirely in rural areas.

The proportion of homeless served by shelters does not vary significantly based on size of municipality. However, if towns of fewer than 5,000 are excluded (many of these percentages could not be computed because of denominators of zero), a higher proportion of the homeless — about 90 percent — were found to be sheltered in larger areas, compared with about 8 percent in cities of between 5,000 and 14,999 people.

Table 4

Mean Rates of Homelessness by Town or City Population

Population Category	n	Rates per 10,000			Percentage of Homeless in Shelters
		Shelter	Street	Overall	
Fewer than 4,999	119	1.3	0.0	1.3	100.0
5,000–14,999	119	1.6	0.5	1.7	79.8
15,000–49,999	92	4.7	0.2	4.9	87.0
50,000–99,999	17	13.1	2.1	15.2	91.5
More than 100,000	4	32.5	3.6	36.0	89.6

Source: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census, Summary Tape File 1–A.

Note: The means are weighted by population of municipality. They therefore represent mean rates for the combined populations of the towns or cities in each category.

Bivariate Analysis

The next step in the analysis consisted of testing several hypotheses about the particular contributions of selected demographic, service, and economic conditions to explain variations among homeless rates. This was done by computing zero-order Pearson r correlation coefficients between the various predictors and the shelter, street, and overall rates, both for the total sample of 351 cities and for twenty cities with populations of more than 50,000 (see Appendix A). It is important to determine if relations uncovered by the total sample can be replicated with the smaller group of cities in which there is reason to believe that considerably better counts were obtained. If these findings cannot be replicated, the possibility that the relation uncovered represents the differential search efforts becomes more plausible.

Even within the twenty urban areas, population size remains one of the most important predictors, with an overall r of .67 ($p < .001$). However, population density ceases to be a significant factor (overall $r = .28$). Other variables correlated with urban size also gain in significance when the twenty cities are examined by themselves. In particular, the greater the racial diversity, the higher the rates of homelessness, especially in cities of more than 50,000 (overall $r = .69$; $p < .001$). Similarly, as median age decreases, rates of homelessness increase, especially in the larger areas ($r = -.52$; $p < .01$). The percentage of those aged sixty-five and older is also negatively correlated with homelessness ($r = -.52$; $p < .01$), but not the percentage of those aged eighteen or under. Homelessness is found to be associated with higher proportions of males, especially with the street rates in the larger urban areas (street $r = .49$; $p < .01$).

The family structure variables all gauge social fragmentation, a phenomenon often associated with urbanization and hypothesized to place individuals at risk of homelessness. In the total sample, it was found that the higher the percentage of persons not living together in families ($r = -.27$; $p < .001$) and more one-person households were both associated with higher homeless rates ($r = -.31$; $p < .001$); however, this relation was minimized within the twenty larger cities. A similar pattern emerged in respect to places with higher percentages of separated, widowed, and divorced adults ($r = .28$; $p < .001$), and similarly, female single-parent households were associated with higher rates of homelessness ($r = .41$; $p < .001$). These predictors are not as

important within the more homogeneous group of twenty larger cities. An important exception, however, was the finding that the more female single-parent families, the more people live on the streets in the larger cities ($r = .48$; $p < .001$).

Unexpectedly, the two most recent indicators of available economic resources — per capita income and per capita income change, 1979–1987 — did not explain any significant level of variation in homeless rates. These are crude measures and do not accurately reflect resources available to families at low-income levels. It should be noted that the higher the mean per capita income of a community, the more it was able to increase its income during 1979 to 1987 ($r = .70$; $p < .0000$).

Indicators of housing availability and affordability present a mixed picture. The most dramatic relationships involve vacancy rates and rental availability, but not affordability. The greater the overall vacancy rate (which includes nonrented houses), the more people are homeless, especially those on the streets in the twenty urban areas ($r = .69$; $p < .001$). In contrast, the more vacant rental rooms (whether in a single room or a large expensive apartment) per homeless person, the smaller the rate of the homeless, especially those in shelters ($r = -.69$; $p < .001$). This measure varies from a low of about 20 in Boston upward of several hundred in some rural areas. When per capita income and median rents were considered together in a housing affordability index, it was found that the more unaffordable the housing, the higher the rates of homelessness in the total sample ($r = .27$; $p < .001$), but this relationship disappeared within the confines of the more homogeneous group of twenty cities.

Virtually none of the indicators of service usage ("service recipients") was significantly associated with any form of homelessness in either analysis. The one exception involved the percentage of persons in juvenile institutions in the twenty larger cities: the more such recipients, the more homeless, especially those in shelters ($r = .49$; $p < .001$).

In contrast, overall service availability, measured by the percentage of population employed in various types of services, was found to significantly predict homeless rates, but only in the larger cities. The more health, education, and social services, the more homeless, particularly those in shelters. The one exception involved residential services, where the more such services were slightly associated with fewer homeless ($r = -.11$; $p .05$).

Other service indicators showed little predictive power in respect to the homeless rates, especially two measures of mental health institutional and community services computed from a factor analysis of state Department of Mental Health data. Whether deinstitutionalization has significantly contributed to homelessness, as is commonly believed, can be fully tested only by examining interstate data in which there are more noted variations in the history of the depopulation of state and county hospitals.

Multiple Regressions

Whether all 351 cities and towns or only the twenty largest cities are considered, significant patterns in the variation of homelessness between municipalities were identified in this study. Of several regression models tested, the two of greatest interest involve that for shelter rates in the total population and the one for street rates in the largest cities. Betas as well as summary statistics for these two models are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5

Indicators of Homelessness Regressed on Selected Predictors

	Shelter Rate (<i>n</i> = 351)		Street Rate (<i>n</i> = 20) ¹			Partial <i>r</i>
	Beta	<i>B</i>	Partial <i>r</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	
Persons in families (%)	-.39 ^c	-.0059	-.29	-.32 ^a	-7.46E-04	-.54
Separated, widowed, divorced adults (%)	.43 ^c	.0176	.26			
Family households with aged (%)	.14 ^a	.0029	.13			
Index of racial diversity ²	.55 ^c	.0037	.42			
65 and older (%)	-.22 ^c	-.0087	-.19			
Occupied units rented (%)	-.22 ^c	-.0139	-.14			
Total vacancy rate				.73 ^c	.0074	.79
Rooms for rent/ homeless	-.17 ^b	-.0064	-.16			
Correctional facilities	-.11 ^c	-.0135	-.18			
Health care	-.19 ^b	-.0139	-.11			
Education	-.21 ^b	-.0175	-.18			
Social service, individual & family	.22 ^b	.2437	.18			
Mean SS salary	.40 ^c	5.17E-07	.27			
Constant		-.0019			2.38E-04	
Equation Statistics						
<i>R</i> ₂			.82			.84
<i>R</i> ₂			.68			.71
<i>R</i> ₂ Adjusted			.67			.68
D.F. — Regression			12.00			2.00
D.F. — Residual			338.00			17.00
<i>F</i>			59.30			21.00
Significance <i>F</i>			.0000			.0000

Sources: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census, Summary File Tape 1-A; U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, 1988.

Notes:

1. See note 1 in Appendix A.

2. See note 2 in Appendix A.

^a*p* < .05

^b*p* < .01

^c*p* < .001

The sheltered homeless are most likely to be found in cities where fewer persons live together in families (beta = -.39; *p* < .001); where there is a high proportion of adults who are separated, widowed, or divorced (beta = .43; *p* < .001); and to a smaller extent, in cities where there are relatively few aged (beta = -.22; *p* < .001) who tend to live in family households (beta = .14; *p* < .05). The single strongest predictor was racial diversity: the more racially diverse a city, the more people

have lost their homes ($\beta = .55$; $p < .001$). In addition, there are more homeless in shelters in places where a higher proportion of housing units are rented ($\beta = -.22$; $p < .001$) and where there are few rooms for rent per homeless person ($\beta = -.17$; $p < .01$). There is a slight tendency toward larger numbers of sheltered homeless in cities where there are fewer correctional ($\beta = -.11$; $p < .001$), health ($\beta = -.19$; $p < .01$), and educational facilities ($\beta = -.21$; $p < .01$). In contrast, more sheltered homeless are found in cities where a high proportion of adults are employed in individual and family-oriented social services ($\beta = .22$; $p < .01$). The characteristics of the 351 Massachusetts towns and cities collectively account for two thirds of the variation in the rates of sheltered homeless persons (adjusted $R^2 = .67$; $p < .0000$).

A considerably more parsimonious model, one with only two predictor variables, was computed to account for variations in the levels of the street homeless among the twenty cities with more than 50,000 population. Similar to the sheltered homeless, when fewer persons live together in family units, more homeless live on the streets ($\beta = -.32$; $p < .05$). The other predictor, rental vacancy rate, tells a similar story: the higher the proportion of vacant rental units, the more people live on the streets ($\beta = .73$; $p < .001$). Because only two predictors are included in this model, minimal information is provided about the meaning of these relationships and the multiple forces that lead to the fragmentation of families and lack of utilization of existing housing, as well as the various ways they contribute to homelessness. Nevertheless, low proportions of persons in families and high rental vacancy rates account for more than two thirds of the variation in rates of persons living on the streets in the urban areas in Massachusetts (adjusted $R^2 = .68$; $p < .0000$). Family fragmentation and housing accessibility correspond to the foremost reasons homeless persons give in many surveys for their lack of a home.²⁸

Important patterns have been identified in this series of analyses. Indicators of urbanization, racial diversity, family fragmentation, housing displacement (vacancy rates), and availability of individual and family social services were all found to be associated with high levels of homelessness.

Application of Model

One of the main values for statistically modeling a phenomenon such as homelessness is that it permits the identification of causal relationships and possible avenues of intervention. The data used in this study, however, have permitted only an initial exploration of these relationships, mostly because important policy variables could not be included in an intrastate level analysis.²⁹ Nonetheless, the variables included proved to have substantial predictive power in accounting for variations in the homeless rates. To the extent that the two predictor variables — percentage of persons in families and vacancy rates — used to account for the street rates operate similarly in smaller areas, it is possible to estimate the actual rates of homeless persons on the streets in the remaining 331 underenumerated cities in the commonwealth. However, such projections cannot stand by themselves without being tested through comparisons with independent estimates and counts.³⁰

The model computed for street rates in the urban areas was used (see Table 5), therefore, to compute estimates of the actual numbers of homeless in each of the remaining 331 cities and towns. For each of these municipalities, the unstandardized regression coefficients for the family and vacancy variables were multiplied by the

value for the corresponding predictor variable and totaled, along with the intercept constant, to form a projected rate.³¹

The second stage in adjusting the street counts for known systematic biases involved applying the 42.6 percent undercount figure from the analysis of the monitoring studies (see Table 2) to the projected rates, which involved multiplying the newly adjusted rate for each town by 2.347 (100 divided by 42.6). The resulting rate was then multiplied by the town's population to give a projected actual count of street homelessness in each jurisdiction. If at any stage the rate was a negative number, it was set to zero. While the adjustment for vacancy rates and percentage of persons in families was applied only to the 331 smaller cities, the second adjustment was applied to both the projected urban and rural rates equally. Finally, the adjusted street counts and rates were added to the original, unadjusted shelter counts and rates to provide new overall adjusted levels for each of the 351 towns and cities in the commonwealth. These figures are summarized in Table 6.

Table 6

**Adjusted Levels of Street Homeless and Adjusted Totals,
Based on Proportion of Undercount and
Predicted Levels from Regression Equation**

	Census		Projected		Street & Shelter Adjusted Totals		Percentage Sheltered
	Count	Rate	Count	Rate	Count	Rate	
Massachusetts	674	1.1	3,947	6.6	10,155	16.9	60
Boston	218	3.8	512	8.9	2,757	48.0	81

Source: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census, Summary Tape File 1-A.

Note: Street rates and counts for cities of 50,000 or more were adjusted only on the basis of the reported undercount from prior research (see earlier section). Figures for all other cities were also adjusted on the basis of predicted figures, using the equation from the multiple regression equation in Table 5, column 5.

Overall, it is projected that Massachusetts in 1990 had 10,155 homeless persons fitting the Census Bureau's implicit definitions, indicating that the U.S. government successfully counted only two thirds of the most visible and hard core of the homeless whom it sought to enumerate in Massachusetts (see Table 6). Out of every 10,000 persons, about 17 were either living in homeless shelters or at visible street locations. Homeless persons in women's shelters, in hidden places, in mental hospitals and other institutions, as well as those doubled up with families and friends are not included in this projection. When the distribution of homeless persons as indicated by the adjusted rates is reexamined according to population of municipality, it becomes clear that rural areas also have significant numbers of homeless, though not to the degree that urban areas do.

Table 7 summarizes this pattern, indicating that at least one in every 250 persons are homeless in the largest urban areas, but only about half that number are homeless in the smaller areas. The unexpectedly high rates in the smallest areas, those with fewer than 5,000 people, are attributable to very high rates in the Cape Cod area: Barnstable, Duke, and Nantucket counties. These may be unrealistically high

projections, since one of the predictors in the model is a housing vacancy rate, and such figures are extraordinarily high for the Cape in March owing to the many vacation homes there. Nonetheless, there are published reports which claim that the Cape has one of the highest rates of homelessness in the commonwealth: "Cape Cod, by far, has the greatest incidence of family homelessness in the state."³² Outside of the Cape and extremely small towns, the rural rates are at the 9 to 10 level, or about one out of each 1,000 persons (for all towns of fewer than 50,000 the rate has a weighted average of 10.2). This adjustment of the rates indicates that of those who are homeless, a much greater proportion are sheltered in urban than in rural areas. While 4 out of 5 (79.3%) of the urban homeless are sheltered, only one in 14 (7.1%) are sheltered in the most rural areas.

Table 7

Mean Adjusted Rates of Homelessness by Town or City Population

Population Category	n	Rates per 10,000			Percentage of Homeless in Shelters
		Shelter	Street	Overall	
Massachusetts Total	351	10.3 ^a	6.6	16.9	59.9
Fewer than 4,999 ^b	119	1.3	18.3	19.6	7.1
5,000–14,999	119	1.6	7.5	9.0	10.9
15,000–49,999	92	4.7	5.0	9.7	47.8
50,000–99,999	17	13.1	4.9	18.0	85.0
More than 100,000	4	32.5	8.4	40.9	79.3

Source: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census, Summary Tape File 1-A.

Note: The means are weighted by population of municipality. They therefore represent mean rates for the combined populations of the towns or cities in each category.

^aShelter rates are not adjusted; only street rates are adjusted.

^bAdjusted figures for these extremely small areas probably represent an artifact of the statistical analysis as they are based in part on a multiple regression equation that used vacancy rates as one of the key predictors. The values for this variable for these areas, unlike the variable and areas, is extremely divergent from the twenty cities used in the initial regression. Many of these small towns represent vacation spots on the Cape and Nantucket, which have extremely high vacancy rates at the time of the census, represent conditions too dissimilar from those of the remainder of the state to enable confident projections. Nevertheless, there are some reports that homeless rates in these areas are quite high owing to housing that is unaffordable for many local residents as well as significant transient populations.

Testing the Model

The final stage in the model's application consisted of testing, which was done by obtaining independent and published counts or estimates and comparing them with the adjusted figures. Table 8 summarizes the adjusted and independent counts, as well as the census figures, and indicates that there was a fair level of agreement between the adjusted and independent counts. This is most dramatically the case with the aggregate Massachusetts and Boston figures, for which there was no more than a 1.5 percent disparity in the two sets. There was also a fair degree of agreement for the figures for the Franklin County area, where the actual count was higher than the projected one. However, as a period count, it would be expected to be somewhat higher than the adjusted "point in time" figure used in this study. Although the Cape

Cod and Peabody-Beverly-Salem independent estimates are considerably lower, it should be kept in mind that these were from a period five years earlier, are based on service contacts, and are general estimates. If it is assumed that each of the Cape Cod families has three individuals, this provides a 1985 count of about 700, about half the projected 1,456. If Burt's projection of a 22 percent annual growth in homelessness is accurate, the projected 1,456 would be fewer than the adjusted independent estimate. Thus, while rates for some of the smallest rural areas could be on the high side, on the whole the model predicts levels of homelessness throughout the state in a manner largely consistent with independent counts and estimates.

Table 8

**Comparison of Adjusted Counts with Independent Counts
and Estimates for Selected Areas**

	U.S. Census	Adjusted Counts	Independent Counts/ Estimates	Type	Year
Massachusetts	6,887	10,155	10,000	Estimate	1990
Boston	2,463	2,757	2,784	Count	1990
Barnstable County (Cape Cod)	337	1,456	400-I 100-F	Estimate	1985
Franklin County and Athol Area	29	91	108	Records	1989
Gloucester	45	79	50-75	Estimate	1985
Peabody-Beverly-Salem	204	230	50-I	Estimate	1985

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census, Summary Tape File 1-A; Massachusetts: Executive Office of Human Services, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, *Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plan 3*, 1990, 3; Boston: Emergency Shelter Commission, City of Boston, *State of Homelessness in the City of Boston, Winter 1991-1992*, 20. To maximize comparability of the data, the figures for winter 1990-1991 were used, excluding those for detox, hospitals, mental health facilities, and battered women's and adolescent shelters. These represent types of homelessness not covered by the U.S. special census or these adjustments; Barnstable County, Gloucester, and Peabody-Beverly-Salem: Executive Office of Human Services, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, *Massachusetts Reports on Homelessness, 1985*; Franklin County and Athol area: Executive Office of Human Services, *Homeless Assistance Plan 3*, Appendix 4, 3. The 108 figure, which includes only single men and women, is probably low.

Note: "I" indicates a count of individuals, "F" a count of families of unknown size.

This study provides strong evidence that at least one in every 590 Massachusetts residents are living on the streets or in homeless shelters. It demonstrates that homelessness is not only a severe urban problem, but also that significant numbers are homeless in rural areas, and that emergency shelter services are severely deficient in these localities. It also illustrates that homelessness is not a simple function of housing unavailability, deinstitutionalization, or poverty, but represents a complex interplay between several different sets of conditions. The bivariate analyses showed that significant associations exist with high levels of racial diversity, one-person families, persons not in families, female-headed families, and younger individuals. While there are many ways that these data might be interpreted, probably the most plausible is

that each of these groups — minorities, nonnuclear families, single, and young people — is at risk, and that the higher their numbers, the higher the homeless rates.


Previous surveys of the homeless have clearly established that disproportionate numbers of them are minorities, single, and male and that a fast-growing subgroup is female single-parent families. In contrast, two-parent families, whites, and the aged are underrepresented among the homeless.³³ When detailed data about the characteristics of homeless in various localities become available (from the Census Bureau's STF-2 tape series), it will be possible to test this interpretation by computing differential rates for various demographic subgroups based on age, gender, or race.

A significant finding is that in Massachusetts vacancy rates are for the most part positively associated with high levels of homelessness. Thus, it appears that homelessness does not reflect housing unavailability, but instead its inaccessibility. People, especially minorities, young people, and female-headed families, are being displaced from existing housing. The lack of significant correlations between the housing affordability index and homelessness is unexpected. While it may simply reflect the fact that the index used was a general measure of the affordability of all rental properties, rather than ones for lower-income groups, it may also suggest that there are other barriers to housing access such as discriminatory zoning and rental policies, as well as financial disincentives for landlords to adjust rents to changing market conditions. However, when a specific index of number of rooms for rent per homeless person is correlated with homeless rates, there are consistently negative zero-order correlations. This suggests that although people are being displaced from the larger stock of housing, some are being reabsorbed in areas where there is a relatively high ratio of vacant rental rooms to the number of homeless persons.

Correlations between services and homelessness can mean many things. Positive associations could mean that services are making people homeless, attracting the homeless from other areas, or responding to the high numbers of homeless. Conversely, negative associations might mean that services are effective in solving the problem of homelessness, that service providers are avoiding the homeless, or that the homeless are avoiding the service providers. However, if it is assumed that services were there first, then the two hypotheses that service providers either follow or flee from the homeless can be rejected, except in the case of those services specifically developed and designed in response to the growth of homelessness. In this study, most of the service indicators correlated positively with rates of homelessness. The most basic interpretation would be that both services and homelessness are associated with urbanization, so that their distributions tend to parallel one another and illustrate an interactive clustering of providers and recipients. This is not the case with residential services, which showed negative zero-order correlations. They suggest either that residential services provide an important safety net, minimizing the prevalence of homelessness, or that these services sometimes tend to be located in less populated residential suburban areas and smaller towns where there are lower rates of homelessness.³⁴

One of the most important findings of this study is that it is feasible to adjust census data using known sources of variation and bias to produce synthetic estimates, which can in turn be confirmed or disconfirmed. Both astronomers and criminologists have been effective in predicting the existence of unobserved but later-to-

be-verified phenomena by using the flimsiest of data, the most disreputable of informants, or the most abstract theoretical conjectures as their starting point. The ability of social scientists to productively use the "fatally flawed" data from the census to study the dimensions of homelessness should not be an insurmountable task. This attempt to do so has met with a moderate degree of success. A similar yet far more accurate and useful adjustment of the data will no doubt be possible by using the national data, not only because of the greater number of jurisdictions (3,241 counties), predictor variables, and sources of data on systematic biases that could be used, but also because there would be a much wider range of independent studies and estimates for fully testing predictions generated from such an empirically based model.

The value of such undertakings as those recommended here is not only the development of an accurate portrayal of who and how many are homeless, where they are located, and what their personal characteristics are; the data are also the foundation for causal modeling efforts that are direly needed to answer questions about the impact of possible alterations in various economic, income maintenance, mental health, and housing policies and the identification of those changes which will mean the greatest reduction in homelessness with a given level of resources. 

Appendix A

Zero-order Correlations of Homeless Rates with Selected Predictor Variables

	Shelter	All Cities (351) Street	Overall	Cities w/Population <50,000 (20) ¹ Shelter	Street	Overall
Indicators of Urbanization						
Population	.45 ^c	.35 ^c	.48 ^c	.65 ^b	.47 ^a	.67 ^c
Population density	.34 ^c	.32 ^c	.37 ^c	.25	.33	.28
Family Structure Variables (%)						
Persons in families	-.27 ^c	-.13 ^a	-.27 ^c	-.32	-.22	-.32
One-person households	.30 ^c	.18 ^c	.31 ^c	.17	.25	.19
Separated, widowed, divorced adults	.26 ^c	.18 ^c	.28 ^c	-.10	.24	-.06
Female single-parent households	.38 ^c	.34 ^c	.41 ^c	.25	.48 ^a	.30
Family households w/aged	-.19 ^c	-.18 ^c	-.21 ^c	-.41	-.49 ^a	-.45
Nonfamily households w/aged	.20 ^c	.17 ^c	.22 ^c	.10	.32	.14
Households w/nonrelatives	.26 ^c	.11 ^a	.26 ^c	.35	.22	.35
Other Demographic Variables						
Index of racial diversity ²	.37 ^c	.37 ^c	.40 ^c	.65 ^b	.63 ^b	.69 ^c
Median age	-.11 ^a	-.14 ^b	-.13 ^b	-.45 ^a	-.68 ^c	-.52 ^b
65 and older (%)	.10 ^b	.03	.10 ^b	-.51 ^b	-.38	-.52 ^b
18 and younger (%)	-.18 ^c	.01	-.17 ^c	.08	.31	.12
Males (%)	-.18 ^c	-.08	-.18 ^c	.37	.49 ^b	.41
Economic Variables						
Estimated 1990 per capita income	-.06	-.08	-.07	.01	-.30	-.04
Per capita income change 1979-1987	-.02	-.07	-.03	.11	-.20	.07
Housing Variables						
Occupied units rented (%)	.33 ^c	.27 ^c	.36 ^c	.24	.53 ^a	.30
Median rent	.09 ^b	-.02	.09	.07	-.26	.02
Median rooms/unit	-.27 ^c	-.18 ^c	-.28 ^c	-.13	-.43	-.18
Median persons/room	.10	.16 ^b	.12 ^a	.18	.52 ^a	.24
Total vacancy rate	.00	-.04	-.00	.33	.69 ^c	.40
Rental vacancy rate	.22 ^c	.20 ^c	.24 ^c	.22	.59 ^b	.29
Rooms for rent /homeless	-.27 ^b	.06	-.27 ^b	-.69 ^c	.30	-.68 ^c
Housing affordability Index ³ (reversed)	.26 ^c	.13 ^b	.27 ^c	-.00	.07	.01
Service Recipients						
(% Persons in:) Correctional facilities	-.03	-.01	-.03	.13	.14	.14
Nursing homes	.06	.06	.07	.19	.19	.20
Mental hospitals	-.00	-.01	-.01	.04	-.01	.03
Juvenile institutions	-.05	-.02	-.05	.49 ^a	.15	.47 ^a
Other	-.03	-.02	-.02	.11	-.04	.09
Service Providers						
(% Population Employed in:)						
Health care	.07	.07	.08	.48 ^a	.30	.49 ^a
Education	.14	.07	.14	.40	.18	.39
Social service	-.04	.01	-.04	.51 ^a	.33	.52 ^a
Individual & family	.12 ^b	.07	.12 ^b	.53 ^a	.32	.54 ^a
Job training	-.07	.00	-.07	.22	.16	.22
Residential	-.10 ^a	-.05	-.11 ^a	-.11	.04	-.10
Other SS	.10	.08	.10	.49 ^a	.29	.49 ^a
Other Service Indicators						
Day care coverage (child./center)	-.10	.00	-.10	-.04	.12	-.02
Employees per SS agency	-.02	.05	-.01	.22	.16	.23
Mean SS salary	.26 ^c	.11 ^a	-.26 ^c	.47 ^a	.28	.47 ^a
Community mental health (factor)	-.06	-.05	-.06	.11	-.01	.10
Institutional mental health (factor)	.11 ^a	.10	.12 ^a	.22	.20	.23

Sources: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census, Summary Tape File 1-A; U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, 1988; Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, "Resource Inventory for Fiscal Year 1991," September 27, 1991.

Notes:

1. There are twenty-one cities with more than 50,000 population; Lynn was excluded from these analyses because its extreme outlying values significantly camouflaged relationships in the other twenty cities.
2. The index of dispersion was computed from the population counts for each of the following groups: white, black, Asian, American Indian, other.
3. Housing affordability was computed by dividing median rent by mean household income (computed from estimated per capita income).

^a*p* <.05

^b*p* <.01

^c*p* <.001

Notes

1. National Urban League, *The Geographic Distribution of Homelessness: A Count of Shelter and Street Dwellers* (Washington, D.C., April 1991).
2. National Coalition for the Homeless, *Fatally Flawed: The Census Bureau's Count of Homeless Persons* (Washington, D.C., May 9, 1991).
3. Mary Ellen Hombs and Mitch Snyder, *Homelessness in America: A Forced March to Nowhere* (Washington, D.C.: Community for Creative Non-Violence, 1982).
4. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Report to the Secretary on the Homeless and Emergency Housing (Washington, D.C., 1984).
5. M. R. Burt and B. E. Cohen, *America's Homeless: Numbers, Characteristics, and the Programs That Serve Them* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1989).
6. M. R. Burt, *Over the Edge: The Growth of Homelessness in the 1980s* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1992).
7. Ibid.
8. U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, *Conference Proceedings for Enumerating Homeless Persons: Methods and Data Needs*, March 1991. These data, as well as data on the demographic characteristics of the homeless, were not released in time for inclusion in this analysis.
9. National Coalition for the Homeless, *Fatally Flawed*. Census Bureau officials report not making any systematic decision to exclude areas with fewer than 50,000 people, and it is clear, at least in Massachusetts, that there were occasional counts of homeless persons in smaller areas. Yet all available reports, as well as the data themselves, indicate that no efforts were made in areas of fewer than 50,000.
10. This figure does not include shelters for abused women, substance abuse centers, and homes for unwed mothers.
11. National Urban League, *The Geographic Distribution of Homelessness*. The totals in this monograph contain two errors based on an initial flawed press release by the Census Bureau, which this agency has subsequently corrected in personal correspondence as well as later data products. The published total for emergency shelters, 178,828, should be 178,638 (based on an overcount of 190 in the Kentucky data), and the Idaho street count of 78 should be 19, bringing the total street figure to 49,734, not 49,793.
12. J. H. Thompson, Memorandum, "Preliminary Results of the S-Night Enumerator Debriefing Questionnaires for the S-Night 'Assessment' Cities" (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, May 2, 1991).
13. See National Coalition for the Homeless, *Fatally Flawed*.
14. W. T. Friskics-Warren, "The Independent Compilation of Shelter Lists by Local Experts for the 1990 S-Night Enumeration: Project Design and Recommendations," Council of Community Services, January 31, 1991.
15. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "The Shelter Component of S-Night," March 18-20, 1991.

16. Burt, *Over the Edge*.
17. U.S. Conference of Mayors, *A Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness in America's Cities: 1990: A 30-City Survey* (Washington, D.C., December 1990).
18. Further examination of reliability issues should include comparisons between Burt's total sample and the census count.
19. M. R. Cousineau and T. W. Ward, "An Evaluation of the 1990 Census of the Homeless in Los Angeles," Los Angeles Homeless Health Care Project, June 8, 1990; J. D. Wright and J. A. Devine, "Assessment of the Street Enumeration Procedures during the Census 'Shelter and Street Night' in New Orleans," Tulane University, n.d.; Kim Hopper, "Final Report: Monitoring and Evaluating the 1990 S-Night Count in New York City," Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research, January 1991; Louisa Stark, "An Evaluation of the 1990 Census of Homeless People in Phoenix," Community Housing Partnership, Phoenix, July 30, 1990.
20. See Kathryn Edin, "Assessment of S-Night 1990 in Chicago, IL," North Park College, Chicago, May 1990.
21. Coalition on Homelessness, *The Newsletter of the Coalition on Homelessness*, "Alternate Homeless Survey Finds Severe Under Count by Census Bureau," San Francisco, April 1990, 3; Primavera Foundation, press release, "Monitoring the U.S. Census Bureau Shelter/Street Count of Tucson: A Survey by the Primavera Foundation," March 28, 1990.
22. Since the Census Bureau did not choose these sites randomly, statistical generalization — without empirical testing — cannot be made to the nation or urban areas as a whole. As this study goes beyond mere statistical generalization and investigates the fit of these generalizations and projections with independent observations, the assumption of random selection here and elsewhere is not made.
23. B. E. Bryant, "Report on the 1990 Census S-Night Operations," U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, May 9, 1991.
24. Massachusetts, Executive Office of Human Services, *Comprehensive Homeless Assistance Plan 3*, submitted by Michael S. Dukakis, governor, and Philip W. Johnston, secretary, Human Services. There is a potential bias in administrative data, as they tend to underestimate homeless persons because they exclude people who do not seek services.
25. City of Boston, Emergency Shelter Commission, *State of Homelessness in the City of Boston, Winter 1991-1992*.
26. U.S. Department of Commerce, *Current Population Reports. Local Population Estimates. Northeast. 1988 Population and 1987 Per Capita Income Estimates for Counties and Incorporated Places* (Series P-26, No. 88-NE-SC), March 1990.
27. H. J. Loether and D. G. McTavish, *Descriptive and Inferential Statistics*, 2d ed. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1980), 154.
28. Richard First and Beverly Toomey, unpublished manuscript on results of survey of rural homeless in Ohio, Ohio State University, 1992.
29. I am conducting a similar study on the national level with an extended range of policy predictors, with additional data to permit adjustments for systematic forms of error.
30. These twenty cities were not randomly selected; furthermore, because of their larger population, it is known that many conditions are different. Thus, it cannot be assumed that these two predictors will operate in a similar fashion outside these parameters, but it also cannot be assumed that they will function differently. It is an empirical question. Projections need to be made, then compared with independent sources of information.
31. The equation is:
$$\text{Street Rate} = (.007377 \times \text{Vacancy Rate}) + (-7.46285\text{E-}04 \times \% \text{ in Families}) + 2.38110\text{E-}04.$$
32. Massachusetts, Executive Office of Human Services, *Massachusetts Homeless Report 1985*, publication #14165-150-500-9-85-CR, 85.

33. Burt, *Over the Edge*.

34. It was not possible to examine a range of hypothesized causal factors in this study because of the lack of sufficient variation in a single state study, such as deinstitutionalization policies or provisions for many kinds of income maintenance. These have to be tested in a follow-up study with the national data.

Good-bye to All That

The Rise and Demise of Irish America

Shaun O'Connell

The works discussed in this article include:

The Rascal King: The Life and Times of James Michael Curley 1874–1958,
by Jack Beatty. 571 pages. Addison-Wesley, 1992. \$25.00.

JFK: Reckless Youth, by Nigel Hamilton. 898 pages.
Random House, 1992. \$30.00.

Textures of Irish America, by Lawrence J. McCaffrey.
236 pages. Syracuse University Press, 1992. \$29.95.

*Militant and Triumphant: William Henry O'Connell and
the Catholic Church in Boston*, by James M. O'Toole. 324 pages.
University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. \$30.00.

When I was growing up in a Boston suburb, three larger-than-life public figures defined what it meant to be an Irish-American. I could not have put it that way at the time, of course; only retrospection, aided by fresh information, yields a sense of the past's design. In that sense, as William Faulkner often reminded us, the past is never over; it is still happening — still taking shape in our minds, still shaping our lives.

Cardinal William Henry O'Connell towered over Greater Boston's Irish Catholics like a colossus. A framed picture of the cardinal — stiff-backed, big-bellied, a summer straw hat set square on his large head, his face set in a characteristically grim visage, his imposing frame garbed in a black, priestly suit — stood in a place of honor in the family "front room." James Michael Curley's legendary largess and larceny, particularly while he was mayor of Boston, made him the center of many uproarious conversations when my O'Connell clan gathered. Most important, John F. Kennedy's elegance, grace, and intelligence gave young Irish Americans of my generation a new way to think of themselves. I first saw this young author, war hero, and playboy — in 1948, when he was running for his second term as a congressman — marching in a Fourth of July parade in my hometown, Marlboro. I thought then that

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he was a kind of man who was entirely new, a man born and bred beyond the pale of anything I had previously known. Though I know far more about JFK now, I still see him as an exemplary figure.

In the mythic Irish-American family of my imagination, Cardinal O'Connell was a stern father figure to the Irish Catholics — in those days, to think of yourself as “Irish” was automatically to declare yourself as Catholic — who urged us to take pride in ourselves and in our faith, as did he, but also to heed our duties and responsibilities, as *he* defined them and as *he* assigned their reinforcement to vigilant nuns — elder sisters acting as doctrinal enforcers who imposed their wills on parochial school students with ready rulers! Mayor Curley was a scampish uncle figure, a man as well known for his foibles and his failures as for his achievements. Jack Kennedy required neither obedience nor forgiveness, for he was the brightest young son (our Prince Hal) who held out to us the promise of transcendence from the parochial. For Jack Kennedy, all politics and all religion were *not* local.

Cardinal O'Connell died in 1944; since then the Boston archdiocese that he molded to his own and to Rome's will has changed dramatically. Mayor Curley died in 1958; his cohesive Irish-American voting bloc even then was dispersing in its gravitation from the ghetto to the suburbs. John F. Kennedy died in 1963, leaving a legacy of permanent loss in the national psyche. Indeed, all three men — each a master at controlling his public image — have come under recent scrutiny and reevaluation.

Now, in the hands of a new generation of biographers, each figure is seen more fully for the man he was. Cardinal O'Connell, in James M. O'Toole's solid and revealing biography, turns out to have been a prince of the church with a hollow crown. Mayor Curley, in Jack Beatty's lively and enlightening biography, turns out to have been far more corrupt than popular mythology — abetted by Edwin O'Connor's sentimental treatment of a Curley alter ego in his novel *The Last Hurrah* — portrays him. Jack Kennedy, in Nigel Hamilton's flawed but still useful biography, turns out — surprisingly, after all of the scandalmongering that has surrounded JFK's dramatic life and death — to have been a dazzling figure as a young man; he is even more impressive than my youthful imagination conceived him to be when I first saw him.

Taken together, these three figures can be seen as representative men in the movement of Irish America from the immigrant ships to the presidency, from persecution and patronization to what Lawrence J. McCaffrey, in *Textures of Irish America*, calls “respectability and acceptability.”¹ These representative men mark sharp changes in American culture: the rise and incorporation of nineteenth-century ethnic immigrants into the American power elite, the development in style from narrow righteousness, personified by the focused life and vision of Cardinal O'Connell, to open variousness, embodied in the style and character of John F. Kennedy.

Irish immigrants first registered their presence in their parishes and wards — those territorial definitions of Irish-American ghettos. By the time John F. Kennedy was elected president in 1960, he had persuaded a slim majority of Americans that his first loyalties were neither to the papacy nor to Tammany — or to any other urban Irish political machine. Kennedy, then, took the American Irish out of the parish and the ghetto and left them on their own, without the old assurances and limitations of self-definition.

In *Beyond the Melting Pot*, Daniel Patrick Moynihan — who made his own symbolic journey from Hell's Kitchen to Harvard and then to a seat in the U.S. Senate — called Kennedy's brief reign (not Curley's demise) a "last hurrah" for Irish America.

On the day he died, the President of the United States, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Majority Leader of the United States Senate, the Chairman of the National Committee were all Irish, all Catholic, all Democrats. It will not come again.²

It was, we might say, a very Irish story — long and hard in the making, brief in fulfillment, full of sentiment, and quickly past.

This passage from "someplace to no place," as McCaffrey puts it, began in Lowell, Massachusetts, in 1859, with the birth of William O'Connell, the youngest of eleven children born to immigrants from County Cavan in north-central Ireland.³ John O'Connell, with his wife, Bridget, had come over to the "other side" to work in the Lowell mills. As their family gained a footing, they looked for better things for their youngest son. So William O'Connell was chosen for a religious vocation by his family, just as later John F. Kennedy, after the death of his older brother in World War II, was marked for political office by his ambitious father. The Irish-American saga has been one long and circuitous climb toward the promised land of acceptance and respectability through success in public institutions: particularly in the church and the government. Only now, with the clarity of hindsight, can we both count the costs and measure the gains of this struggle.

William O'Connell — priest in 1884, rector of the American College in Rome in 1895, bishop of Portland in 1901 — sought status through identification with the will of the Catholic church's Roman leaders, particularly the pope. O'Connell's own inclinations to curry favor with powerful elders conveniently coincided with a movement toward authoritarianism in the Catholic church and a discouragement of "Americanism," the local-control movement that was condemned by Pope Leo XIII in 1899. His successor in 1903, Pius X, moved against a heresy of modernism, the "higher criticism" of biblical and other sources of authority. "Ultramontane orthodoxy" became the prevailing way of the Holy Roman Catholic Church.⁴

While O'Connell — archbishop of Boston in 1907, cardinal in 1911 — looked beyond the mountains to Rome for his authority, he looked to the local to secure his power base. "The Puritan has passed, the Catholic remains," declared O'Connell on the occasion of the centennial of the Boston diocese, October 1908.⁵ O'Connell became a celebrity in Boston, a leader of his flock and, despite his ethnic chauvinism, an honored figure among the Yankee-Brahmin class. Like John Fitzgerald and James Michael Curley, O'Connell understood his symbolic role as leader of his clan, O'Toole rightly points out. "They wrote the history of the last century; we must make the history of the coming one," declared O'Connell.⁶ No need to explain who "they" were! Yet O'Connell established himself among the power elite of the Brahmin-Yankee class more firmly than either James Michael Curley or Joseph P. Kennedy.

Though O'Connell claimed the high ground — both morally and territorially in Boston — and spoke contemptuously of politicians, he too knew how (and when) to play the game. For example, he won the day in his curious fight against child-labor

laws in the 1920s and he successfully thwarted a proposed state lottery in 1935. He opposed birth control as, in the words of the *Pilot*, a newspaper under his control, “a practice which God Almighty has forbidden,” when the Massachusetts legislature considered (and defeated) legislation allowing the sale of birth control products in 1942.⁷ However, the cardinal kept silent on other questions, like women’s suffrage (which he opposed), or he registered his position late, as he did in opposing prohibition. “In effect, his church was the ward of which he was boss,” says O’Toole.⁸ In the Massachusetts legislature, O’Connell was fittingly known as “Number One.”⁹

O’Connell, representing the Catholic church and suggesting that he spoke for the pope and even higher authority, intimidated Irish-American politicians, particularly Curley, and presided over the union of Irish-American families like the patriarch he was; for example, Cardinal O’Connell married Joseph P. Kennedy and Rose Fitzgerald in his private chapel in October 1914. The cardinal lived lavishly, in his home in the Back Bay; then he moved to Brookline in 1916; he then established himself regally in his Renaissance palazzo in Brighton in 1926. He owned a summer colony on Boston’s North Shore. He drove a Pierce-Arrow, bought with contributions from laymen. He was a member of The Country Club in Brookline, though he did not actually play golf, and he joined many other exclusive Brahmin clubs. He went to Europe so often that he was nicknamed Gangplank Bill. He also maintained a home in the Bahamas, where he vacationed for three months each winter.¹⁰ Cardinal O’Connell’s life of splendor and conspicuous consumption reflected glory on his generally poor and socially insecure followers, just as did James Michael Curley’s grand house on the Jamaica way or the Kennedy “compound” of grand summer homes at Hyannisport.

O’Connell rallied his new-model army of Catholics in an Irish-American church under his command. “The Bishop of the Church stands like a sentinel,” he wrote in a pastoral letter in 1904. “His see is a watch tower whence he scans his own peaceful camp, ever alert against aught that could work disorder in the ranks.”¹¹ His motto was *Vigor in Arduis*, and he saw his life as a “struggle . . . through storm and tempest.”¹²

O’Toole’s thorough and fair-minded inquiry has uncovered much “storm and tempest” in O’Connell’s life, which was kept secret from the members of his flock, who saw him, as I did in that front-room photograph, as the embodiment of holiness and rectitude. When he was bishop of Portland, O’Connell took for his own use over \$25,000 in church funds, which he had to pay back after he left. O’Connell’s *Letters* (1915) were fabricated to suit his image as a plain, determined, and holy man. Perhaps overgenerously, O’Toole describes them as “not really forgeries in the usual sense,” but rather, “a form of early autobiography in epistle form,” because O’Connell believed that “edification was more important than accuracy.”¹³ Less generous spirits might call the production of such letters a deceit in the service of public relations!

However, these matters were venial sins compared with O’Connell’s major transgression, when he condoned the sins of others and then lied to the pope in his effort to cover up the transgression. Father James P. E. O’Connell, the cardinal’s nephew, became his secretary, his representative, “his uncle’s alter ego.”¹⁴ In 1914 Cardinal O’Connell’s nephew was made a monsignor at the age of thirty, an appointment that came a year and a half after his secret marriage! James O’Connell led a double life —

a monsignor in Boston and a husband in Manhattan, a man known as Roe (for the roe was the emblem of the O'Connell clan).

At the same time, another priest, Father David J. Toomey, the editor of the *Pilot*, who lived in Boston with the cardinal and the monsignor on Bay State Road, married a woman in Manhattan and also led a double life. When Toomey's wife, who had not known she had married a priest (as James O'Connell's wife did know), complained to the cardinal, her silence was purchased by the cardinal's attorney. Later, Toomey, after having been excommunicated, accused James of blackmailing his uncle and accused the cardinal of homosexuality, to support which charge O'Toole finds nothing more than circumstantial evidence.¹⁵ What is clear is that when Cardinal O'Connell was asked about the case of his nephew by Benedict XV, O'Connell lied to the pope.

Amazingly, O'Connell survived as cardinal of the Boston archdiocese until his death in 1944. His image of rectitude, strongly compromised within the Catholic church, remained untarnished in the mind of the general public until O'Toole's biography revealed the cardinal to be a far more flawed, yet a much more interesting man, than he wished us to imagine him. My own mind still reels with wonder to learn the truth about the devious man behind the august image.

Cardinal O'Connell personified the uncompromised and uncompromising man of faith, an image designed to intimidate his enemies and overwhelm his followers. "There can be no true morality unless it is founded on religious principle," he affirmed, though his own morality was severely compromised.¹⁶ Though he sought respect with a passion for himself, his church, and his Irish-American kind, he did so with a closed mind and a repressive hand.

O'Connell joined the Puritan attack on indecency in stage performance and in literature, guarding his flock's morality through acts of censorship which at times became ludicrous, as when he opposed Sunday baseball and attacked radio crooners. He was set against free speculation about time, space, and the cosmos, for such intellectual inquiry was nothing but "a cloak beneath which lies the ghastly apparition of atheism."¹⁷ Only eternal vigilance and deference to his will could prevail against the enemies of doubt and heresy, which lurked without and within. Faith could be sustained, apparently, only through ignorance.

Cardinal O'Connell chose from the many modes of Catholicism the most repressive and militant of strains, one which drove many of the best and brightest of young Irish Catholics away from their smug and stifling church. In his balanced assessment, James T. O'Toole credits Cardinal O'Connell with transforming Irish Americans' "preoccupation with discrimination, both real and perceived, from the whine of self-pity into the confidence of self-assertion," but O'Connell tolerated no self-assertion against *his* will. Cardinal O'Connell, O'Toole adds, oversaw the transformation "from ghetto Catholicism, fearful of nativist hostility, to public Catholicism, eager to compete on equal terms in American society and to succeed," yet he would have his followers enter the wider world with narrow minds and closed hearts.¹⁸ At the end of the day, William Henry O'Connell excused his own immorality and confused his own self-image with reality and demanded that his followers worship that carefully created image. Now that image is shattered.

James Michael Curley. Though fortunes slipped through his quick hands and he lived — in his twenty-one-room neo-Georgian mansion (with the famous shamrocks

cut into the shutters) and on his many trips abroad — in the lavish style of William Henry Cardinal O’Connell or Joseph P. Kennedy, Curley (having served four terms as mayor of Boston) called himself the Mayor of the Poor; most of his Irish-American constituents accepted this self-serving, but still plausible, self-image. However, many other Bostonians, ranging from the outraged Yankee Brahmins to the embarrassed middle-class Irish, with equal justification called Curley a crook (a man who served two jail terms) and a damn liar (a man who undercut his own rhetorical reaches with a wink of irony and complicity). Perhaps, take him for all and all, both designations were true. Whatever he was, he was never just plain Jim (*certainly* never a folksy Jimmy) Curley.

On the other hand, John F. Kennedy was Jack until he was transmogrified through assassination. Now, in a demythifying biography by Nigel Hamilton, *JFK: Reckless Youth*, Kennedy again becomes Jack; even more, Hamilton transforms this charming and sexually adventurous young man into “Don John,” the name the young Kennedy sometimes ironically used in signing his high-spirited letters to friends.¹⁹

However, only his full name affirmed James Michael Curley: his dignity, his bravura, his pretention. He would be James Michael Curley just as Henry Cabot Lodge — Brahmin archenemy of the Boston Irish, U.S. senator, and advocate of immigration restrictions — was Henry Cabot Lodge. In Boston they used to say that the Cabots spoke only to the Lodges, perhaps a characteristic example of hub-of-the-universe hyperbole. However, it is certainly fair to say that neither the Cabots nor the Lodges spoke well of Curley, the Kennedys, or their kind.

John F. (“Honey Fitz”) Fitzgerald, grandfather of the future president, loved to tell the story of his encounter in 1897, when Fitzgerald was a member of the U.S. House and an advocate of an open immigration policy, with Senator Lodge, who was even then pushing for immigration restriction, for Lodge believed that “the lowering of a great race means not only its decline but that of civilization.”

“You are an impudent young man,” Lodge said to Fitzgerald. “Do you think the Jews or the Italians have any right in this country?”

“As much right as your father or mine,” replied Fitzgerald. “It was only a difference of a few ships.”²⁰

In Boston, of course, those “few ships” made all the difference.

“James Michael Curley and Henry Cabot Lodge: the names bracket the duality of Massachusetts’ polarized political culture,” writes Jack Beatty in his splendid and spirited study of Curley, *The Rascal King*.²¹ Each man personified his group in the passion-play conflicts between Yankee and Celt that held Boston in thrall for more than a century.²² Each man, playing the green card, sought his own political advantage by denouncing the other, thus affirming a close tribal relationship of necessary antagonism.

The Great Famine of Ireland during the 1840s began what Henry James once described as “the tide of foreign immigration,” which, at the time, “had scarcely begun to break upon the rural strongholds of the New England race; it had at most begun to splash them with the salt Hibernian Spray.”²³ The intruding Irish tidal wave, which sent the Brahmins into retreat onto the high and dry ground of Beacon Hill or into the Back Bay, the swampy new landfill along the Charles River, or out of Boston entirely, declined in the 1920s — after a Lodge-inspired literacy law was

passed in 1917 and Immigration acts were passed in 1921 and 1924 — and finally spent itself during Boston's "busing" crisis of the mid-1970s. Then Irish Americans were pitted against each other and against black Bostonians in a conflict which, it is now clear, was, paradoxically, the last moment of the Boston Irish community's cultural isolation.

Boston's current mayor, Raymond Flynn, opposed court-ordered integration of the city's public schools in the mid-1970s, when he was a Massachusetts representative; at the time he said, "The sacred principles on which this nation was founded are threatened by a new tyranny, a tyranny dressed in judicial robes."²⁴ However, as mayor of the city, Flynn, a South Boston Irish American, has worked diligently to end segregation in all areas of the city.

It is not Curley — a one-term governor of the commonwealth, who liked to be addressed as Governor when he was not running for office as Mayor of the Poor — but John F. Kennedy who stands, frozen forever in midstride, preserved in a heroic statue, near the equally exalted statue of Henry Cabot Lodge, on the front lawn of the Massachusetts State House. Lodge and Kennedy, not Curley, loom over Boston, the city on a hill. Indeed, Curley has had *two* statues erected in his memory, works more fittingly located *behind* Boston's new City Hall, but it is Kennedy who has displaced Curley in the popular imagination as the primary Irish-American representative man. Though the Kennedy style, as much British as Bostonian, as Hamilton and Garry Wills have pointed out, was not noticeably Irish American (fedoras, cigars, bombast, winks, nudges, and glad hands), John F. Kennedy did embody his tribe's apotheosis.

Kennedy's election in 1960 released Irish immigrants and their descendants from a century of second-class citizenry, psychic inferiority, and compensatory aggressiveness in America, particularly in Boston, the "next parish" to the west of Ireland. The American Irish had had their hopes raised in the presidential campaign of 1928, but Tammany-produced Al Smith was defeated by Herbert Hoover and those great expectations for tribal recognition through political ascendancy had to wait for another generation, which produced an Irish-American politician in a more eclectic and gracious style.

"John F. Kennedy's presidency symbolized the Irish-American success story," notes Lawrence J. McCaffrey in his stately volume, a summing up of a long career of distinguished scholarship on Irish and Irish-American history and culture, *Textures of Irish America*.²⁵ Then, after a thousand days of Irish-American ascendancy, things fell apart. Kennedy's assassination in 1963 confirmed Irish Americans' tragic and sentimental visions of life. The coalition of voters put together for Kennedy's slim victory and held together by Robert F. Kennedy until his assassination in 1968 broke up. Many Irish Americans consoled themselves by voting Republican in succeeding elections. At least Ronald Reagan at times *acted* the part of the Irish-American president, as when he drank beer in a Dorchester pub while visiting Boston, and President Reagan spoke for a white suburban majority, a category in which Irish Americans finally felt themselves accepted, though perhaps at the cost of connection with their true history of oppression and faith in a nurturing government.

Kennedy went from Boston's suburbs to the White House; in his funeral procession from the White House to Arlington National Cemetery, he passed into legend and became his admirers. Now, however, Kennedy has become the subject of lurid revelations, ranging from Mafia molls and murderers to Marilyn Monroe seductions

and betrayals. "Has the actual as well as the literary Irish-American trek from ghetto to suburbs been a passage from someplace to no place?" asks McCaffrey.²⁶ The exemplary lives of William Henry Cardinal O'Connell, James Michael Curley, and John F. Kennedy, the three most influential Boston Irishmen in the twentieth century, hint at a complex answer to McCaffrey's well-posed question about the significance of the rise and dispersal of the Irish in America.

The Kennedy, Curley, and Lodge families have had a long history of strain and occasional cooperation that reveals the tense but enduring relations between Yankees and Celts — a veritable "Boston marriage" of grudging, half-loving protagonists. John Fitzgerald was inspired as a boy by a glimpse inside the Beacon Hill home of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. A newsboy invited in out of the cold by an Irish servant employed by Lodge, Fitzgerald was shown the opulent children's playroom at 31 Beacon Street; there he realized his life's mission, according to Doris Kearns Goodwin in *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys*. "I stood in the doorway," recalled Fitzgerald, "and made a promise to myself that someday, when I had children of my own, I would be in a position to give them all the toys that these children of privilege had enjoyed."²⁷ Thus would the Fitzgerald and Kennedy children surely receive, for better and for worse, what young Fitzgerald, while still a child himself, promised them.

Fitzgerald, rising rapidly from Boston's North End Irish ward, gained the family's first foothold on power and prestige through his election — despite the opposition of the future president's other grandfather, Patrick Kennedy, boss of Ward 2 — to public offices: Fitzgerald became a three-term congressman and a two-term mayor of Boston. Politics was indeed the way up, though the climb was harsh and narrow. As in the Catholic church for Cardinal O'Connell, in politics the Fitzgeralds, the Kennedys, and Curley learned that men did what they had to do to get where they got; they and their families also paid the price for their consuming ambitions.

James Michael Curley intimidated Honey Fitz from running for mayor of Boston in 1914 by threatening public revelation of the mayor's flirtation with one Elizabeth ("Toodles") Ryan. Fitzgerald was unwilling to pay the price of public exposure, so he was never again elected to any office. This would not be the last time sex and politics would work at cross-purposes in the Fitzgerald-Kennedy line. Nor would Curley's affront to their family be soon forgotten.

Curley suffered his worst miseries in *his* private life, losing his first wife and four of his children to death; he once speculated, in a rare moment of introspection, that people were punished in *this* world for their crimes.²⁸ Perhaps Curley's brooding is merely an example of Irish-Catholic Jansenism, a strain enforced by New England Puritanism, but the much-afflicted Kennedy family must also have wondered what they had done to deserve the miseries inflicted on them.

In 1916, Fitzgerald challenged and came close to unseating Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Then, in 1936, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the senator's grandson, beat Curley in *his* bid for the Senate. In 1942, Fitzgerald, though then age seventy-nine, decided to take on Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., in a race for the Senate, but Fitzgerald lost to Joseph Casey in the Democratic primaries.

In 1946, John F. Kennedy replaced Curley in the U.S. House of Representatives. Curley had abandoned his House seat after he became mayor in 1945, an election he

won with the financial support of Joseph P. Kennedy (who did not mind helping the enemy of his father-in-law if it advantaged his children), who paid off Curley (his debts and his campaign funds) to clear the House seat for his son Jack. Finally, John F. Kennedy beat Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., in a race for the Senate seat in 1952. Thus Kennedy triumphed over the Lodge family in revenge for the defeats of his grandfather and the denigration of his tribe. Such, such are the joys of public service!

In the summer of 1947, over a hundred members of the U.S. House signed a petition requesting President Harry Truman to grant "executive clemency" to Curley, who was then serving time in prison for mail fraud. Representative Kennedy, however, refused to sign, though he was urged to do so by his father. Again, John *Fitzgerald* Kennedy exacted his family's vengeance on the man who had humiliated his grandfather Honey Fitz.²⁹ If all politics is local, in the famous phrase of Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill — who, for thirty-two years, occupied the U.S. House seat previously held by Curley and John Kennedy, the same seat that would be occupied after O'Neill by Joseph P. Kennedy, the son of Robert Kennedy — then Boston politics is a muddy turf-war battle for survival of the fittest: inter- and intratribal strife. Vengeance and spite, coated in blarney and bombast, supply the music and lyrics for the operetta of Boston politics — no stage for the deferential or the pure of heart.

James Michael Curley was, whatever else we might say about him, a fierce battler, a man well suited to his environment. (As was Cardinal O'Connell. As was financier Kennedy.) Curley was pugnacious, a Mick who would not tug at his forelock before his "betters." Commentators, like Hamilton, who underplay the desperation of Irish Americans — a people who went from persecution by the English and the Anglo-Irish in Ireland to exploitation and patronization by the Brahmins and Yankees in Boston — blame the Boston Irish for their aggressiveness; other commentators, like Beatty, who better understand the social and psychological consequences of this pattern of humiliation (their "cosmic insecurity"), count the costs to the Irish Americans for their piety in the service of an oppressive church and their devotion to unworthy political leaders.³⁰ "Curley was good with his fists," notes Beatty, who details the mayor's various aggressions, round by round.³¹

William H. O'Connell, James M. Curley, and Joseph P. Kennedy, in the fields of religion, politics, and finance, represent the leaders of the first generation of Irish Americans to have the opportunity to seize power. "The child of the immigrant is called to fill the place" of leadership in society, proclaimed O'Connell, "and that responsibility demanded no timidity, no retiring modesty," adds O'Toole.³² Arrogance, boldness, and a loose construction of legal and moral boundaries were the only means to power and, paradoxically, respectability.

In the quintessential Curley story, the perennial campaigner, running for mayor, interrupted his prayer — "Give us this day our daily bread and forgive us our trespassers [*sic*]" — in an address, before a rally in front of Saint Augustine's Church in South Boston, with a shouted warning to an aide who was standing in a crowd near his open car — "Get that sonuvabitch, he's stealing my coat!"; then, assured of his coat's safety, Curley continued with his prayer — "as we forgive those who trespass against us."³³ Curley assaulted his enemies, real and imagined, with combative words, complicitous humor, and occasional violent deeds. He even knocked one of his own sons to the floor for addressing his father overfamiliarly as Dad.

Curley was not a nice man; indeed, had he shown inclinations to decency or susceptibility to intimidation, as did Honey Fitz, Curley would not have got where he got. (Cardinal O'Connell and Joseph P. Kennedy were Curley's counterparts in ruthlessness, but O'Connell, a devoted *Roman* Catholic, and Kennedy, "the founding father" of a political dynasty, lived for some ideal beyond their own fulfillment, while Curley, despite his impulses to improve the lot of the Boston poor, seemed primarily obsessed with the next election.) What, then, do we make of those who had little choice but to seize their opportunities? Nigel Hamilton excoriates Joseph P. Kennedy for his social and moral transgressions; O'Toole balances compassion with judgment in his life of O'Connell, while Beatty presents a complex portrait of James Michael Curley as a man for whom commitments to his own personal advantage and to the betterment of his people were uneasily joined.

Beatty follows the lead of William Shannon in *The American Irish*: Shannon's Curley "was the idol of a cult, arbiter of a social clique, and spokesman for a state of mind." Shannon is right in suggesting that Curley, through his lifelong lust for office and his many victories, vicariously fulfilled the need of the Boston Irish for recognition and vengeance.³⁴ "Vengeful in victory, Curley was vindictive in defeat."³⁵ But Curley was more, as Beatty notes, than this. "Curley built his public life on two contradictory props: his ability to express powerful collective rancors and his capacity to care, 'even for people who really didn't deserve it,' as his son Francis put it."³⁶ Curley's own betterment, then, was inextricably mixed with the betterment of his own kind.

James Michael Curley spoke to and for the Boston Irish at a time when they needed him to give them an encouraging word and a helping hand, while they, in turn, winked at Curley's lies and ignored the graft he was grabbing up with his other hand. In *Man of the House*, Tip O'Neill recalls the time when he, then a young congressman, and Curley, then out of office, volunteered to raise money for poor families at Christmas by collecting contributions to the *Boston Post* Santa at a Boston street corner. O'Neill was surprised to see Curley passing *out* money to those in need as fast as O'Neill was taking it in!

O'Neill put the best construction on Curley's action — "When you saw the people he was helping, who could argue?" — and, like most Bostonians of his generation, O'Neill forgave Curley his trespasses.³⁷ Curley articulated one strain of Boston Irish values (Catholic, provincial, combative) and stated his people's grievances against the patronizing and prejudiced Yankee Brahmins, whose city the Irish had taken over. As did James M. O'Toole in his life of O'Connell, Jack Beatty, in writing a first-rate life of Curley nearly half a century after his last defeat, speaks to and for the American Irish community — and well beyond it to anyone interested in American ethnic politics — as we look back in anger, awe, and compassion at the world of our fathers, a world so dominated, for better and for worse, by the likes of Himself: James Michael Curley.

Like O'Toole on Cardinal O'Connell, and Hamilton on John F. Kennedy, Beatty presents a revised version of Curley. Joseph Dinneen's *The Purple Shamrock* (1949) was an effort to see Curley as "a creation of a curious society known as 'The Boston Irish,' as distinguished from all other Irish."³⁸ Curley cleverly embraced Dinneen's book and, by so doing, muted its mild criticism. Edwin O'Connor's vastly popular novel, *The Last Hurrah* (1956), drew heavily and selectively on the Curley legend for the creation of Frank Skeffington, the "tribal chieftain" of the redbrick city that

was unmistakably Boston. O'Connor, following the example of Dinneen and using in his novel a somewhat detached observer of Skeffington's final campaign to serve as the audience's go-between, utilized the Curley legend to reconcile America to the strange ways of the Boston Irish, much as John P. Marquand had done for the Boston Brahmins in his novel *The Late George Apley* (1937). (Boston, with its nurtured sense of the past and its quaint ethnic dramas, thus became something of a curiosity for the rest of rootless, increasingly homogenized America.)³⁹ As Marquand had lovingly patronized the Brahmins, O'Connor sentimentalized the Boston Irish. (John Ford's 1958 film version of *The Last Hurrah*, starring the irresistible and brilliant Spencer Tracy as Skeffington, was even more corny, making the mayor into a patriarchal Robin Hood.) Curley's campaign slogan was "He did it for a friend!" — alluding to his conviction for taking a civil service exam for an illiterate constituent — but Curley, as they say on the streets of Boston, did all right for himself as well — as his magnificent house on the Jamaicaaway, built from contractors' kickbacks and maintained by siphoned-off campaign funds (stuffed into two safes) and other shady sources, clearly demonstrates.

All of this was muted in Curley's autobiography, ghostwritten by John Henry Cutler, *I'd Do It Again* (1957), a book rushed into print to take advantage of the good feelings for Curley that had been stirred by O'Connor's novel. The Curley-Cutler book is full of self-serving blarney, but here and there, cutting through the intentionally inflated rhetoric and the pseudo-learned allusions, we can hear the true voice of the inner man, aggressive and arrogant, as when he declared, "I have been handed the hot end of the poker since memory runneth not to the contrary, to borrow a phrase from Daniel Webster, who was no less pilloried in his day than I was in mine."⁴⁰

Edward R. F. Sheehan added a qualifying note to the Curley legend in his novel, *The Governor* (1970), portraying him as a "tribal hero who squandered old scores, a crippled warrior egging on an amused mob of shanty Irish in the sacking of the Yankee Troy."⁴¹ The Curley portrayed in James Carroll's popular novel *Mortal Friends* (1976), is a master manipulator but also a culturally impoverished and ethnically defensive man. Thus fiction writers helped clear the air for a fresh, unsentimental look at James Michael Curley.

In addition to all the books and films on Curley, the oral tradition of stories about Himself have been thick in the air of Boston for decades. Indeed, Jack Beatty, as did I, grew up hearing descriptions of the former mayor as a grand man, a delightful rogue. (If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then Curley is much flattered to this day, for William F. Bulger, Massachusetts Senate president, imitates (parodies?) Curley's orotund intonations at Bulger's Saint Patrick's Day annual breakfast gathering, and Governor William Weld, though a Republican who is devoted to minimizing government's role, in a whimsical gesture has Curley's portrait hanging in the governor's office.)

So Beatty had to go a long way around the broad fields of Boston blarney to see James Michael Curley steadily and see him whole. Though, as Beatty winningly admits, elements of Curley's complex character still remain mysterious — why, for example, did he hold the love and devotion of the two women who married him and stood by him? — *The Rascal King* sets the record straight and presents Curley as a man whose likes we will not see again.

If, as Scott Fitzgerald said, “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function,” Beatty’s book functions beautifully as a presentation of the divided character of James Michael Curley.⁴² He exploited the angers of the Boston Irish, thus further polarizing his people in this already divided city, but then he helped them by building hospitals, schools, roads, bathhouses, and public housing projects — at the same time he was lining his own pockets with kickbacks! He spoke eloquently, in the high-blown fashion of the day, but he added his own turn and counterturn of humor. As Curley admitted near the end of his life, his ability to speak was “the most important thing — without it there wouldn’t have been a career — there would have been nothing.”⁴³

He moved and impressed crowds (particularly Irish-American crowds, for whom he gave voice) and he mocked his enemies. At best, Curley created a vision of the world in which the Mayor of the Poor fought the good fight against agencies of evil and oppression. At worst, he was a self-serving manipulator whose words served as a smoke screen to obscure his selfish end. Perhaps, like Cardinal O’Connell, Curley never stopped long enough to figure out the difference, for both men presumed that what was good for them was good for their devoted people.

Curley was a man of mixed, unresolved character. “The mayor who was famous for winking after making a moving speech mirrored life in its hopelessly alloyed state.”⁴⁴ Yet he was an unreflective man who took his moral instructions from the Catholic church without question. (In any case, it would not have been politic to cross Cardinal O’Connell!) Curley was a speaker first, a reader only for pleasure and for cultivation. His rhetoric was shot full of mock-heroic intonations and exaggerations (traits mimed beautifully by Edwin O’Connor in his novel), a style designed to grieve his enemies and to amuse his friends. Curley, agreeing with O’Connell, insisted that “the Puritan is passed; the Anglo-Saxon is a joke; a newer and better America is here,” with the arrival of the Irish! While O’Connell had to maintain the dignity of his office, Curley could indulge in low mockery. “What we need in this part of the world is men and mothers of men, not gabbing spinsters and dog-raising matrons in federated assembly.”⁴⁵

Curley was an extravagant rhetorician, yet he was also a prissy man, big on decorum, who once ordered Babe Ruth from his table for saying “bullshit” in front of Curley’s family. Ultimately, Curley was a loner, a majority of one. “James. M. Curley was not a party man. He was a James M. Curley man.”⁴⁶ He was an “urban populist” who learned to thrive in the smothering environment — bounded by Cardinal O’Connell’s hierarchical Catholicism on the one hand and Brahmin discrimination on the other — of Boston. William Shannon saw Curley as “a self-crippled giant on a provincial stage,” but Beatty adds a necessary qualification to Shannon’s indictment: “On that stage he *was* a giant.”⁴⁷

Beatty’s bountiful book gives detailed accounts of Curley’s involvement in election after election — ultimately a tedious litany that forces the reader to ask the point of all this striving. Frederick W. Mansfield, who ran against Curley in the mayoral election of 1930, asked in his campaign slogan, HASN’T CURLEY HAD ENOUGH?⁴⁸ The answer was clearly *NO*! Such hungers that gnawed at Curley and his kind could not be easily assuaged. George Washington Plunkitt, Tammany pol, had as his motto, He Seen His Opportunities, and He Took ’Em.⁴⁹ So, too, did James Michael Curley see and take. Given the opportunity, he’d do it again, and again . . .

Like Lyndon Johnson in our own time, James Michael Curley was a man ever on the move, his actions unchecked by fear, self-doubt, or conscience. "I have never been afraid to make the bold move," said Curley late in life — a fair-enough self-assessment. "I think that is why my life has been such an adventure."⁵⁰ Indeed, Curley's life was one of the great adventures in American political history, though his obsession with elections illustrates his spiritual narrowness and the unslaked neediness of the addict. He was his own first constituent and beneficiary. "Nobody is through with politics who has ever tasted it," he revealingly said.⁵¹ Furthermore, politics was the best way to achieve identity and acknowledgment for the Irish in America.

In *JFK: Reckless Youth*, the first of his projected three-volume biographical study of John F. Kennedy, Nigel Hamilton creates a dramatic revisionist myth of a divided hero that will serve as a controversial reference point for discussion of the former president — in the manner of Robert Caro's biography of Lyndon Johnson — for some time to come. (However, unlike Caro, who loathes LBJ, Hamilton views JFK as a hero.) No longer the brightest son of a large and loving family, Jack Kennedy, in Hamilton's reconstructive case history, is "nothing less than an abused child," in the words of Roger Morris, whose enthusiastic review in *The New York Times Book Review*, served, as did many other rave reviews, as an uncritical stamp of approval of Hamilton's thesis.⁵²

No longer the mere child of privilege, Jack Kennedy is now presented as the damaged product of what Hamilton calls the "almost psychotic drama" between, in Morris's admiring summary, JFK's monstrous parents — "these instantly decadent parvenus, the 'dotty mother' and the lecherous father who 'could not resist the temptation to manipulate his own emotionally deprived children.'"⁵³ That is, John F. Kennedy has now been reimagined by a British biographer (the official chronicler of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery) who has researched his subject with un-discriminating diligence and has, at times, recklessly recast JFK's life; Hamilton's reading is influenced by psychological models derived from the currently fashionable notion that all the most interesting people are survivors of dysfunctional families — abused children in recovery.

Hamilton's JFK is a flawed hero, and heroes, by definition, overcome obstacles; therefore, Hamilton insists that the first and greatest obstacles in young Jack's struggle to fulfill his destiny were set by his cold mother and his overbearing father. In Hamilton's romantic, revisionist myth, JFK was destined to pull the sword from the stone, but he did it on his own.

The surviving members of the Rose and Joseph P. Kennedy family — Jean Kennedy Smith, Eunice Kennedy Shriver, Patricia Kennedy Lawford, and Edward M. Kennedy — took strong exception to Hamilton's portrayal of their parents in a letter to *The New York Times*. All the Kennedy children, they insist, owe their successes to their parents, despite what Hamilton says.

The book's repeated allegations of abusive family relations are outrageous falsehoods. It is grotesque to compare our father to Stalin. It is preposterous to call any of us "abused" children. Our parents gave us love, support and encouragement throughout their lives. Contrary to the malicious portrayal in this book, they were devoted and caring parents who lavished affection on all of us.⁵⁴

Hamilton, for his part, has accused the Kennedy family of caring more for public relations than for "history."⁵⁵

Certainly Hamilton is correct in insisting that the private papers relating to JFK, particularly those letters which remain in the control of the Kennedy family, should be made available to historians. Hamilton's biography offers ample evidence that the more we learn of JFK, particularly from his own words — after he worked past the style of adolescent smuttiness evident in his letters, he was a compelling writer — the more we are impressed by him. Jack Kennedy shines like a bright light in his family, in his community, and in his age. The Kennedy family's understandable desire to protect the memory of their slain brother should not obscure the true life, public and private, of JFK, a figure who belongs to all Americans.

On the other hand, Hamilton's charge that a Washington lawyer was "ordered by the Kennedy family to put pressure on the author to amend his portrait" omits the fact that Hamilton, in turn, tried to put his own counterpressure on the Kennedy family by promising that he would reconsider his findings (if the letters so warranted) if the Kennedy family granted him permission to examine sealed letters from JFK.⁵⁶ Hamilton can hardly be as surprised as he affects to be that the Kennedy family is not eager to help him after the portrayal, in *JFK: Reckless Youth*, of their parents as monsters! As the surviving children of Rose and Joe put it, "Any so-called biography that tries to take our parents from us, that gets this basic fact about our family wrong, is not worth the paper it is printed on."⁵⁷

One of the problems Hamilton faced in making his case is that Jack, a loving son, always spoke respectfully, though occasionally ironically, about his father, and Jack showed, at worst, minor annoyances with his proper and pious mother. At his inauguration, as his limousine passed the reviewing platform, JFK stood up and saluted his father; Joseph P. Kennedy, in turn, stood up and saluted his son, the president. Film of this scene served as a dramatic high point of the recent Public Broadcasting documentary on the Kennedys. Was this salute by JFK an expression of affection and respect for his father? "No," said Hamilton in a television interview with Christopher Lydon; such a reading of the incident, Hamilton insists, derives from the more "sentimental" construction of JFK's life shaped by Doris Kearns Goodwin in *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys*. Hamilton believes that JFK pitied his father, but offers little supporting evidence, and Hamilton has, of course, no way of knowing *what* was in JFK's mind when he saluted his father.⁵⁸

Goodwin's John F. Kennedy emerges from a tightly knit, supportive family and a rich world of Irish-American culture, overlaid by the finest schools and best social connections his mother's drive for acceptance and his father's money and influence could buy. That is, her JFK is the product of the forces, familial and cultural, that shaped him, while Hamilton's JFK is, like the lone wolf of folk legends or the ugly duckling of fairy tales, someone who composes himself anew by going against the grain of the Kennedy family and the Boston Irish.

In passing, Hamilton also grants his approval to Kathleen ("Kick") Kennedy, JFK's sister, who set herself against her family's wishes and her cultural tradition by marrying a titled Englishman who was, of course, a member of the Church of England. Hamilton reveals his own cultural prejudices when he discusses Rose Kennedy's futile efforts to deflect Kathleen's interests away from courting English gentlemen. "How Rose Kennedy could imagine that Kathleen, after exposure to such an array of suitors in a Protestant country, would dutifully settle for a Roman

Catholic defies ordinary understanding.”⁵⁹ In Hamilton’s “ordinary understanding,” the attractions of his sceptered isle are, despite competing claims of religious and family loyalties, self-evident. Robert Frost told President Kennedy in 1961 to “be more Irish than Harvard.”⁶⁰ Clearly, Nigel Hamilton admires only those Kennedys who he imagines were more British than Irish.

Hamilton’s JFK is a mixed man, a hero-in-the-making who attempted but who did not wholly succeed in reinventing himself by distancing himself from the destructive element of Kennedy family life and values. It is as though Eugene O’Neill’s *Long Day’s Journey into Night* — a work which centered upon another well-off, isolated, and troubled New England, Irish-American family — had become the informing parable of the Kennedy saga. Joseph P. Kennedy assumes the role of domineering James Tyrone (actor, land-hungry skinflint); Rose takes on the part of the detached Mary Tyrone (addictive, devout Catholic, socially pretentious); the eldest Kennedy boys resemble the doomed Tyrone sons: Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., the self-destructive James Tyrone and JFK the sickly but brilliant Edmund Tyrone. Hamilton’s Kennedys are every bit as much a compositional construct as O’Neill’s Tyrones.

However, Hamilton might have learned some humanizing and qualifying ambiguity by thinking more deeply about the Kennedys in relation to O’Neill’s Tyrones. Both the Kennedys and the Tyrones (who were based on the O’Neills) were Irish-American strangers in a strange and hostile land — introverted families who were desperate for success and recognition. Both families were shaped by strong fathers who did questionable things because they were determined to make a new life for themselves and their families. “What the hell was it I wanted to buy, I wonder, that was worth . . .” asked James Tyrone, in a moment of self-realization in O’Neill’s play.⁶¹ (Did Honey Fitz ever wonder at the cost of those “toys” for his descendants or did Joseph P. Kennedy ever ask himself what the hell it was *he* wanted to buy?) O’Neill here reveals the destructive element in Irish-American ambition, but he also presents the domineering father figure, as well as the pious mother figure, in a compassionate light, as the products of forces beyond their comprehension. The play reaches for mercy rather than judgment. Hamilton’s portrayal of the Kennedy elders, however, makes little effort to understand (and thus to sympathize with) the social and psychological forces that made Rose and Joe what they were. Rather, Hamilton levels charges, labels the Kennedy parents, and makes them serve as mere obstacles to the growth of their potentially heroic son.

Hamilton’s Rose Kennedy alternately beat her children with wooden coat hangers and withdrew inside a cocoon of Catholicism. He neglects to mention that parents in her day — long before Dr. Spock encouraged tenderness in child rearing — were urged by the best authorities to impose discipline upon their children, for their own good. Hamilton also blames Rose for limiting her children’s access to certain films.⁶² Should he not, rather, praise her for so concerning herself with her children’s moral education? Hamilton also sees Rose’s Catholicism as her defense mechanism, not as her sincere expression of faith, though Goodwin has chronicled Rose’s stay in convents, her election as a Child of Mary, and her sincere devotion to God. For Hamilton, however, Rose was only “a pathetic figure” who hid her pain and social ambition behind a dedicated Catholicism and a lust for jewelry.⁶³ Presumptuously, Hamilton describes Rose, on her way to her son’s funeral in 1963, as “having flown to Washington with thoughts only of what she would wear at the funeral and bringing extra stockings for her daughters.”⁶⁴ How he can claim he knows Rose Kennedy’s

“only” thoughts is not explained, nor is her alleged concern for her own and her daughters’ attire seen in a compassionate light — Rose’s way of focusing attention on manageable details as a way to get through a staggering experience. Rose Kennedy, like Joseph P. Kennedy, is damned if she did and damned if she didn’t, in Hamilton’s blunt eyes.

Hamilton is curiously much easier on the “old-fashioned” grandfather, Honey Fitz — though he prevented his daughter from attending Wellesley (her life’s greatest disappointment, she later told Goodwin), tried to block her marriage to Joe, and then made her return to a loveless marriage — than he is on Joseph P. Kennedy.⁶⁵

Hamilton’s Joseph P. Kennedy was often away from home, obsessed with making money, seducing women, and gaining political recognition; when he was home he drove his children mercilessly to compete and to succeed. Between them, the Kennedy parents, in Hamilton’s eyes, were little better than prison guards in a gulag — the Kennedy “compound.” As Elizabeth Hardwick put it, in a mixed review of Hamilton’s book, “We are not to settle for the Kennedy men as driven by caprice and will, but as formed by a conjunction of parental and maternal infirmity — a sort of Mendelian double dose.”⁶⁶

Garry Wills, in *The Kennedy Imprisonment*, offered his version of a family trapped by a dream of success that became a nightmare: the sins of the founding father devolving onto his children. “Joseph Kennedy, a man of strong will and low tastes, passed on both traits to his son. . . . It is difficult to become an American prince.”⁶⁷ Doris Kearns Goodwin, in *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys*, portrayed these Kennedy children as “natives of the Kennedy family, first and foremost, before any city or any country.”⁶⁸ However, no previous biographer has imagined a Kennedy family so driven, so isolated, so riven, and so deranged as has Hamilton. The Kennedys presented themselves as an ideal family — as illustrated in the many photographs in which the parents and children appear as handsome, smiling, affluent, and close — but Hamilton offers a reverse image of these photographs: what once was white, the picture of sweetness and light, now is as black as night. Indeed, Hamilton’s gothic portrait of the Kennedy family derangement strains credibility.

In order to build JFK into a complex, “rounded” character, Hamilton makes the elder Kennedys — Joseph P. Kennedy, Rose Kennedy, and even Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. — into callous, cold manipulators of the first order. Hamilton’s portraits of these characters descend into caricatures and his reach after psychological explanation exceeds his grasp. However, for all that, Hamilton’s portrait of JFK has value, for young Jack turns out to be a man of greater substance than most of us had previously imagined. Hamilton has conducted thorough research into the Kennedy papers, particularly into JFK’s own writings: his journalism, diaries, and letters — though Hamilton has not received access to sections of JFK’s papers still under the control of the Kennedy family.

Hamilton has conducted exhaustive interviews of those who knew JFK and has included commentaries which, though often redundant and trivial, do expand and enrich JFK’s character. Hamilton relies particularly on young Jack’s letters to his schoolmate K. LeMoyné (“Lem”) Billings and Jack’s lover, Inga Arvad (implausibly cast by Hamilton in the role of mother substitute). Other casual acquaintances of JFK get prominent treatment when their testimony bolsters Hamilton’s case. Henry James, a friend from Stanford, for example, stresses JFK’s lust to conquer women. Former British tennis star Kay Stammers is included because she said that JFK was “spoiled

by women. I think he could snap his fingers and they'd come running. And of course, he was terribly attractive and rich and unmarried — a terrific catch really. . . . I thought he was divine." Another lover asked him if he had ever been in love. "No," he replied, then smiled and added, "though I've been *very* interested."⁶⁹ Movie star Gene Tierney was stunned by Jack's eyes. All of this is trivial chat, of course, though it also lays the groundwork for Hamilton's case — which will no doubt be fully documented in succeeding volumes — of JFK's destructive addiction to sexuality.

However, the ample record of young JFK's interests and achievements assembled by Hamilton calls into question the accuracy of Hamilton's accusatory title, *JFK: Reckless Youth*. "Young Kennedy," as JFK ironically signed himself in a letter to a friend in the midst of World War II, turns out to have been, despite his near constant illnesses and pains, an immensely attractive figure. He was indeed charming, to men as well as to women, intelligent, and handsome.

As well as being one of the children of the famous financier and ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy (son of ward boss Patrick Kennedy) and his wife, Rose (daughter of mayor Honey Fitz), JFK quickly became famous in his own right by publishing a best-selling book, *Why England Slept*, in 1940, and by becoming a war hero in 1943: the *PT 109* commander who, after being rammed by a Japanese destroyer, risked his life to save his crew. Indeed, by the time he was only twenty-eight, JFK had traveled the world — from Hitler's Germany in 1939 to the UN conference in San Francisco in 1945 — and had arrived at a stoic vision that he could express in an elegant, laconic prose style which shows grace under pressure, as he does in a 1943 letter from the South Pacific, in which he reports on the ramming of his boat but understates his own heroism.

We have been having a difficult time for the last two months — lost our boat about a month ago when a Jap can cut us in two & lost some of our boys. We had a bad time for a week on a Jap island — but finally got picked up — and have got another boat.⁷⁰

Certainly neither in this testing incident nor in his measured response to it can JFK be justly called "reckless." Thus Hamilton deserves praise for presenting, with clarity and drama, telling scenes from his subject's life, but Hamilton also leaves himself open to criticism when he exaggerates his conclusions to suit his insistent thesis. ✓

Hamilton makes his theme clear immediately, when he opens his book with a curious prologue, loaded and portentous, titled "The Birth of Camelot." He then credits Jacqueline Kennedy with brilliantly stage-managing JFK's funeral services on November 25, 1963; then Hamilton hints that her triumph was motivated by a tinge of vengeance. "Unable to tame her husband's rampant sexual appetite in his lifetime, she was determined to shape his memory in death." Thus, for Hamilton, stand in stark relief the issues of JFK's "sexual appetite" — the emblem of his "recklessness" — and his widow's desire to "tame" him in a death pageant. All is clarified, dramatized, simplified — Hamilton's muckraking biographical intent clearly foreshadowed. At the core of his study lies the plot of a soap opera!

As a result of JFK's assassination and Jacqueline's artfully contrived ceremony, "myths were spun that would take historians decades to defuse."⁷¹ (Why would one have to "defuse" a "spun" myth? Here and elsewhere, Hamilton's habit of hyperbole leads him to overreach the logic of his own metaphors.)⁷² These myths invite

revision, which Hamilton is ready to supply. "Perhaps it is only now, a quarter of a century since his death, that a truthful accounting can be made that is both scholarly and fresh."⁷³ Nigel Hamilton arrives to pull the sword of truth from the stone of myth surrounding the dead president! *JFK: Reckless Youth* is all of that — a massive undertaking and a "fresh" (in several senses) reading of the Kennedy family — but it is also a book that insists on a narrow and at times even a lurid thesis which stresses greed, power, and sexual obsession as the keys to interpreting the dynamics of family life and the mysteries of character.

Nigel Hamilton — in his overwrought, overwritten, and thematically reductive book — has grossly distorted the picture of young Jack's family, his Irish-American community, and his Boston. It passes my ordinary understanding to imagine that John F. Kennedy, Hamilton's hero, would be anything but appalled by such a portrayal. As am I.

In at least one interview, Hamilton revealed a defensiveness about his treatment of Joseph P. Kennedy as a moral monster and manipulator. Though "people in Irish Boston," he suggests, might suspect Hamilton's harsh portrayal as an act of revenge upon the elder Kennedy's anti-British stance while serving as U.S. ambassador to Britain in the early stages of World War II, Hamilton denies the charge, a charge that no one has made in print.⁷⁴ Having said that, I find it interesting to note that Hamilton does often identify Joseph P. Kennedy with his city of origin: he is a "Boston-Irish braggart" and a "jumped-up Boston Irish Catholic," as though these were well-known local character traits.⁷⁵ Amazingly, Hamilton claims that the Boston Irish — a people "noted for gregariousness, sentimentality, and willingness to undertake hard labor" — did not "make great entrepreneurs" just before he goes on to recount Joseph P. Kennedy's amazing entrepreneurial successes!⁷⁶

Indeed, Hamilton approaches his story with a dismissive, denigrating attitude toward the Boston Irish. On the other hand, Hamilton stands in awe of the Boston Brahmin class, noting that "these descendants of great professional, mercantile, and textile families" had produced three presidents, the nation's first public school and college and, in all, "nearly fifty universities in the Boston area."⁷⁷ It comes as no surprise, then, that Hamilton's winning JFK is more English than Irish. "His sense of fun might be Irish, but his deeper emotional coolness accorded with Anglo-Saxon society."⁷⁸ Later: "Fun was still Jack's leimotiv [*sic*], and in his increasingly English way, this meant hard work, hard play, and hard socializing."⁷⁹ Presumably Boston Irish Americans had fun in other ways, those lazy, yet jumped-up braggarts and bigots!

Hamilton's charges against the "founding father" are various and seemingly limitless.⁸⁰ He accuses Joseph P. Kennedy, then a bank president, of cowardice in avoiding service in World War I and mocks his wartime role as assistant manager of the Fore River shipbuilding yard — though Hamilton eventually grants that the elder Kennedy's work was "vital" and his was the most productive yard during the war.⁸¹ Hamilton charges that Joseph P. Kennedy was guilty in the 1920s of "financial larceny on a vast and unseen scale, manipulating share prices with other hands in secret stock pools designed specifically to hoodwink investors," though Hamilton does not claim that he did anything illegal.⁸² Nor does Hamilton discuss the business ethics of the day, which reveal Kennedy only to be better at the game of stock manipulation that many played. In any case, as Hardwick notes, "it is not altogether easy for those who have lived through the past two decades in American finance and who know of

the previous 'robber barons' and their interesting accumulations, to summon the proper moral indignation about Joe's ruthless dealings."⁸³ Hamilton's outrage at Joseph P. Kennedy seems feigned for effect, contrived for dramatic ends and thematic purposes.

Hamilton also charges that Joseph P. Kennedy "raped" Gloria Swanson in 1927, though he quotes Swanson as saying, "I had known this would happen," an admission that would suggest to others, if not to Hamilton, her complicity in the act.⁸⁴ Hamilton sees a pattern of enterprises, in which Kennedy invested himself, which "always ended in flight or ignominy," an exaggeration that ignores his many successes.⁸⁵ Hamilton's Joseph P. Kennedy was "a disappointed man" who could not curry sufficient favor with FDR or ever become president.⁸⁶ Hamilton's FDR barely tolerates Kennedy. The president "had no illusions about the Boston-Irish braggart," but Hamilton does not note, as does Beatty, that FDR, a Dutch patrician, was suspicious of *most* Irish-American politicians.⁸⁷ Hamilton — again making a damning judgment and ignoring the context of his observations — just assumes that FDR's attitude toward Joseph P. Kennedy was a fair appraisal. Hamilton then makes little of the fact that FDR *did* trust Kennedy enough to appoint him as the first chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, a job he performed admirably.

Joseph P. Kennedy's role as ambassador to the Court of St. James's is the occasion of Hamilton's greatest disapproval. There the elder Kennedy became "the arch-appeaser of the Nazis."⁸⁸ Kennedy at the time urged a policy of American isolationism, a position that elicits a frenzy of name-calling from Hamilton: the ambassador was a "sniveling defeatist."⁸⁹ But Hamilton neglects to add that isolationism was a prevalent American view until Pearl Harbor. In retrospect the issues of "The Good War" seem clear, but they did not seem so clear to most of those who lived through the late 1930s. Throughout his book, Hamilton is guilty of "presentism," a mind-set that judges the past by the values of the present.

Hamilton's thesis is so narrow that it ignores or dismisses qualifying evidence. For example, he praises young Jack for persuading his father not to oppose Lend-Lease to Britain in 1941, but Hamilton gives no credit to the elder Kennedy, who was "embittered by his fall from grace," for changing his mind. The surviving Kennedy children are correct in calling Hamilton's portrayal of their parents "grotesque."

Nigel Hamilton has renewed interest in the life of JFK, thus deflecting attention from the president's lurid death. That life was exemplary in many respects, ranging from acts of intelligence to acts of courage. Hamilton attempts to make his hero into another Jay Gatsby, one who composed himself anew, but Hamilton's own evidence shows JFK struggling with his identity as a Boston Irish Catholic. When Jack was asked to conduct Bible classes in the Navy, he wrote to his mother and asked, "Would you say that is un-Catholic?" Anticipating that her answer might be that such an activity would indeed be "un-Catholic" — not, I think, "ridiculing her bigotry," as Hamilton suggests — JFK went on:

But don't good works come under our obligations to the Catholic Church? We're not a completely ritualistic, formalistic, hierarchical structure in which the Word, the truth, must only come down from the very top — a structure that allows for no individual interpretation — or are we?⁹⁰

Here, in words of gentle persuasion to his pious mother, JFK takes exception to the Irish Catholic religious character of docile obedience, promulgated by Cardinal

O'Connell and absorbed without question by his and by most Irish-American mothers of the day, just as he would expand the style and character of the Irish-American politician, as embodied in the figures of his grandfather Honey Fitz and, most particularly, in James Michael Curley. In his own gracious and thoughtful ways, JFK was releasing himself and his fellow Irish Americans from their confining and self-defining ghettos and parishes.

These biographies of three major figures show how far Irish Americans have come — from obscure Lowell and Boston wards and parishes to a central place in the American mind. Each biographer weighs the cost of the climb upward in church and state politics and asks whether the game was worth the candle. "Today," writes McCaffrey, "the best and brightest Irish Americans are neither in the church nor in politics. Many are applying their political instincts and skills in corporate boardrooms."⁹¹

Which is another way of saying that the successes of William Henry O'Connell in the Catholic church, Joseph P. Kennedy in finance, James Michael Curley and John F. Kennedy in politics, have released their kind into mainstream America. (James M. O'Toole and Jack Beatty are Irish-American writers who now are free to cast a cold but not unsympathetic eye on their ancestors. Nigel Hamilton, unfortunately, brings a tone of British smugness toward the Irish to his study of the Kennedys.) Irish Americans have been released, as well, into schools, hospitals, labor unions, and all other aspects of American life, for the old signs that said IRISH NEED NOT APPLY have long since become collectors' items. These bold men helped make certain that the Irish *did* apply in America. ■

Notes

1. Lawrence J. McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 178.
2. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The Irish," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press and Harvard University Press, 1964), 287.
3. McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 176; James M. O'Toole, *Militant and Triumphant* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 9–10.
4. O'Toole, *Militant and Triumphant*, 59.
5. *Ibid.*, 5.
6. *Ibid.*, 88.
7. *Ibid.*, 136.
8. *Ibid.*, 127.
9. *Ibid.*, 129.
10. *Ibid.*, 86–87.
11. *Ibid.*, 45–46.
12. *Ibid.*, 79.
13. *Ibid.*, 100.
14. *Ibid.*, 103.

15. Nigel Hamilton, with far less caution, gives more credence to the charge that Joseph P. Kennedy "might have sexually abused Rosemary," his daughter. His source for this serious allegation is anonymous, identified only as a "close female friend of JFK." Nigel Hamilton, *JFK: Reckless Youth* (New York: Random House, 1992), 411, 842.
16. O'Toole, *Militant and Triumphant*, 138.
17. *Ibid.*, 247.
18. *Ibid.*, 155.
19. Hamilton, *JFK*, 155.
20. Doris Kearns Goodwin, *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys: An American Saga* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 101–102.
21. Jack Beatty, *The Rascal King: The Life and Times of James Michael Curley* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1992), 130.
22. Beatty notes that Lodge has been judged by history as a statesman, while Curley "tends to be thought of as a cross between a clown and a crook." *Ibid.*, 135.
23. Henry James, *Hawthorne* (London: Macmillan, 1967 [1879]), 95.
24. J. Anthony Lukas, *Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three American Families* (New York: Vintage, 1986), 316.
25. McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 173.
26. *Ibid.*, 176.
27. Goodwin, *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys*, 56–57.
28. Beatty, *The Rascal King*, 326.
29. Hamilton, *JFK*, 21.
30. Beatty, *The Rascal King*, 19.
31. *Ibid.*, 97.
32. O'Toole, *Militant and Triumphant*, 88.
33. Beatty, *The Rascal King*, 144–145.
34. William Shannon, *The American Irish: A Political and Social Portrait* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1989), 163; Beatty, *The Rascal King*, 501.
35. Beatty, *The Rascal King*, 434.
36. *Ibid.*, 41.
37. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., with William Novak, *Man of the House: The Life and Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip O'Neill* (New York: Random House, 1987), 29–30.
38. Joseph F. Dinneen, *The Purple Shamrock: The Hon. James Michael Curley of Boston* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949), 9.
39. Dealt with at length in Shaun O'Connell, *Imagining Boston: A Literary Landscape* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).
40. James Michael Curley, *I'd Do It Again: A Record of All My Uproarious Years* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957), 4.
41. McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 91.
42. F. Scott Fitzgerald, "The Crack-Up," in *The Crack-Up*, ed. Edmund Wilson (New York: New Directions, 1963), 69.
43. Beatty, *The Rascal King*, 58.
44. *Ibid.*, 205.

45. Ibid., 170.
46. Ibid., 248.
47. Ibid., 151–152.
48. Ibid., 264.
49. William L. Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics, Delivered by Ex-Senator George Washington Plunkitt, the Tammany Philosopher, from His Rostrum — The New York County Court House Bootblack Stand* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1963 [1905]), 6.
50. Ibid., 83.
51. Ibid., 400.
52. In his review in the *Boston Globe* (November 22, 1992, B36, B39), for example, Michael R. Beschloss, like Roger Morris in the *Times*, accepts, with minor reservations, Hamilton's biography on Hamilton's terms. However, the *Boston Globe* printed (December 13, 1992, "Focus," 75) my own op-ed page complaint about Hamilton's book, "Reckless Youth'? No, Reckless Book."
53. Roger Morris, "More Than a Rake's Progress," *New York Times Book Review*, November 22, 1992, 36.
54. Jean Kennedy Smith, Eunice Kennedy Shriver, Patricia Kennedy Lawford, and Edward M. Kennedy, "A Grotesque Portrait of Our Parents," *New York Times*, December 3, 1992, op-ed page, A-25. Martin F. Nolan, using a term coined by Benjamin C. Bradlee, calls their response "a non-denial denial," but the Kennedy children were, after all, in a position to know their parents and Hamilton has only secondhand sources on which to base his own assessment. Martin F. Nolan, "The Kennedys Attempt to Reburnish a Legend," *Boston Globe*, December 4, 1992, 1, 12.
55. From a television interview by Christopher Lydon with Nigel Hamilton, *Christopher Lydon and Company*, WGBH, Boston, December 4, 1992.
56. Hamilton's "Notes and Sources" comments cited in Nolan, "The Kennedys Attempt to Reburnish a Legend," 12. Nolan notes Hamilton's excesses in comparing Joseph P. Kennedy with Joseph Stalin, but Nolan also grants the legitimacy of Hamilton's charge that the elder Kennedy was a bigot. Hamilton's discussion of his counteroffer to the Kennedy lawyer was made at a reception on the publication of *JFK: Reckless Youth*, hosted by the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, University of Massachusetts at Boston, December 1, 1992.
57. Kennedys, "A Grotesque Portrait," A-25.
58. Lydon interview.
59. Hamilton, *JFK*, 234.
60. Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 250.
61. Eugene O'Neill, *Long Day's Journey into Night* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), 150.
62. Hamilton, *JFK*, 47.
63. Ibid., 51.
64. Ibid., xx.
65. Ibid., 649.
66. Elizabeth Hardwick, "The Kennedy Scandals," *New York Review of Books*, January 14, 1992, 7.
67. Garry Wills, *The Kennedy Imprisonment: A Meditation on Power* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 26.

68. Goodwin, *The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys*, 366.
69. *Ibid.*, 714.
70. Hamilton, *JFK*, 613.
71. *Ibid.*, xix–xxiv.
72. *JFK: Reckless Youth* also suffers from hasty or inattentive editing. The dust-jacket copy, usually approved by the author, inaccurately identifies John F. Kennedy as “America’s thirty-sixth president.” Massachusetts Republican governor Channing Cox is hilariously misidentified as “Canning Fox” on page 53. Years are miscounted by a decade on page 27. On page 492, two curiously similar sentences appear: “However, as Jack had feared, the divorce did not release her from J. Edgar Hoover’s tentacles.” “As Jack had predicted, divorce from Fejos — who was later found to be completely innocent of anything resembling un-American activity — had not brought Inga release from Hoover’s nefarious tentacles.” The reader can only wonder how the image of Hoover’s “tentacles” of the first sentence was clarified by the modifier “nefarious” in the second sentence. These and other gaffes suggest that *JFK* was driven through production to meet a commercial deadline: the anniversary of JFK’s assassination and the Christmas book-buying market.
73. Hamilton, *JFK*, xxiv.
74. Peter Kadzis, “JFK: Redefining the Legend, An Interview with Nigel Hamilton,” *Boston Phoenix*, November 20, 1992, 28.
75. Hamilton, *JFK*, 97, 103.
76. *Ibid.*, 3.
77. *Ibid.*, 4.
78. *Ibid.*, 199.
79. *Ibid.*, 258.
80. Richard Whelan, *The Founding Father* (New York: New American Library, 1964). In the same accusatory vein, see Thomas C. Reeves, *A Question of Character: The Life of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Free Press, 1991).
81. Hamilton, *JFK*, 39, 40–42.
82. *Ibid.*, 51.
83. Hardwick, “The Kennedy Scandals,” 6.
84. Hamilton, *JFK*, 65; Doris Kearns Goodwin, in a letter to the *New York Times Book Review*, convincingly refutes Hamilton’s charge that Joseph P. Kennedy “raped” Gloria Swanson. Though Hamilton used Swanson’s memoir as his source, Swanson’s description of the event “contains absolutely no suggestion, not even a hint, that she was not a willing and even delighted partner in an act of making love. ‘Since his kiss on the train, I had known this would happen,’ [Swanson] wrote. ‘And I knew as we lay there that it would go on.’” Doris Kearns Goodwin, *New York Times Book Review*, “Letters,” January 17, 1993, 34.
85. *Ibid.*, 66.
86. *Ibid.*, 98.
87. *Ibid.*, 97.
88. *Ibid.*, 218.
89. *Ibid.*, 289.
90. *Ibid.*, 493–494.
91. McCaffrey, *Textures of Irish America*, 124.

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